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ABSTRACT
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"The Magic of the Many Which Sets the World on Fire":

Boston Elites and Urban Political Insurgents During the
Early Nineteenth Century is

a

broad analysis on social

class and political culture in Boston and Massachusetts

between 1800 and 1830.

I

have consciously focused on the

political odyssey of congressman, Massachusetts legislator,
and Boston's second mayor, Josiah Quincy, to investigate
the political and cultural evolution of Boston during these

three crucial decades.

Quincy's political career—though

central to the story--is utilized as

a

narrative hook that

helps unveil the dramatic changes in the political and
social culture that Massachusetts faced in between the
first and second party systems.

During the first three decades of the nineteenth
century, Massachusetts and Boston,

in particular,

faced

dramatic period of political, cultural, and economic
transformation.

At the beginning of the century,

the

a

transformation.

At the beginning of the century, the

politics, economy, and culture of the state were controlled

almost exclusively by

a

close-knit elite which ran

roughshod over the ordinary citizenry.

By the mid-1820s

this elite faced an onslaught of serious challenges to its

hegemony in Massachusetts.

By 1823 the political arm of

the elite, the Federalist Party, was gutted by a united

lower-to-middling class electorate led by ex-Federalist and
Brahmin, Josiah Quincy;

This newly charged electorate

refused to abide by the political standards of the past,

resulting in the passing of the first party system.
This study investigates the emergence of

a

dramatically new sort of political culture while also
providing an analysis of

a

highly popular caesarist who

helped destroy the first party system in Massachusetts, but
could not survive the advent of the second.

v

PREFACE

Historians of nineteenth-century Boston have

consistently viewed the city as a static fortress of elite

conservativism

— truly

a

protected "city upon the hill."

Those interested in elite-class studies invariably turn to
Boston's patricians as a premier example of an economic,
cultural and political hegemonic class that ruled over

region with oligarchical power.

a

Only the historiography on

Southern slaveholding elites can compete in sheer volume
with the work done on Boston's "Brahmins" and their class
structure.

1

Though mostly interested in economic and/or cultural
dominance, Frederic Cople Jaher, Edward Pessen, Ronald
Story, and Betty G. Farrell among others, assert that

Boston's nineteenth-century cultural and economic elite
held sway over the politics of Massachusetts.

Established

cultural and economic institutions intertwined with the

political structures of the state, giving

unified Boston

a

patriciate nearly complete control over the Bay State.
Inextricably bound together not only by cultural, political
and economic institutional ties, but reinforced by direct

familial allegiances, Boston's elite posed

a

sustained and

unified front against the various forces of democratization
that threatened its hegemony.

Much like the slaveholding

elite, Boston's Brahmins embraced

a

unigue brand of

paternalism as the philosophical justification for their
vi

.

dominance.

Built by "many of our wealthiest and most

liberal merchants," Massachusetts General Hospital cured

Boston's sick.

The director of the privately funded

Perkins Institution for the Blind claimed he could teach
2
"an oyster" to read.

Armed with

a

sense of noblesse

oblige, Boston's nineteenth-century patricians consolidated

and reinforced their economic, cultural and political

power--unif ied in their common purpose and right to lead as
a

class.
[a]

1860,

As Frederic Cople Jaher argues, "between 1800-

multi-functional upper-class, by dominating the

foremost local business establishments, political

organizations and cultural and philanthropic institutions,
assumed the role of
realm,

a

ruling elite."

In the political

it is argued that despite nineteenth-century party

mutations and restructuring, Boston's ruling elite
maintained unremitting political solidarity in the face of
the
growing political turbulence during the first half of

nineteenth-century

3

class
In this sense, students of Boston's elite

model that
structure have formed an incomplete and static
politics while
neglects the complexity of antebellum Boston
the solidarity
ignoring how political disruptions affected
The limited
Boston.
of the elite class structure in
peninsula, despite
geographic space imposed by the Shawmut
fill-in projects, compelled
the city's nineteenth-century
As much as
classes.
various
Boston's
of
commingling
the
Vll

they may have wanted to, the city's elite did not
live in
social isolation.' The effects of urban life during
1

the

/

early nineteenth-century bred counter-hegemonic thought
that directly affected the political culture of Boston.

Ronald Formisano, John Brooke, Paul Goodman, John

R.

Mulkern, and others interested in popular political

confrontations with this economic, cultural and political
elite focus on challenges to the Bay State's established
order.

Tracing the successes and failures of antebellum

Massachusetts political insurgents, these historians
concentrate on popular forays into the state's political
culture.

s

Despite heated historiographical debate over

ethnocultural vs. sectional/ local vs. national causation
for the break-up of established party systems, these

studies greatly expand our understanding of how nineteenth-

century party systems changed in Massachusetts over time.
Yet they too often fall victim to the static model of

Boston elite hegemony

— all

too easily associating

Federalist/Whig/Republican political interests with the
interests of Boston's upper class.

Massachusetts' most

adroit political historian, Ronald Formisano, concedes
"[t]he nerve center of maritime Massachusetts, Boston, was

Federal ist]
[

.

Its upper classes were predominantly so...."

Demonstrating the alliance between elite economic interests
and Federalist party affiliation, Formisano resolves that

the Bay State's coastal region "boasted 'many families of
viii

wealth and culture,' including the Cabots, Lees and
Thorndikes, who sat in the highest Federal [ist] councils.
Its social hierarchy was well marked and highly cohesive."

Despite an analysis demonstrating Massachusetts Whiggery's

broad social construction, in the end, Formisano succumbs:
"The Whig Party, it is not farfetched to say, was the

instrument of this [Brahmin] elite." 6

Drawing from both these historiographical approaches,
I

hope to expand dominant notions of elite-class hegemony,

while also broadening our understanding of popular

political urban insurgency movements.

In studying the

political career of patrician Josiah Quincy, it became

apparent that many assumptions historians placed on elites
and particularly the "Brahmins," do not hold together after
a close reading of the primary material.

In particular,

the presumption of a static and unified nineteenth-century

Boston elite is vitiated by the evidence in the rich papers
and manuscripts of the Massachusetts Historical Society and
the American Antiguarian Society.

Perhaps, Boston's

historians had too easily accepted the mythology of Brahmin
apologists such as Oliver Wendell Holmes, Henry Adams,
Ralph Waldo Emerson, Cleveland Amory, Samuel Eliot Morison
and a myriad of other upper-class Bostonians.

alternative newspapers of Boston

— the

the Bostonian and Mechanics Journal

,

The

New Engl and Galaxy,
the Debtor's Journal,

the Independent Bostonian and many others, as well as the
ix

diaries and correspondence of elites, demonstrates
political solidarity among Boston patricians proved

difficult to maintain when it came to local and state
politics. At times, any form of cohesion was impossible.

Illustrative of the fragility and frailties in eliteclass solidarity was the turbulent relationship between

Brahmins Harrison Gray Otis and Josiah Quincy.

Both men

are usually viewed by historians as political and class
allies, yet their political relationship was at best uneasy

and often broke apart, reflecting larger social divisions

within Boston's elite class structure.
also were not connected financially.

Otis and Quincy
In fact, during the

early-nineteenth-century, while Otis became heavily

invested in Massachusetts

1

s

early manufacturing industry,

Josiah Quincy strongly railed against New England money
being funneled away from merchant trade and into

manufacturing in the factory towns of Waltham and Lowell.
This is not to say that in the eyes of ordinary

citizens there was not obvious class divisions between the

Quincy family and the vast majority of Bostonians.

Without

question the Quincy' s were viewed as wealthy gentry.
Nevertheless the political support they garnered among
Bostonians who had shed traditional notions of deference,
indicated that the electorate had formed significant

distinctions between elites like the Quincy family and
those epitomized by Harrison Gray Otis.
x

By making such

.

distinctions and then articulating them through the
electoral process, early nineteenth-century Bostonians
claimed a significant role in controlling their destinies.

Although the established elite in Boston was perhaps
more entrenched socially, economically, institutionally,
and politically than in other northern cities, by 1820

popular challenges to its authority emerged.
Paradoxically, one of Boston's oldest and most respectable

elite families accelerated this political challenge.

Under

such circumstances it is difficult to abide by the

provincial mythology of Boston as the Brahmin's cocoon-like
"city upon the hill."

By 1820, those who could claim

stewardship of the hub were not only composed of the town's
"first families," but also contained people from the lower-

to-middling orders.

For these "other Bostonians,"

allegiance with politically astute Brahmins like Josiah

Quincy succeeded in destroying the traditional shackles of
class deference, exposing the ignorance and weakness of the

established "standing order."

Boston became a much more

democratic city because of these innovative intra-class
relationships

xi
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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION:

THE SETTING FOR INSURGENCY

"...nothing is so unequal as equality."
Samuel Lyman, 1800

—

"...the duped and deluded mob whose hosannas and
execrations are as much mechanical and responsive as
the pipes of an organ."
Harrison Gray Otis, 1801

—

No other political organization more overtly

epitomized and championed Massachusetts
than the Federalist party.

'

s

patrician class

Unlike its structure elsewhere,

Boston Federalism developed a highly sophisticated and

effective machine that promoted, reinforced and maintained
what Ronald Formisano identifies as "deferential-

participant politics."

While in other states the party

atrophied after the "treason" of the Hartford Convention,
Federalism'

s

political infrastructure in Massachusetts

forestalled its demise and provided the party an unusually
long and somewhat anachronistic life.

Until the early

1820s, ordinary voters continued to participate in a

variety of elections, following the lead of their cultural
and economic "betters"
interests.

— voting,

often, against their own

Although as early as 1814, Federalism on the

national level was dead and buried, in the Massachusetts
the party continued to enjoy significant appeal and

experienced a rebirth of sorts in its opposition to the
Missouri Compromise.

Yet the party's "Indian Summer," as

historian Samuel Eliot Morison once described
lived.

1

it,

was short

By 1822 Federalism had lost the city of Boston,

and with it the party's last bastion.

The decisive blow,

ironically, occurred not only in the party's most loyal

stronghold of Boston, but was delivered by ranking members
of both the party leadership and the Boston patriciate.

During the city's first mayoral race in 1822, a

curious nonpartisan coalition formed between estranged

members of the Boston Federalist elite and a diverse urban
electorate, containing a majority membership of poor-to-

middling Bostonians.

This unconventional fusion mustered

the energy to cause the collapse of Federalism in Boston,

thereby signaling the party's final demise.

2

The party

disloyalty shown by some of the Boston elite in 1822 also
indicated that the normative socio-political precepts in

Boston had changed.

No longer could Federalism bank on

Boston's elite to follow in lock-step.

In this sense, the

political events that began in the early 1820s transcends

conventional political history and illuminates
crisis among Boston's once homogenous elite.

a

cultural

These

activities expose the precariousness of an elite class
structure that has traditionally been seen as one of the

most durable and unified political and economic structures
of its kind in America.

3

The most visible member of this insurgency in Boston

was patrician Josiah Quincy.

Quincy was a scion of Boston

"

wealth and lineage.

John Adams once described him as "a

rare instance of hereditary eloquence and ingenuity in
the

fourth generation.

..

.He comes into life with every

advantage of family, fortune and education."

A graduate of

Andover and Harvard, and buttressed with a hefty
inheritance in real estate, he chose a life in politics,

serving in the U.S. House as a reactionary Federalist for

most of his early adulthood.

4

Yet,

in his first run for

mayor Quincy dramatically broke with his party and led an
insurgent campaign that resulted in the uprooting of

Federalist hegemony in Boston.

This was hardly the

presumed role of a man whom Boston patrician and diplomat,
John Lothrop Motley hailed as "the head of the Brahmins of
America.

5

As the popular mayor of Boston for six years between
1823 and 1829, Quincy ushered in a new form of politics

that centered almost solely around himself.

Operating much

like future Boston political impresario and mayor James

Michael Curley, Quincy remained unfailingly confident in
his right and ability to consolidate municipal power within
the Mayor's office.

He presided over a rambunctious

assortment of bristling political factions, while promoting
a wide array of public service activities that consistently

satisfied
him.

a

general electorate that annually re-elected

Ever the individualist, and seemingly above the

narrowness of party and class loyalty, Quincy manipulated,
3

cajoled and appeased Boston's variegated political
forces
into acceptance of his ambitious agenda of urban growth.
More than any other factor, Quincy «s appeal in Boston

rested upon a cult of personality.

The Quincy mayoralty

was dictatorial as some have accused.

Nevertheless, his

rise to political power in Boston and his mayoralties

should be viewed as a transitional phase that positively
imbued ordinary Bostonians with a new sense of political

empowerment and stability during
change and political dissent. 6

a

turbulent period of

Many factors combined to

produce this moment of political transformation.

Besides

the men and their motivations, the historical setting was

all-important.

Three years before Quincy made his first bid for the

Mayor's office, depression hit the nation.

What began in

the cotton export markets of New Orleans and Charleston in

the beginning of 1819 quickly spread east, causing

financial panic and chaos in virtually every sector of the

American economy.

No region of the country was immune.

Not even the strong economy of Boston, some two thousand
7
miles away, withstood the tremors.

Cotton prices steadily rose after the War of 1812.

British textile manufacturers, deprived of American cotton

during the war, hankered for product and were willing to
pay for it.

Between 1815 and 1818 the price per pound of

raw cotton in the export markets of the South nearly
4

doubled from 16.5 cents to 32.5.

Running parallel to the

remarkable increase in cotton prices, Northern
controlled
shipping rates guadrupled between 1817 and 1818.
The
cotton boom of the post-war years not only benefited

established Southern cotton planters and Northern
merchants, but also sparked the greed of speculators who

gobbled up virgin cotton lands in the Southwest for resale
at inflationary prices.

Those who bought the speculator's

land happily mortgaged themselves to the hilt to Northern

bankers betting on the continued rise of the cotton
market. 8
By 1818, English cotton importers found their market

could no longer withstand the high price of American cotton
and began tapping other sources for the staple crop.

British manufacturers began importing East Indian cotton,
nearly doubling its Far East importation between 1817 and
1818.

The price of cotton in the South plummeted, taking

with it the value of newly bought, underdeveloped producing
land in the Southwest.

The ambitious farmer who had

recently bought land in the Southwest, saw property values
plunge by 50 to 75% within one year.

The same pound of

cotton that had sold in foreign markets for 32.5 cents in
1818 went for less than 14.5 cents in 1819; and after the

New Orleans or Charleston trading house got done with him,
the actual planter only took home
cotton.

9

cents per pound of

Just as commercial shipping rates had followed

5

.

cotton's upward trend during the boom years, so
did they
fall during the panic.

The maritime interest of New

England had lost its primary customers on both sides of
the
Atlantic 9
The sea-board towns of Massachusetts were not the only

areas hit by the depression.
felt the sting.

Fledgling manufacturers also

The strict trade restrictions on British

importation into the United States during the War of 1812
had served as a air-tight protective tariff for youthful

American industries.

Boston-financed industry developed

during the war from an embryonic state into
largely healthy toddler.

a

viable and

With peace, Great Britain's

burgeoning warehouses opened and flooded the American
market, undercutting Massachusetts manufacturers.

The

protective tariffs imposed on British goods in 1816 proved
ineffective against unscrupulous exporters with falsified
documents.

Custom agents were easily fooled or bought,

rendering the tariffs ineffectual in defending home
industry.

A steady stream of British imports continued to

deluge American ports. 10
More close to home and directly affecting Boston's
small merchants, jobbers, and importers was an ingenious
new method of retailing conjured-up in the boardrooms of

England's manufacturing headguarters

.

Not only would

Britain manufacture finished products, it would now sell
them directly to American consumers in open auction.

A

full bellied ship would anchor in Boston harbor
stock-piled

with goods; word would spread on the street and its
cargo
would sell at the highest bidder to Boston's consumers.
All local importers, jobbers and retailers were undercut
by

the public open bidding of the auctions.

Although this

clearly benefited Boston consumers, the system drained

money out of American coastal cities and into the coffers
of British industry.

11

The auction system only further

intensified the economic pressure Boston already faced due
to the national depression.

During a three month period in 1822, one hundred

businesses in Boston failed.

Shipping rates fell and dock

workers were laid off in unprecedented numbers.

Credit was

frozen and banks, reported Boston's Evening Gazette
to "demand immediate repayment of the debtors."

r

began

Between

1819 and 1820, prices for goods tumbled, yet, as one

observer explained, money was "tighter than the skin on a
cats back."

So who could pay?

"[T]he industrious

mechanic," revealed the Boston Patriot

.

"may not be able to

earn enough money by his labor to supply the natural wants"
of himself or his family.

Between 1820 and 1822, more than

3,500 Bostonians were imprisoned for debt.

Governor John

Brooks declared the state was in "times of peril and
In 1819 alone Massachusetts lost

extreme pressure."

twenty-five percent of it commercial capital.
the Boston Patriot

,

According to

the city had become "a dull and

uncheery spectacle— silence reigns in the
streets and gl oom
and despondency" rules.
"[M]oney is so
scarce,"

sardonically reported the Boston Castiaatnr

r

"that a

gentleman has offered his character for sale." 12
For many Bostonians, the Castiaator * report
directly
'

illustrated the problem.

Boston's leaders did nothing to

ease the burdens of depression and, as a result, fell
under

suspicion of selling their "character" to maintain economic
and political supremacy.

For the city's established

leadership, such charges to its benevolence and honor had

devastating consequences.

Before the insurgent challenges

of the 1820s, the elite's strongest grip on the "lower

orders" depended upon Boston's collective reverence for

patrician "character."

As historian Ronald Formisano

explains the pre-depression culture of the city: "Boston
was once an oligarchy .... It was a world in which deference
to one's social betters did not necessarily imply servility
or obsequiousness, and in which respect for social rank was

quite compatible with integrity, self-respect, and one's
own sense of importance."

Such a social order depended on

traditional arrangements of reciprocal obligations between
the classes.

During the panic of 1819, this arrangement

fell into disrepair and community leaders quickly became

viewed as uncaring, aristocratic, and corrupt.

1

"

Old party

alliances fell by the wayside as the character and honor of
Boston's leadership faced blistering attacks.
8

In the one-party town of Boston, such a new
political

consciousness could mean only one thing: an attack
on the
Federalist establishment. The Massachusetts Federalist
Central Committee was controlled at the time by Harrison
Gray Otis, William Sullivan and Thomas Handasyd Perkins.

These men ruled their party with a dictatorial iron hand.

Having total control over the party's purse-strings, its
caucuses and its press, the perception grew that the

committee used such resources to implement its class
interests at the great expense of the people. 14
All three of these men were seasoned and wily

politicians.

Although Sullivan tended to stay in the

shadows, preferring to avoid public office, his devoted and

active administration of the central committee proved
essential to the day-to-day operations of the party.

low-profile status was hardly the result of

personal political ambition.

a

His

lack of

Instead, his shadowy role

within the party was probably due more to the fact that his
father, James, had allied with the state's Jef f ersonians

who elected him governor in 1808.

Also, Sullivan had been

raised in the far-away Maine district.
seemed quite a strange commodity.

Thus,

in Boston, he

Perkins, on the other

hand, had served either in the House or the Senate of the

Massachusetts General Court pretty much non-stop between
1805 and 1822.

Without question, Otis's record proved the

most impressive of the trio and made him its natural

leader.

in 1796,

his political career began with a boom.

In that year alone, he received an
appointment by John

Adams to head the U.S. District Attorney's office
in
Massachusetts; he was appointed to the director's

seat of

the U.S. Bank in Boston; and without already enough
to do,
he ran for and won a position in the lower house of
the

General Court where he stayed for

a

year before taking over

Fisher Ames's coveted spot in the U.S. House of

Representatives.

Leaving Washington in 1802, he returned

to his seat on the Massachusetts General Court, serving as

House Speaker between 1803 and 1804.

In 1805, Otis rose to

the state Senate where he stayed, despite
in the House,

until 1817.

a

one year foray

In the state's upper-house, he

wielded immense power as its president for four of his
eleven years there before returning to the U.S. Senate and

making a failed bid for the governorship of Massachusetts
in 1823.

15

Each of these men epitomized what Boston's

oppositional press began in 1820 to identify as an

undemocratic "monied aristocracy" that subverted the
authority of the electorate. 16

The central committee's key

leadership was politically dominant and fabulously wealthy.

Unlike most Bostonians, Perkins, Sullivan, and Otis

maintained sufficient capital to easily weather the
depression.

In fact,

both Otis and Perkins significantly

expanded their business ventures during height of the
10

financial panic.

Taking advantage of

a

falling market,

Otis expanded his Boston real estate holdings
during the
panic and continued to extract high rents from his

tenants.

In 1819, Perkins took advantage of the economic
chaos and

his large cash reserves to invest $765,000 in a shipping

venture to the Far East while his competition's ships
languished in their slips. 17

These facts did not go

unnoticed by the ordinary citizens of Boston whose
financial affairs were thrown into

a

state of chaos by the

depression.

Before the depression, Otis had acguired

a

real estate

empire by successfully speculating (often with the aid of
inside information) in Boston and Maine lands.
had branched-out into manufacturing.

By 1822, he

With Otis's

encouragement, Sullivan became his partner in the lucrative
real estate syndicate, the Mount Vernon Proprietors which

developed Beacon Hill.

Sullivan also had inherited stock

in the Middlesex Canal which had languished until the

creation of the Lowell mills in 1813 reinvigorated its
profits, adding to his personal wealth.

richest of the group

—a

Perkins was the

merchant prince who had made a

fortune in the illegal opium trade.

Receiving an estimated

profit of $50,000 on each shipload of opium sold in Canton,
China, Perkins accumulated massive sums which he

successfully reinvested in manufacturing and, later,
railroads

18

11

These men controlled huge amounts of capital
and were
members of a intricate network of interlocking
financiers
that virtually commanded the wealth of the
state.
Meeting
each Saturday night with various others of their
ilk,

Otis,

Sullivan and Perkins established the Saturday Fish
Club, a
highly secretive social fraternity estimated to have
a

total membership of six.

Here these powerful men enjoyed

madeira together and schemed over politics and business.
As historian Peter Dobkin Hall argues, by the first two

decades of the nineteenth-century, this elite, "had been

thoroughly transformed. Its power was no longer based on
public authority, formal or inf ormal

derived explicitly from.

..

.

.

.

.

Its power now

possession of wealth...." 19

Heightening public awareness to the inequality of
Boston's class structure, the depression of 1819 fostered

a

rebellious spirit in the electorate that rejected this new
foundation for elite Federalist authority and dramatically
altered Boston's traditional power structure.

Overstating

the situation, yet betraying a common anxiety among many

upper-echelon Massachusetts Federalists, Harrison Gray Otis

described the new political temper of Boston as
"revolutionary." 20

And in many ways it was.

After the Revolution, "the Boston political and

economic elites merged," explains historian Frederic Cople
Jaher,

"and government service advanced class power as well

as class ... honor

.

21

Business and the politics that

12

Federalism bred went hand-in-hand in defining the
Boston
elite to itself. To challenge the validity of

one, was to

denigrate the status of the whole.

As one historian of

Massachusetts explains, a Federalist "was expected to
adhere to the Federal standard and the acceptable

conservative creed. To renounce one's past political
behavior, if one was a Federalist, was tantamount to

admitting a serious character flaw." 22

Besides this

particular aspect of the Federalist party culture, there
was a practical side to blending political and economic

interests

— of

fusing Federalist policy with the affairs of

elite enterprise.

Not only could such a combination be

easily justified by following the pragmatic logic of

Alexander Hamilton that trumpeted the benefits of binding
capitalism with government, but in a much more utilitarian
sense,

it ensured Federalist oversight of economic policy

in the state.

As Oscar and Mary Handlin have demonstrated,

Federalist command of the Massachusetts General Court

advanced enterprise and capital accumulation. 23

Clearly,

those who benefited most from the legislature's patronage

were those with established wealth.

Thus, the Federalist

policy-makers and the Massachusetts economic elite worked
in tandem,

advanced the same agenda, and, as the Federalist

Central Committee's membership suggests, were often one-

and-the-same

13

By 1822, Federalism, with its firm directive
requiring

obedience from its members, its elitist overtones
and the
economic interests the party blatantly championed,
was

under siege by

a

new party with the innocuous name of the

Middling Interest.

Surprisingly, the candidate to lead the

insurgency's charge had spent most of his life as

a

self-

described "raving Federalist." 24
To understand the transformation in political culture

that occurred in Boston during the early nineteenthcentury, the political odyssey of this "raving Federalist"

turned insurgent, Josiah Quincy, must be examined.

Quincy's political career had many ups and downs which
resulted in his remarkable political transformation from

Federalism to third partyism.

Whether he led the political

and cultural realignments that occurred in Boston's

ordinary citizenry, or whether it led him, is less
important than acknowledging that the two became

inseparably linked and were widely associated with the
other.

The political journey of Quincy reflects not only

his personal odyssey, but that of all the Bostonians who

supported him.
Josiah Quincy stood at the epicenter of every

contentious political battle waged in Boston and the state
during the first three decades of the nineteenth-century.
Never hesitating to strongly voice his often irreverent
opinions, he maintained

a

reputation throughout his career

14

as an individualistic and independent
politician who did

not fear retribution from any party elders.

He first

earned this reputation while serving as a member of
the
U.S. House of Representatives.

15
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CHAPTER II

NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM ON THE ATTACK:
THE WASHINGTON BENEVOLENT SOCIETY AND

TURNING GARDENS INTO REPUBLICAN FARMS

1800-1819

,

"Federalism takes opium; Jacobinism gunpowder and
rum
Fisher Ames to Josiah Quincy, Feb., 1804
.

—

The morning after the devastating defeat of John
Adams
to Thomas Jefferson in the election of 1800, Federalism

awoke to the disarming reality that it was powerless on the

national level.

The party lost its chief executive and

both houses of Congress.

Jefferson stalwart, Albert

J.

Beveridge gloated that those remaining Federalists in
Congress were simply a bunch of "grumbling.

..

gentlemen.

Jefferson

.

.mournful of a glorious past."

out of date

himself christened the lingering partisans "mere

obstructionists," who would challenge his mandate in vain.

And in many ways, both Beveridge and Jefferson's appraisal
of the battered Federalists was right.

Even Federalist

party warhorse from Dedham, Fisher Ames, scolded his party
fellows after the election, professing
opium; Jacobinism gunpowder and rum." 2

"

[

f

]

ederalism takes

Indeed, during

Jefferson's first term, congressional Federalists were
reduced to bitterly complaining about the acquisition of
the Louisiana Purchase and the wholesale reversals of the

Adams administration's policies.

1

When Federalist Josiah Quincy began his eight
year
tenure as Suffolk County's congressional
representative in
1805, Jefferson savored his second term victory and
seemed
more popular than ever.

Both the Senate and the House

remained in the hands of the Republicans and there
seemed
little the Federalist freshman from Boston could do.

As

his wife, Eliza, confessed to Abigail Adams in 1806, her

husband confined his ambitions to "enjoy [ing] the
satisfaction of preventing evil," but to "produc[e] good,
beyond [his] power." 3
Eliza's assessment of her husband's role in Congress

proved overly optimistic.
and failed dramatically.

As a Congressman, Quincy failed

Perhaps if "the little band of

federalists," as Eliza described the minority position in
Congress, had been more united the "evil" of Jeffersonian

policies could have occasionally been checked; but internal
differences within the party caused resentments between the

younger and the older generations, dividing congressional
Federalists.

4

Having learned

a

harsh lesson from their Republican

victors in 1800 and 1805, young Federalists began to

practice oppositional politics in

a

much more pragmatic

manner than their party elders had ever imagined.

Quincy

sided with this vanguard and its new approach to politics.
As Harrison Gray Otis explained, Quincy was "the only man

among us who had intended.

.

.to pursue politics as a

21

profession." 5

This seemed vulgar to older members of the

party.

To them government service should be
restricted to
benevolent, disinterested amateurs. The old
guard

distrusted the very notion of established parties.
Although many were the beneficiaries of their own

party's

state and local organizations, these crusty old men

despised what they saw as the corrupting influence party
spirit inflicted on the great united family of America's

revolutionary past.

"Let not party-rage, private

animosities, or self-interested motives succeed that

religious attachment to the public weal which has brought
us successful thus far," pleaded Boston traditionalist,

Jonathan Mason.

If conspicuous partisanship became the

primary basis for Federalism, what would distinguish it
from the "Jacobin" Republicans?

With Jefferson's

reelection, younger Federalists rebelled and openly

disagreed with the very premise of such a question.
Harrison Gray Otis articulated New England's interest in
the fresh Federalist approach: "If we mean to preserve the

commonwealth and New England.

..

our organization must be

more complete and systematic. It must extend through every
county and town, and an ample fund must be provided for the

distribution of political truth."

Old guard, Massachusetts

stalwarts like George Cabot, Stephen Higginson, John Lowell
and Theodore Lyman looked on in utter dismay as younger

Federalists like Otis and Sullivan established a highly
22

effective party structure that would elect and
send the
confirmed non-traditionalist, Josiah Quincy to
Washington.
After serving only one year in the Massachusetts
Senate, Quincy, at age thirty-two, entered the House
with

little political experience.

His opinion of the Federalist

traditionalists he met there was unmistakably negative.

Writing to John Quincy Adams, he severely criticized the
old guard as "cautious politicians, who are always prophets
by retrospect; men who neither devise nor execute," and who

were altogether ill equipped to challenge the majority

position in Congress. 7

Often single-handedly, Congressman

Quincy would overtly defy the old guard's party regimen and
follow his own political instincts into unchartered and

often dangerous waters.

The result was a botched and

embarrassing congressional career.
Three notable incidents point out his political
naivete, his impetuosity, and his enthusiasm to stir still

waters in order to strengthen his minority position.
first occurred in 1809.

The

Characterizing Jefferson as a

"dish of skim milk curdling at the head of our nation," on

the House floor Quincy demanded the President's impeachment
just five weeks before Jefferson was to step-down from
office.

In his January 25, speech before the House, Quincy

accused Jefferson of corruption, directly linking the

President to staffing problems in the Boston Customs House.
Even House Federalists were appalled by the audacity of the
23

charge and Quincy's proposal was overwhelmingly
defeated by
a vote of 117 to his l.
Four years after the House vote,

Henry Clay predicted that the Federalist from
Suffolk
county's act "shall live only in the treasonable
annals- of
history.
<;

When Quincy rose to the floor to speak against
Louisiana statehood on January

14,

1811,

he was once again

charged with treason, this time from his Republican

opponents in Congress and from much of the Boston press.
"If this bill passes," Quincy threatened,

"I

declare it my

deliberate conviction that the bond of this union is
virtually dissolved: that the states are freed from their
moral obligation: that as it will be the right of all
it wJJJ, become the duty of some,

separation
In Boston,

— amicably

f

so

to prepare for a

if they can:

forcibly if they must."

the Republican press promised that "the people

of [Quincy's] own state would crush any rebellious

movement ... as quick and as effectively as they did the
insurrection of Shays."

Despite Quincy's menacing claim,

New England refused to secede from the union once Louisiana
was granted statehood.

Later that year,

in the fall,

Quincy concocted an

ambitious scheme to reestablish Federalism as
political force.

a

national

Believing that the recent Republican

clamor for war with England was merely saber-rattling

designed "to embarrass [New England] commerce and

annihilate its influence," Quincy decided
to push the issue
by coming out in favor of war. His
strategy rested on the
assumption that war with Great Britain was an
impossibility.

By strengthening the position of the

Republican "war hawks," as he dubbed them, Quincy
believed
he could drive a deep wedge between the pro-war
and the
anti-war Republicans.

This, he believed, would irreparably

shatter Republicanism.

On January 25,

1812, he supported a

Republican war bill to strengthen the navy.

in February,

he voted with the war hawks to step-up appropriations for

armed conflict.

On June

1,

1812, pro-war Republicans

achieved what Quincy had not believed possible

— by

a vote

of 79 to 49, the House approved the President's declaration
of war.

Much to Quincy' s horror, the war hawks 's clamor

for combat had been sincere.

By severely underestimating

the genuine pro-war feeling in the House, Quincy

contributed in provoking an armed conflict that would prove
devastating to his region.

11

As Fisher Ames sadly predicted for Quincy before

Ames's own death in 1808, "I declared to you,

I

fear

Federalism will not only die, but all rememberence of it be
lost. As a party,

it is still good for everything it ever

was good for; that is to say, to cry 'fire' and 'stop
thief,' when Jacobinism attempts to burn and rob.

[Yet],

[i]t never had the power to put out the fire, or to seize

the thief." 12

Despite trying to defy Ames's judgment by
25

employing Machiavellian techniques to
strengthen his
minority position in Congress, Quincy finally
absorbed the
fact that Ames's assessment of Federalism
was
accurate.

Federalists had no place in Washington.

They had become

exactly what Jefferson predicted— "mere
obstructionalists.
"I feel ready... to throw myself out of the
window,
a

horse pond, when

I

or into

think of coming here [Washington]

again," Quincy confessed in utter dismay to William
Sullivan.

13

In fall 1812, Quincy informed the central committee

that he would decline a Federalist nomination to Congress
if it was offered.

Disregarding his wishes, the committee

reassigned him to the post, but Quincy refused to accept.
For eight miserable years in the House, he had filled the

unpleasant role of being one of Federalism' s most explosive
and reactive operatives.

His intricate and unsuccessful

political stratagems had caused him to be ridiculed and
spurned by his own party as well as the opposition.

He had

few friends in Washington and the capitol, during the early

nineteenth-century, was no more than a frontier town that

Quincy and his wife hated.

Writing to his wife on the eve

of the War of 1812, he explained his "odd" position:

some

I

"By

am thought such a raving Federalist as to be

shrewdly suspected of [treason]; by others that

danger of turning Democrat [Republican]." 14
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I

am... in

Clearly, Quincy's congressional career
merited such
confusion. He had called for a popular President's

impeachment; he had threatened New England secession
over
Louisiana's constitutional right to enter to Union;
and he
had gone against the anti-war sentiments of his

constituents in a failed political scheme to destroy the

Republican party.

Quincy had always thought of himself as

a professional politician in the Federalist cause,

but his

impulsive and erratic behavior in the House belied any
sense of professionalism.

Henry Clay's summation of

Quincy's career held more truth than falsehood when he
stated before the House that, "[t]he gentleman from
Massachusetts.

.

.has entertained us with Cabinet plots,

Presidential plots which are conjured up in the gentleman's
own perturbed imagination," and done little else. 15

Quincy's covert partisan adventures marked a man whose
stubborn refusal to surrender his independent and often

self-righteous personal campaigns for more reasonable
solutions to the problems Republicanism caused in New
England, resulted in a highly unsuccessful and humiliating

congressional career.

"I

left Washington," Quincy wrote in

his 1813, personal journal, "with the feelings of a man

quitting Tadmor in the Wilderness,

'where creeping things

had possession of the palace, and foxes looked out the
16
windows,' and sought the refuge in home, and in family."
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In March, 1813, Quincy escaped from Washington
and

seemingly found more refuge in his family estate's
gardens
than with his family. According to both his son,
Edmund,
and his daughter, Eliza II, the ex-Congressman
transferred

his intensity for congressional partisan politics into
an

obsession with experimental farming.

"[W]ith all the zeal

of his ardent temperament," as Edmund put it, his father

poured money and time into his agricultural experiments.
Soiling cattle

(a

topic he wrote a book on)

,

cultivating

hedges, using root crops as cattle feed and growing carrots

were Quincy' s particular specialties.

As one historian

argues, Boston's early nineteenth-century elite often

turned to the farm to resolve their contradictory notions
of aristocracy and republicanism as embodied in the image

of the sturdy New England farmer.

Revolutionary ideals of

equality clashed with the reality of an established, post-

Revolutionary ruling class based in the urban setting of
Boston.

Boston elites desperately tried to resolve the

contradictory nature of their existence within
by dabbling in the soil.

a

democracy

17

If one of the most visible symbols of elite control

the country estate

— could

be manipulated to represent a

more democratic meaning in the popular mind, then the

hypocrisy of a dominant "seated" gentry within a democratic
society could be better hidden.

The rub for Boston's

landed gentry was how to go about implementing the
28

perceptual change.

George Cabot, the director of the

Massachusetts Bank and leading old guard Federalist,
found
the solution in cultivating potatoes instead
of rare
flowers on his Brookline estate; Thomas

H.

Perkins took

time out from his work on the Federalist Central
Committee
and in the opium business to begin growing fruit;
Theodore

Lyman experimented with bananas and pineapples on "the
Vale," his estate in Waltham when he wasn't tallying his

profits from the East Indies and China trade or raving
against the atrocities of one Republican administration or
another.

And Josiah Quincy grew

of carrots.

a

particularly hardy breed

18

The idea was to shift the purpose and meaning of the

country seat from

a

place of leisure to one of utility.

The country estates, with their beautifully extravagant,
but useless gardens, were transformed into working farms.

With the establishment of the Massachusetts Society for

Promoting Agriculture and the Massachusetts Horticulture
Society, patrician farmers institutionalized their new

self -perception and pursued a bucolic form of noblesse
oblige.

The stated purpose of both the MSPA and the MHS

was to provide Massachusetts

•

s

yeomanry with advanced

farming techniques that were being discovered on patrician
estates.

In an ironic twist, Boston's Federalist

aristocracy would return to the soil under the guise of
19
Jef f ersonian, agrarian democratic principles.
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Most of Boston's "book farmers" clearly were
insincere

about their conversion to functional agriculture.

None of

them gleaned a living from the soil, but from
maritime
commerce or manufacturing.

True to the Hamiltonian

economic agenda and as high-ranking Federalists, the "book
farmers" consistently fought America's agricultural
interests.

Instead, most Boston elite's involved in

experimental farming saw it as a way to stave-off popular
criticism, and at best, to sure-up the state's yeomanry for

Federalism. 20

Josiah Quincy viewed his estate differently.
because he was trying to gain some success as
after his miserable failure as

a

a

Perhaps

farmer

Congressman or, perhaps,

sincerely driven by a passion to revolutionize hedge
technology, between 1813 and 1820, Quincy dumped the family

fortune into his experiments.

Being "wholly occupied with

thoughts of agriculture," as he explained himself, Quincy

seriously jeopardized his family's financial security as he

plowed more and more cash into his carrots, hedges and

root-crop cattle feed.

As his son Edmund gently explained,

his father had lost "more than it was at all convenient to

him to lose," claiming the only profits culled from the
family estate came from selling salt to the local

fishermen

—a

venture his father had no interest in.

Quincy 's daughter, Eliza, somewhat distressed, confessed to
her dairy in 1820, "upon settling his account.
30

..

[her

father] found that his expenses were exceeding
his income.
A fact that caused him anxiety with regard
to future

independence."

Summing up the situation, Eliza declared:

"farming experiments were the cause of this difficulty." 21
By April, the Quincy's financial situation became
so

grave that they could no longer afford to lease their
posh
Boston home on Summer street. Eliza was aghast.
"[T]he
only plan to be pursued," she reported to her diary, "was
to reside at Quincy all the year now."

Horrified because

this meant "the exit of us from Boston Society," Eliza and
her family prepared for a new, more isolated life as fallen
gentry.

Yet, Quincy's uncle, John Phillips, upon hearing

the news, came to the family's rescue and provided them,
free of charge, with a "modest" house on the corner of

Hamilton Place and Tremont street.

Although Edmund

remarked their new residence, "was not, in itself, so large
or so good as that [they had] left," the Quincy family was

spared the public mortification of social exile from the
Hub of New England society and culture. 22

Although Quincy spent much of the five years after his

unfortunate congressional career in convalescence with his
hedges, roots and carrots, to the surprise of many, he did

remain engaged in politics.
a

"I thought you

peaceful political death, but

I

would have died

see it is not in your

nature," Philadelphian, Richard Peters, noted as an aside
to Quincy in a long letter detailing the proper uses for a
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particular breed of Newcastle thorn bushes. 23

When he had

first returned to Boston in 1813, the central
committee
rewarded Quincy with a nomination to the state
senate.
"He
is proverbial industrious," explained Harrison
Gray
Otis,

"and though an occasional expression or two have
served as

catchwords to injure his popularity,

I

have no doubt that

in th[e] Senate he would soon efface any petty
prejudice

existing against him, and be

a

very useful member." 24

"Useful" may not be the most operative word for Otis
to have used.

As Edmund Quincy explained, his father's

"duties [in the Senate] were confined to a few months out
of the year, and were not of a very engrossing nature." 25

Instead, when not in his gardens, Quincy preoccupied

himself with much more exciting extra-legal party affairs.
First as vice-president of the Washington Benevolent

Society [WBS] from 1812 to 1815 and then as its president
in 1816, he remained active and contributed greatly to

local Federalist party business. 26

With the inevitability of war with Britain, the Boston

chapter of the WBS was established in the downtown Exchange
Coffee House on March

6,

1812.

Its founding members,

Nathan Appleton, Henry Dwight Sedgwick, Nathan Hale, Samuel
Livermore, Jr., Benjamin Russell, Thomas H. Perkins, Josiah
Bradlee, Francis J. Oliver, and Lemuel Shaw, represented
27
the local vanguard of Boston's Federalist young turks.

Instigated by their anti-war stance, the 1811 losses of the
32

governors 's seat and the General Court to
Republicanism,
and the ineptitude of Federalism' s past
organizational
structure, these men astounded Bay State's old
guard by

mimicking Republican political fraternities such as New
York's Tammany. Under the auspices of "benevolence,"

the

Boston chapter of the Washington Benevolent Society

constructed a highly organized and effective arm of the
Federalist party. 28
The WBS's primary goal was to broaden party

membership.
grown.

Since 1800, Boston's population had steadily

By 1810, the town held 33,250 people, an increase

from 18 00 of over nine thousand people.

The vast majority

of Boston's new arrivals were young, semi-skilled to

skilled native men from the countryside who came to the Hub

seeking their fortunes.

Although the political persuasion

of these men is not known, clearly the WBS was partially

established to ensure that these new Bostonians would come
into the Federalist fold.

Indeed, society members tended

to be young and semi-skilled or skilled.

The Boston

chapter contained 44 laborers, 68 clerks, 296 shopkeepers,
153 professionals and 309 mechanics.

constitution under article

17,

Codified into its

those who could not afford

the modest initiation fee of two dollars were exempted and

given free membership.

Over one third of Boston's

membership in 1814 were designated by the society as "Free
Members.

1,29
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The WBS constitution declared that the society
would
"oppose all encroachments of Democracy, aristocracy
or

despotism.

.

.and with all our strength to oppose the

establishment of any usurped power therein.

..

[we pledge to]

alleviate the sufferings of unfortunate individuals, within
the sphere of our personal acquaintances." 30

The "sphere

of personal acquaintances" of the society proved extremely

limited.

In 1813,

the WBS gave only $10 out of its total

yearly expenditure of $1,721.70 to the widow of society
member W. Reynolds.

When Fred W.A. Brown applied for

charity from the society in 1812, "it was found," according
to the WBS minutes,
&

"that he is not a member of the Society

consequently not entitled to relief." 31

According to the

WBS's annual budgets, the income of the society either paid
for partisan propagation or went to speculative business

ventures to turn

a profit.

similar fashion as

a bank.

The WBS managed its money in
It made loans and charged

interest much more often than it issued charity.

Many

investments were lucrative, but, in 1815, the WBS found
itself in financial trouble, running a deficit of $1,398.33

after one of its companies, Austin

bankrupt

&

Blanchard, went

32

Fluid in structure, the WBS's administrative positions

often rotated annually.

Its leadership included a

president, six vice presidents,
treasurer,

a

a

treasurer, vice

secretary, two assistant secretaries, and

34

a

standing committee of sixteen that decided
upon who would
.ind would not be accepted as
members.
Underneath this

super-structure lay the heart and soul of the
organization.
Each of Boston's twelve wards held a committee of
four who

circulated WBS information, collected membership dues,
recruited potential members, oversaw elections for the
society's leadership and reported relevant information from
each ward to the Standing Committee.

In turn,

the Standing

Committee reported to the WBS leadership that relayed
information directly to the Federalist Central Committee.

33

By 1813, the Boston WBS boasted a membership of 1,500.

That same year, it formed

a

committee to centralize and

coordinate the efforts of all the WBS chapters throughout
the country.

Boston's highly organized system proved so

effective that Federalists from all over New England began

writing to the Boston chapter for copies of its
constitution, advice and organizational blue-prints.

Shilborn Whitman of Pembroke's letter is typical of the
flood of communications arriving at the Boston WBS

headquarters: "[i]t is my wish to have
constitution]
this kind,

...

and ...

I

a

copy of it [the

will thank you for your opinion, on

in every town in the County,

the Officers of

which, shall be the organs of communication to the county

Society,

&

they the medium of intelligence to the Head

Quarters of Good Principles

—

I

am seriously of the opinion,

that if this plan could become universal in each County in
35

the State by next year, good men would be
restored to their

standing

" 3<

The Boston chapter sent organizational

material to towns as close as Salem, and as distant
as
Hallowell, Me.

After one year of its founding, voter

participation in the state gubernatorial race swelled
13%,
the majority of which voted Federalist.

In 1812,

Federalism recaptured the governor's seat

—a

m

party would hold until 1823.'

position the

Portsmouth, NH, a

young, budding Federalist, Daniel Webster waited for his

copy of the Boston chapter's constitution so he could draft
one of his own.
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Partially due to the WBS

'

s

success, the society

provoked the wrath of Boston's Republican press. The
Independent Chronicle charged that "the

Benevolent Societies

,

answer the purpose of

'

Washington

so called, were established to

•

a

political party, and that they are

in direct opposition both to Washington and Benevolence

,

must be evident to every one who will give himself the

trouble to review their conduct. The fund, said to be
raised for benevolent purposes, is ... expended in paying for
banners, votes, ribbands [sic], and other vapid trumpery,
to make up

a

show."

The Chronicle

'

s

assessment of the WBS

society funds proved accurate.

In 1813,

•

s

allocation of

$101.61 went to

pay the Federalist-leaning Boston Washington Artillery

Company for firing cannons during
36

a

society festival.

Other militias often employed by the WBS were the
Boston
Light Infantry, the Boston Hussars and the Winslow

Blues.

These militias not only provided great color to WBS
functions, but also protection.

After the 1812 pro-war

riots in Baltimore, where mobs attacked and killed several

society members, the Boston branch heeded the advise of
G.S.

Stewart, the WBS Secretary of Maryland.

Stewart,

fearing for his life during the rioting, fled Baltimore for
exile in Philadelphia.
a

He provided the Boston branch with

detailed description of the Baltimore rioting and urged

the Boston chapter to hire protection.

Baltimore, Stewart

claimed, had been "shamefully troddened under the foot by a

brutal and licentious mob who exercise an alarming tyranny
over the good people of Baltimore and its vicinity.
[Society members] have fallen victims to the fury of a mob,
and the treachery of the civil authority. The reign of

terror and confusion," Stewart heralded, "still continues
to agitate that infested city, where scenes of massacre and

bloodshed have of late occurred."

Taking no chances, the

Boston chapter of the WBS had various militias on its
payroll and placed WBS members to lead them.

Certainly the

militias would prove loyal to the WBS since they were well
paid, but also, as Fisher Ames once had suggested, "[l]et

the popular and wealthy Federalists take commissions in the
38
militia, and try to win the men [for Federalism]."
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The WBS functioned solely to broaden and deepen
the
Federalist party's social base. The Boston
Blt&lflt accused
it of attracting "the neediest and meanest
people.

WBS

celebrations featured liquor, mummery, and rowdiness.

After one Boston banquet, drunken society members stumbled
through the streets causing havoc.

"[T]hey were

exceedingly noisy and sang songs and swore oaths, and did
commit other acts of folly and wickedness," explained one
observer. "Yea, they took the vessels of glass which

contained the wine and other liquors, and did throw them at
the heads of each other.

..

.And the watchmen who guarded the

city, hearing the uproar, rushed in among them.

..

.And some

fled one way and some another, and some were lying

motionless on the ground like men slain in fighting." 40
Although old guard Federalists were disgusted by such
unruly behavior, in many ways, such political antics were

exactly what was needed to reinvigorate the party.

The

founders of the society understood this from the WBS's
inception.

As the preamble of its constitution declared,

"[w]e hold it to be always

assemble
acquire

&
&

a

right

&

sometimes

a

duty, to

deliberate upon the state of public affairs to
impart knowledge

&

to increase the ardor of our

patriotism by the warmth of our social attachments." 41

In

the rough-and-tumble, urban culture of early nineteenth-

century Boston, what could be more effective in
"increas[ ing] the ardor" of Federalist-style patriotism,
38

than a boisterous party?

Here the lowly mechanic met the

silk stocking merchant on the common ground
of gluttony.
In this, at least, they were eguals.

Judging by the reaction of Republican press, the
party
of Jefferson genuinely feared the society.
According to
Federalist operatives outside of Boston, Republicans had
begun intercepting and destroying communications between

various New England societies.

WBS member, Otis Williams

of Easton, MA warned the Boston chapter's first President,

Arnold Welles, that "owing to the treachery of some of our
political opponents.

..

[s]ome person has stopped the papers

[sent by you] by some means or other as there is very

violent opposition to the formation of the Society in this
town."

Refusing to trust the mail service for matters so

important, Williams sent his warning to Welles via courier.

William Gordon of Keene, NH, had similar problems and also
refused to use the mail.

Instead, he sent his own son all

the way from Keene to reguest a copy of the Boston

chapter's constitution. 42
When the WBS contacted Quincy in 1812 after its first

meeting at the Boston Exchange Coffee House, he still
served in Congress and had not yet heard of the
organization.

"Although

I

have no previous delineation of

the plan of the institution, of which you inform me,

I

am

elected Vice President," Quincy explained to Lemuel Shaw,
"the object expressed in its designation and the venerable
39

and ever cherished name associated with it
permit no

hesitation.

I

therefore accept the honor." 43

The

Washington Benevolent Society would gradually lure
Quincy
out of the isolation, safety and protection of his
beloved

gardens and into the public arena again.

The society's

inclusive approach to politics meshed well with Quincy'

pragmatic style of politics.

The Washington Benevolent

Society would provide Quincy with the confidence he had
lost in Congress.

More importantly, his involvement with

the WBS would expose him to an urban constituency of lower-

to-middling-folk who would supply him a popular base for
new and untried political ventures.

Although rain threatened to ruin the Washington
Benevolent Society's April 30th, 1813 celebration, the

heavens held as some two-thousand disciplined, but joyous
WBS members and their supporters paraded through Boston's
streets.

Just weeks before the celebration, Federalist

Caleb Strong, running on a "peace ticket," thoroughly

thrashed the Republican candidate for governor, Joseph

Varnum by 10,421 votes.

B.

The two-thousand member WBS parade

was a show of force demonstrating the potency of Federalism
and anti-war sentiment in the state.

Members from

throughout Massachusetts converged on Boston to participate
in the ceremonies that honored Washington's inauguration.

Three-hundred and twenty eight armed militia-men of the

Winslow Blues, the Boston Light Infantry, the Boston
40

Washington Artillery Company and the Boston
Hussars marched
ahead of two-hundred and seventy uniformed
"school boy

Federalists," as Edmund Quincy remembered.

Behind them,

some one-thousand loyal Federalists and WBS
members from
the rank-and-file marched, four abreast— waving
banners to
the Boston throng who watched from sidewalks and
balconies.

Eliza Quincy vividly described the broad social composition
of the typical WBS parade:

"

[R]

epresentives of all the

Trades drawn on sleds with appropriate standards, and

carrying their tools [marched]. The bricklayers were
building

a house,

they broke their bricks and worked

busily. The carpenters were erecting

printers worked

a

a

temple of Peace. The

small press, struck off handbills ... and

threw them among the crowd. The bakers, hatters, papermakers, blockmakers, etc., etc. had each their appropriate

insignia."

At the head of the procession, mounted on a

white stallion and serving as the Boston Hussar's newly

elected Captain, Josiah Quincy led the column to the "Old
South" church for

a

huge banquet and orations."

Trying to discredit the parade, the Republican

Independent Chronicle reported that the WBS parade was

racially integrated, "including the gentlemen from
[Boston's] Negro-Hill."

The report chastised Quincy,

likening him to his horse, Bayard.

The children of the

parade, argued the equally Republican Boston Yankee

,

had

been "educated like Colts to the menagerie, to be bridled

41

with restraints, to be saddled with prejudices,
and
jockeyed about by party spirit. When trained
sufficiently
in this charity school, they are to be bound
out to Faction

to learn the trades of Sedition and Treason."' 5

The lanke^'s charge of treason, though perhaps a bit

overstated, held some truth.

William Sullivan privately

explained the WBS was created to block pro-war fervor

throughout the country and promote anti-war sentiments as
well as to buttress Federalist partisanship.

Boston Hussars were trained by

a

Indeed, the

member of the WBS's

Standing Committee member, Michael Roulstone, a local

riding instructor and was founded during the early stages
of hostilities between the United States and Great Britain
in 1810 by wealthy, anti-war, Federalists.

the Madison administration was in doubt.

Its loyalty to

Many wondered

which side the militia would take if Britain invaded
Massachusetts, and the Hussar's did little to belay such
suspicions.

The symbolic pageantry employed by the militia

clearly delineated its political leanings.

Hussar uniforms

were modeled after those of the French Imperial Guard and
the militia's most prized possession (which it shared with
the WBS) was the gorget Washington had "heroically" worn as
a British officer during the French and Indian War.

According to Edmund Quincy, the Hussar's costume
represented "their dislike [of] Bonaparte and all his
works."

In April of 1813, with the United States at war

42

with Great Britain, the people of Boston
undoubtedly
interpreted the WBS s great procession as a massive
•

demonstration of the anti-war, anti-administration,
and
anti-Republican sentiment in New England. 46 if the
symbolic message of the parade was missed by those who

observed the procession, after Josiah Quincy 's partisan
speech in "Old South," any misunderstanding would be put
to
rest.

"This war, the measure that proceeded it, and the mode
of carrying it on, are undeniably Southern and Western

policy," Quincy announced to a full audience. "[I]n the
eyes of reason and common sense we [of New England] are
slaves,

..

.slaves to no very desirable masters.

..

.The new

States govern the old, the unsettled, the settled; the

interests of the emigrants prevail over those of the

ancient natives; a black population overbalances the
white. ... [W] ilderness legislators ... control ... the destinies
of [New Englanders], paralyzing all their interests and

darkening all their prospects."

According to Quincy, "this

great and ancient and once proud, but now.

..

humbled

Commonwealth, has absolutely no more weight in the national
scale than a specie of beings [black slaves]." "Remember,"

Quincy reiterated, "the very blacks of the Southern States
are equal in weight,

in the political scale,

State of Massachusetts." 47

43

to the whole

By drawing direct connections between national
policy

and local anxieties, Quincy had designed his speech

brilliantly.

Populated with African slaves and European

immigrants, the South and West had pushed the nation into

war against the wishes and interests of New England.

Not

only was this an assault to the region's honor and
authority, but the war, Quincy charged, would transform

each household economy from one of happy prosperity to

"darkening all their prospects."

At the hands of the slave

power, hardworking and free New England would be forced

into economic subjugation by western and southern

slaveholders.

With one major exception, the ideology

Quincy articulated would, in fifty years, prove remarkably
similar to the foundations of the second Republican party's

free-labor outlook.

The exception rested in Quincy 's

skeptical opinion of manufacturing which future free-labor

doctrine embraced.

Throughout his life, Quincy staunchly

refused to invest in manufacturing and remained tied to the
state's maritime interests. 48

Also, Quincy' s WBS speech

hinted once again at New England secession.
Although the speech predictably received favorable
reviews from Boston's Federalist organs, the Republican
press lambasted him.

"Can any man of sober reflection,"

asked the Independent Chronicle

acting in the character of

a

,

"attend to a declaimer

disciple of Washington, while

he [Quincy] exhibits himself in the boisterous attitude of
44

a manic?
a

— Foaming

mad Tom

,

beating the air

,

...

acting the part of

and exposing his folly by rant and arrogance."

How could he have so insulted the Bay state by claiming
"that the Representatives from Massachusetts were no more

weight in Congress than so many
Chron i c l e questioned. 49

b_l&cj£

cattle?" the

Despite such harsh criticism, the

average Bostonian in 1813 probably would have disagreed

with the Chronicle's assessment of Quincy's speech.

The

congressional vote for war had fallen sharply along
regional lines

— all

of New England's representatives,

including twenty Republicans, having voted against the
war.

50

Also, the effect of war would, in fact, be damaging

to New England's economy, just as Quincy claimed.

The war made some Boston ship captains wealthy as

privateers and hastened the transfer of New England

maritime money into new manufacturing ventures.

Also,

Boston banks with sound money, made profitable war loans to
the Federal government.

Nevertheless, the Bay State's main

enterprise, maritime commerce, dramatically declined

because of the war.

Beginning in 1810, and not recovering

until the war's end in 1815, the actual tonnage of shipping
in customs houses in Massachusetts and Boston dwindled to

new lows that would not be matched again until 1855.
Fishing, a lucrative pursuit for many coastal Massachusetts

towns since the 1790s, also found itself in serious
trouble.

The collapse of Boston's largest sector of the

45
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war impediments to commerce and the war itself
intensified
laboring Boston's uncertainties about its future.
Politically, these insecurities were easily exploited
by
the Washington Benevolent Society to attack
Republicanism

while strengthening the ranks of Federalism in Boston
and

throughout the state.
In October of 1814, every Bostonian in the General

Court unanimously voted in favor of an anti-war convention
to be held in Hartford.

Suffolk county's representatives

adamantly opposed the war, convinced as they were that the
conflict sucked the life-blood out of the state.
the General Court decided
90 opposed.

2

Overall,

60 in favor of the convention to

Only the Norfolk county delegation unanimously

voted against the resolution.

The majority of every other

district's representative delegation to the state
legislature voted for the convention.

In the November

state elections, a month before the Hartford Convention
met,

the Federalist slate swept the state.

John Holmes,

the Republican leader of the Senate and the most vocal

against the resolution and for the war, was defeated at the
hands of

a

Federalist. 53

As the General Court's

overwhelming support for the Hartford Convention indicates,
the anti-war and sectional appeal that Federalists such as

Quincy espoused significantly strengthened the party
throughout the state.
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In December of 1814, Massachusetts sent
twelve

Federalist delegates to Hartford with the overwhelming
approval of the General Court and the governor.

Although

Quincy voted in favor of the convention in the Senate,
he
was not chosen as a delegate. As Quincy 's son recalled,
the Federalist leadership was "afraid to trust his
[Quincy' s]

impetuous temperament and fiery earnestness."

Such fears were justified.

In one of his first acts as a

state senator, Quincy challenged what he saw as the blatant

hypocrisy of his Federalist colleagues.

Before Quincy 's

arrival to Senate, the General Court routinely bestowed
official state honors on naval commanders who successfully

protected American waters from British warships.

Quincy

viewed such actions by his fellow anti-war Federalists as
two-faced.

When the Senate attempted to pass

a

resolution

honoring the "gallantry and good conduct of Captain [James]
Lawrence, in the capture of a British brig of war," Quincy

rose from his chair.

"[I]n a war like the present, waged

without justifiable cause and prosecuted in

a

manner which

indicates that conquest and ambition are its real motives,"

Quincy explained, "it is not becoming a moral and religious
people to express any approbation of military or naval
exploits

.

64

Predictably, the Republican papers charged Quincy with
"moral treason."

John Holmes, having not yet been

displaced from the General Court, demanded that Quincy 's
48

remarks be struck from the minutes of the
senate.
Even
some leading Federalists found Quincy's purist
stand
irritating. These legislators saw no harm in
tipping their
hats to American bravery when it was merited while
still

maintaining an anti-war position.

Thus, when the delegates

to the Hartford Convention were chosen, as Edmund
Quincy

explained, the Federalist leadership "thought that [Quincy]

would represent too well the spirit of those who demanded
the Convention. He always described the Convention," Edmund

remembered, "as

'a

Tub to the Whale,' as a dilatory measure

to amuse the malcontents [like himself] and make them

believe that something was doing for their relief, and keep

them quiet."

Nothing would come of the convention, Quincy

told a friend, except an insignificant "GREAT PAMPHLET." 55

With General Andrew Jackson's unnecessary victory in
New Orleans and the Treaty of Ghent, Quincy's prediction

proved only half true.

Vilified after the war, those who

took part in the Hartford Convention became marked men
seen by most of the nation as secessionists and traitors.
In this sense, the convention had done something of great

significance: it severely damaged the reputation of the

Federalist party throughout the nation.

After 1815,

throughout most of the country, to be called
was a dire insult.

a

"Federalist"

An Indiana man successfully sued for

$1000 in damages after being accused by another of being a

Federalist.

"Indeed," explained a friend of North Carolina
49

Federalist, Ducan Cameron, "the word
Federalist alone
without the aid of expletives represents to
[the people's]
affrighted imaginations every thing that is
base and

infamous.-"

Only in New England did the party continue
to
enjoy success, but within four years of the Treaty
of
Ghent, even the stronghold of Boston would waver.

During the economic crisis generated by the War of
1812,

the Federalist party had proved highly effective in

exposing the root-cause of the Commonwealth's financial
problems.

Employing the Washington Benevolent Society, as

we have seen, the anti-war, anti-Republican party message

resonated throughout the state strengthening Federalist
partisanship.

In addition to this,

in Boston,

the decline

in commerce was augmented by a rise in urban development

largely funded by wealthy Federalists like Harrison Gray

Otis and William Sullivan.

Merchant ships may have been

rotting in Boston harbor, but new improvement projects were

underway in the town.

During the Embargo of 1807, workers

began to rebuild India and Long wharfs; the erection of
Central wharf started in the midst of the war and proved so

extravagant that it was not completed until 1816; and

Harrison Gray Otis's Mill Pond Corporation began fillingthe northern cove of the Shawmut peninsula in 1807.

in

Such

development helped off-set the negative effects of the war
for the town's population and had direct political

implications.

Spreading its wealth, Federalism's Boston

50

leadership appeared sensitive to the broader
population's
financial needs.
Some three years after the war, with the depression
of
1819, Federalist rhetoric would seem stale and its coffers

fastened tight.

Unlike its response between 1807 through

1815, the party proved ill equipped to deal with the

economic and political turmoil of Boston in 1819.

Although

the WBS persisted until 1824, the organization suffered

from financial mismanagement and its overt partisanship

seemed anachronistic during the "Era of Good Feelings."

As

the newly elected president of the WBS in 1816, Josiah

Quincy successfully reduced the deficit the society
incurred in 1815, yet membership levels steadily declined.
Nevertheless, the WBS

1

s

remarkable political success

illustrated the potential power to be gained by
inclusionary politics. 58

By 1819,

in the midst of economic

and political chaos, the Federalist leadership seemed to

have forgotten this and came to be regarded by many

Bostonians as an exclusive "junto" set on maintaining its
political and economic dominance at the expense of the
people.

Josiah Quincy would be spared such condemnation.
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CHAPTER III

MILITIAMEN

,

DEBTORS, DOWNEASTERNERS AND "DEMIGODS":

THE INGREDIENTS FOR INSURGENT ACTIVISM AND

FEDERALISM ON THE DEFENSIVE
"I always told you, Mr.
of a republican.

— Josiah

Lincoln, that

I

was the most

Quincy to Levi Lincoln, Jr. 1821.

The financial panic of 1819 proved much more severe

than the economic problems Boston faced during the

embargoes and the war.

As a conseguence of the depression

hundreds of businesses failed causing widespread

unemployment in Boston.

In 1823, the North American Review

reported that "thousands [of] mechanics" were out of work
due to the numerous bankruptcies within the city's

mercantile and manufacturing sectors.

1

In June 1822,

forty-two petty merchants in Boston stopped payment on
their debts and faced jail time.

In May, June,

and July of

that same year, one hundred Boston businesses, estimated to
be worth a total of $4,000,000, went under. 2

More and more

people were being sent to Boston's almshouse and many, for
the first time, were "respectable" voters who had fallen on

hard times.

3

In 1820, the first copy of the Debtor s J ournal
'

circulated around town.
edited the Debtor

'

f

The "Association of Gentlemen" who

announced their over-all goals were

"to subdue aristocracy and promote our freedom and

happiness, as Americans."

The Debtor

'

demanded a

political response to the growing numbers of
people
imprisoned for debt.
It attacked the state's debtor's laws
through the press and in petitions to the
General
Court.

According to the journal, "our debtors' laws are
extremely
oppressive to the poor debtors. ... T hey only serve

as rods

]

in the hands of tyrants to torture the unfortunate,
while

the more independent debtors have it in their power
to

escape the lash."

"Viewing this," announced the journal's

editors, "as a growing evil, and as repugnant to the laws
of liberty and equality,

legislative action."

[we]

deem the subject worthy of

4

Accumulating a remarkable total of 4,000 signatures,
debtor advocates twice petitioned the state legislature for
reform.

They asked that work-furloughs for imprisoned

debtor's be extended to include the whole of Boston instead
of the traditional one or two block circumference around

the debtor prison.

The General Court responded by debating

the issue, but refused to act.

On September 23,

1820, the

Debtor's reported that, "[t]he inhabitants of this town, or
a

majority of the legal voters, have petitioned for the

limits of the prison to be extended over the whole town. By
the influence of a petty remonstrance of 120 names, the

petition has been rejected."

Having no other recourse,

debtor advocates filed suit against the town.
petitioners, finding themselves attacked by

"The

a small,

though

spirited opposition [in the General Court]," reported the
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Debtor

"immediately employed two gentlemen of the
bar to
defend their cause; and, (what is uncommon
for Americans)
were conquered by an inferior force."
The debtor advocates
had employed lawyer, Republican operative
and future
'

co-

editor of the Jackson Republican, Henry Orne,
to represent
them in the Court of Sessions for the County of
Suffolk in

September of 1820.

The attempt to reform the laws failed

in the courts, yet the Debtor 'a

jojjrjiaJ

continued to be

printed for another year, keeping the issue of debtor's law
in the public eye.

5

The debtor movement in Boston is significant because
of its advocacy for legislative reforms and for its

identification of an oppressive monied aristocracy that

threatened popular conceptions of democracy.
man," heralded the Debtor's Journal

,

"The rich

"is pondering over

hoarded wealth, and devising means to save and increase

it,

while the real patriot, the man of honesty, is meditating
upon... the means... to make men equal and happy." 6

debtor movement focused on class inequity

—a

The

particularly

timely and popular theme for many trying to survive the

depression-ravaged Boston.

"With a sincere desire

to... subdue aristocracy and promote ... freedom and

happiness," the movement helped redefine Boston's political
standard by injecting class issues into the political

dialogue

— issues

that unlike the economic crisis
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surrounding the War of 1812, the Federalist
leadership
refused to address.
As the numbers of those imprisoned for
debt grew in
Boston, the conservative, Federalist organ,
the Columbian

Cent i ne l, found it could no longer completely ignore
the
debtors.
The paper gave the issue credence by running

an

editorial debate.

Although the Centinel stated that the

existing laws "favored the honest and enterprising
merchant, and show[s] no mercy to the rogue and is

therefore much needed in this country," the paper also ran
a

counter-editorial.

It argued,

"the present severe laws

against insolvent debtors as remnant of barbarism
chr i st i an

,

and as ineffectual

.

"

,

as un-

The New England Galaxy 's

editor, Joseph T. Buckingham, no stranger to bankruptcy and
debt, actively supported the movement in his paper. 7

Having been born in Windham, Connecticut to

a

poor

family, Buckingham was an autodidact who aspired to become
a master printer.

In 1796, at age seventeen,

he secured an

printing apprenticeship in New Hampshire before moving to

Massachusetts where he worked for the Greenfield Gazette
and then in the printing offices of Andrew White and

William Butler in Northampton.

Being dissatisfied with his

position and filled with ambition, Buckingham embarked for
Boston in 1800 to make his mark in the state capital.

Within weeks of his arrival, Buckingham landed a job

working for the city's largest printing press, Thomas
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&

Andrews.

Impressed with Buckingham's printing
skill,
Thomas & Andrews in 1805 handed the
firm over to Buckingham
to manage.
That same year, Thomas and Andrews
offered to
sell their press to him.
Buckingham jumped at the chance,
but quickly fell into debt.
Soon he lost his press and
resorted to teaching school and overseeing
the printing
firm of West & Richardson to make ends meet.
Despite his
failure, he had worked in publishing for
twenty-one years
and had become an expert printer, editor,
and writer.
It

was these qualities that led prominent freemason,
Samuel
Knapp to come to Buckingham when he wanted to establish

weekly in Boston.

In 1817,

L.

a

the first copies of

Buckingham's new venture, the New England Galaxy and

Mason i c Magaz i ne

,

were distributed throughout Boston.

The

paper catered to the city's large numbers of skilled

workers and mechanics.

Although the

GaJ^y promised

to

avoid "all partizanship [sic.]," by the panic of 1819 and
fears of going bankrupt once again, Buckingham refused to

stay silent.

Between 1820 and 1822,

in a flurry of

editorials, the Galaxy attacked the Federalist dominated

legislature for its stubborn support of the old debtor's
laws which the paper described as reminiscent of the

"barbarism of former times."
Picking up the crusade when the Debtor's Journal went
bankrupt, the Galaxy kept debt reform alive in the public
mind.

On national issues, the Galaxy was decidedly
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Federalist, but Buckingham took great
care to keep his
paper out of the hands of the Federalist
Central Committee.
On local issues, such as debt reform,
Buckingham assumed a
decisively independent and individualistic view.
As one
appreciative reader explained in a letter to
Buckingham,
"[y]ou have not only been bold enough to assail
the central

committee— a knot of aristocrats—but you have ventured
to
attack aristocracy itself ... Your paper remains
alone
unsubdued. Bribery, flattery, cowardice and corruption
are

the means by which your editorial brethren have been
drawn
into the monied aristocracy."

Buckingham's commitment to

maintaining an independent voice proved so successful that
the Galaxy held a remarkably high subscription rate of over
one thousand and enjoyed a loyal readership. 9

Buckingham imitated the innovative class-based
editorial approach of the Debtor's Journal

,

charging that

the General Court "is so lost to humanity and common sense
as to wish that the poor man should be punished for his

poverty by even a single hour's imprisonment .... Let the
swindler who hides his wealth for the rightful owners and
laughs at [the debtor's] disappointments and losses starve,
die and rot in his dungeon."

The

"

knavish rich

Galaxy argued, who live "in affluence,

[and]

"
f

the

bring up a son

or two at college, and a daughter in elegant and

fashionable idleness" were unfairly protected by the
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current laws, while the
imprisonment.

"

honest P nn r

suffered

'»

10

As more and more Bostonians failed to
make ends meet
in the depressed economy, popular
opposition to the debtor
laws heightened political awareness and
galvanized Boston
against what it viewed as an unjust Federalist
aristocracy
that ruled from the cold towers of the General
Court.

Although the debtor movement had discerned a politically
charged and conseguential concern in Boston, this
one-issue

movement proved too narrow to construct a viable
oppositional third-party that could disrupt Boston's
traditional Federalist political structure.
The depression spawned another reform movement that

emerged largely from the same social base as the debtor
advocates in Boston.

In the midst of depression, many

artisans, journeymen, mechanics, truckmen, and laborers

began to call for the abolition of the state's militia

requirement laws.

These skilled and semi-skilled laborers

relied on a steady stream of task-oriented work to maintain

economic solvency and independence.

To be forced to leave

the shop or a contracted job for militia duty could mean

financial disaster for this sector of Boston's independent
labor force

— especially

in the hostile economic environment

caused by the depression.

Reminiscing, Buckingham

described the deep resentment the law provoked and the
extent to which poorer people tried to avoid service.
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Describing Henry Emmons, a journeyman
friend, Buckingham
explained that »[a]t a time when every
man in Massachusetts
between the ages of eighteen and forty-five
were obliged

to

perform military duty, or suffer the penalty
of refusal, he
[Emmons] suffered imprisonment for his
obstinacy, and in
order to escape further annoyance for similar
cause he
assumed the dress and probably adopted the doctrines

of the

Friends.

1,11

Men such as Emmons felt deeply insecure about their
solvency and popular opinion mounted against the

Massachusetts militia laws that they believed to be
oppressive, unnecessary, and a profound economic burden.

Serving in the militia required one to have a functional
rifle, pay for powder, shot, and buy uniforms (many of

which were quite elaborate and expensive)

,

as well as train

for days at a time with no financial compensation, and take

orders from an officer corps which was accurately perceived
as being exclusively composed of wealthy elites.

The

militiamen correctly suspected that the militias were used
by the Federalist party to indoctrinate them to the

Federalist cause. 12

Adding to both the frustration of those forced to
serve and the energy of the movement was the militia law's

class-based exemption policy.

All clergy, doctors,

schoolmasters, those in public service (elected and
appointed)

,

justices of the peace, secondary school and
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college students as well as anyone
the Governor deemed,
were not required to serve, nor pay
for their exemption.
"Every dandy," complained the Galaxy,
"who is afraid of a
gun... [and] can push himself into the
governor's presence,
and help himself at his table, gets a
commission as a
justice of the peace, and laughs at his
neighbor, who has
to shoulder the musket
The truth is," the Galaxy
concluded, "there is nothing reasonable in the
system; and

there never will be til the whole is renovated,
and

established on principles of equality." 13

The

requirement to serve in the military during peacetime and
while

a

national depression gutted Boston's economy,

angered the militiamen.

Families suffered while sons and

fathers, forced to postpone work often for weeks at a time,

drilled far away from home.

With little or no income

during these periods, family debt naturally accumulated and
fears of imprisonment loomed.

Identifying

a

direct link between debtors and

militiamen, Buckingham adopted the militia reform movement
and used his editorial skill to splice it with the debtor's

movement.

According to his Galaxy

military duty is considered

a

,

"performance of

hardship .... It is

a tax,

which is most unwillingly paid...[T]he military tax is paid
by the poor" only.

Then squarely linking the debtor's

plight with that of the militiamen, and employing the anti-

aristocratic rhetoric inherent in both movements, the
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GaliLXy charged that »[t]he laborer, whose
daily tasks

supplies but
family,

a

pitiful morsel for the support of his

is called upon for the same sum as
the nabob who is

worth millions]

.

He is driven from his employment, and

trained to the use of arms [and] for the defence
of what?
Of nothing that he can call his own—of the
palace
and

treasures of his rich neighbor...." 14
The Federalist Columbian

Centir.P.1

responded in 1820 to

attacks on the militia system stating that "[f]ree men
ought ever to consider the privilege of bearing arms and
hojioj:

not a tax." Few if any lesser Bostonians had the

financial luxury to agree.

In a three month period during

that same year, one-hundred businesses failed in Boston and
the prisons were filling up with debtors.

15

By spring

1820, the militia reform movement organized a state-wide

petition drive and presented its recommendation for the
abolition of the law to the General Court.

Much like its

response earlier that year to debt reform petitions, the
legislature ignored the citizen's call for reform. 16

Although the Federalist party's Centinel continued to

defend the existing law, wide-spread criticism steadily

mounted within Boston.

In part due to the General Court's

consistent refusal to even address the instructions of the
people

— let

alone follow them

— political

tensions based on

lower class animosity toward the "FEW" heightened over both

militia reform and debt imprisonment.
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By the opening

months of 1821, Boston's political
landscape was ripe for
an insurgency that could integrate
both issues within an
over-arching doctrine that heralded the
injustice of

popular subjugation to aristocratic rule.
Since the state was solidly Federalist, simply
being a
Federalist no longer automatically defined a
legislator's

position on a given policy.

Internal sguabbles not

withstanding, the last word always came from the central
committee, which demanded compliance with its final
ruling.

When Quincy and other younger Federalists party operatives
had challenged the conventional wisdom of the party elders

with the Washington Benevolent Society, the central

committee eventually accepted the idea and sanctioned the
WBS due to its effectiveness in strengthening the popular
appeal of the party
time.

— something

it desperately needed at the

Had the committee rejected the society, the whole

idea would have been scrapped and those Federalists who

supported it, had they not fallen in line, drummed out of
the party.

Massachusetts Federalism proved flexible, but

only to a point

committee

— and

that point rested with the central

1

By 1819, trouble brewed not only in the Federalist

party's popular base, but also within sectors of its elitebased, partisan foundation.

The political activities

initiated by Josiah Quincy in 1819 are representative of
the predicament Federalism faced.
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Quincy's role within the

Federalist party drastically changed once
he returned from
Washington and began focusing on local issues
as a state
senator.
When serving in the United States Congress,

Quincy could clearly define his enemies on
partisan lines.
During the "Virginia Dynasty's" rule in
Washington,
the

Federalist party was clearly the underdog, and
Quincy
enjoyed the luxury of reacting against Republican

policy.

Once in the General Court, the issues for Quincy
became

much more complicated.

Although, at first, he did not

distinguish himself from other partisan Federalists in any
significant way as a state senator, the issues that arose
in 1819 forced him into an activist role and at logger-

heads with the party leadership.
By 1819, Quincy had alienated himself from the

committee and lost its support over Maine's separation from
the state of Massachusetts.

The central committee's Otis,

Sullivan, and Perkins viewed separate statehood for Maine
as an effective means to purge the state of the meddlesome

problem of down-east Republicans in the General Court.
Without Maine, one Federalists chieftain privately remarked
that Massachusetts would become "a snug little Federal
state for the rest of our lives." 18

Quincy strongly disagreed.

"On the question of the

Separation of Maine," his daughter explained, "he was
begged to vote with his party, but he chose to stand alone,

against a measure which reduced Massachusetts from the rank
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of a great State" to a minor one.

Indeed, Quincy worried

that significant national representation
within the U.S.
House would be lost if the state split in-two.
According
to Quincy, if the Maine district was allowed
sovereignty,

Massachusetts on the federal level would loose its
flagship status as the premier northern state in
"opposition to
Southern predominance." Quincy also thought abandoning
Maine's loyal Federalists was an act of irresponsibility
on
the part of the central committee. The down-east minority
Federalist position would be pointlessly served-up and

quickly devoured by the ravenous appetite of Maine's

Republican majority.

When the question came to the senate

floor, according to Quincy 's son, he "resisted the

passage.

.

.with all the energy of his character," which was

formidable

19

In June 1819, Quincy stood with the Republican

leadership by actively leading the legislative opposition
to the Maine bill in the General Court.

First, he

unsuccessfully tried to bury the proposal in a senate
committee that would review the question of whether any
bill advocating separation should first be approved by

referendum before reaching the General Court.
was defeated by a senate vote of 24 to 12.

His motion

Doggedly

pursuing his position, Quincy changed tactics by presenting
an amendment to the measure that would require two-thirds
of the Maine district's electorate to vote in favor of
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separation before the bill returned to
the legislature for
final consideration.
This too was rejected.
Despite his
efforts, the Maine bill would come to
a final vote in the
senate on June 15th. 20

Having exhausted all parliamentary tactics
to prevent
the measure from reaching the floor, Quincy
fell back
on

his ability at personal persuasion.
bill for two hours.

He spoke against the

The Boston Daily h^£S£Hssr reported

the speech was "able, clear and forcible," but
did not sway
the senate.
Quincy' s major problem was the central

committee's strong support for the bill which it had
in drafting.

a

hand

Finding its plans complicated by Quincy 's

obstinacy, the central committee found

a

worthy proponent

in Federalist operative from Essex, Leverett Saltonstall,

who rose to the senate floor in response to Quincy 's appeal
and delivered an equally long and more persuasive oration
for the bill.

When the bill finally came to a senate vote,

Quincy stuck to his convictions and cast his vote with a
bizarre coalition of Maine Federalists and Massachusetts

Republicans that lost to an even more peculiar coalition of
bitter traditional enemies; Maine Republicans and

Massachusetts Federalists out-voted Quincy 's forces by a

margin of two to one.
persuaded

a

In a last ditch-effort, Quincy

Boston representative to introduce his

amendment for a down-east referendum to the House when the
bill arrived there on June 16th.
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By a vote of 83 to 168,

the motion for Quincy 's amendment
died in the House.
The
next day, the House overwhelming
voted in favor of Maine's
separation. Thus, not only had Maine
gained its first step
toward statehood, but Quincy, by his
persistent opposition,
had forfeited his standing within the
Federalist party. 21
At the time of legislative debates, the
general
electorate seemed largely apathetic to Maine
statehood.
Within two years of separation, however, the
Boston press
ran editorial after editorial chastising those
individual

Massachusetts legislators who had so easily allowed
their
down-east brethren to break-off. According to one
observer, "the general feeling was one of regret at
a

decision which it had become too late to reverse." 22

Some

three years after separation, the independent Bostonian

anri

Mechanics Journal which rivaled only the Galaxy in its
lower-to-middling class readership, argued, as Quincy had

during the debates, that the central committee of "the
•federal party

favored the separation of Maine, in order

that the Government of Massachusetts might longer remain in

their hands."

The Bostonian accused "the ranks of

aristocracy" of tricking the people for their own selfish,

partisan interests and

— though

after the fact

— it

now stood

with Quincy against separation. 23
The immediate political ramifications of Quincy 's

energetic and stubborn defiance of the central committee's
standing orders were severe and came at great personal cost
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to his political ambitions.

Before the Maine bill debates,

he had been slated by the central
committee to fill Eli P.

Ashmun's U.S. Senate seat once Ashmun retired.
stand on the Maine bill, the central committee

After his
was so

angered that by Quincy's defiance that it
rejected his
nomination to the Senate. Quincy's punishment did
not end
there.
On March 28, 1820, for the first time since
1813,
the committee's nominating list for the state
senate did
not include Quincy's name.

In his place,

the Federalist

leadership nominated one of its own—insider, William
Sullivan.

The committee publicly justified dropping Quincy

on the grounds that he "has not received for several years
as many votes as the other senators had who were on the

federal Ticket."

One-time Federalist lieutenant governor

and Quincy's uncle, William Phillips, was outraged and

expressed "strong indignation at the ingratitude of the
party."
"if

I

"I declare," Phillips confided to Quincy's wife,

was Mr. Quincy

I

would go out of Boston and shake its

dust from my feet." 24
By so doggedly positioning himself against the central

committee and allying with the Republican opposition during
the Maine debates, Quincy found himself ostracized by the

party leadership.

Harrison Gray Otis revealed the fissure

between Quincy and the central committee could have been
easily avoided "[i]f he [Quincy] had always voted at his

party's call, and never thought of thinking.
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..

but he had an

inveterate habit of thinking for himself."

As Quincy's son

remembered, the central committee "look[ed]
upon him as one
whose political zeal might out run his
discretion, and who
could not be depended on in ... partisan
emergenc
ies

[

This, according to his daughter,

]

.

•'

"rendered him unacceptable

to the Federal managers. ... T ] hey could
not calculate on
his obedience to them," so he was purged. 25

Coinciding with these events, in spring 1820, the
debtor and militiaman movements s anti-aristocracy
1

rhetoric, with Buckingham's help, was laying the
groundwork
for viable third party challenges to the central

committee's strangle-hold of Boston and the state.

Before

the April elections, the Federalist Columbian Centin^l

warned its readership of third party activity in Boston.
"[BJeware of mixed tickets," it cautioned.

In Essex and

Salem counties attempts were made to establish

third

a

party against Federalist domination. 26
A month before the state elections, in March, the

central committee fell under severe attack.

Buckingham's

Galaxy/ on March 10, made its position clear: "We

despise.

..

the federal and all other juntos

— and

we should

like to see the [end of the] central-committee, which has
so long been the scourge and disgrace of Boston." 27

Galaxy

'

s

next issue suggested

a

The

radical plan for the

restructuring of Boston politics, devoid of the central
committee's influence.

"At this important crisis, when the
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incompetency of our Central Committee, and
Primary c*»n^
are so glaring, and when we are smarting
under the disgrace
which has recently been fixed upon us in
consequence of
their former folly and obstinacy, I would
suggest,

heralded "Vox Populi" in the pages of the
Galaxy, "the
expediency of taking measures for establishing a
new

Committee and Caucus, on the principle of

representat i on of the wards

;

a re_al

the ward fl&legates to be

actua ll y chosen by the... voters in each ward

[For]

the

junto... are only lovers of themselves [and] manage to

monopolize those offices, which, for the honor of the town
[Boston] and the good of the nation, should be given only

to men of talent and patriotism." 28

determine the.

..

future,

"

"For one caucus to

the Galaxy argued in April,

"is

too absurd and ridiculous for the serious consideration of
any but self-created dictators." 29

Responding to the assaults, the Federalist press
argued that "[t]he Central County Committee, in Boston,
have existed ever since parties began; and have the same

political origin, and been organized to advance the cause
of Federal [ism] the same as the old Jacobin Club.... Is it

because the former have been so successfully frustrating
all the plans of the latter," questioned the Federalist

Centinel

,

"that they have become so obnoxious to their

virulence and abuse?" 30

Despite repeated batteries from

the Galaxy and the Republican press, in the April elections
78

the Federalist party ticket held the
state, holding a
majority of eleven in the state senate. 31

The events of 1820 generated an initial
movement based
on the legitimacy of a new third party
committed to ward
voting.
Within two years, the ward voting issue would
grow
in popularity and the political party it
nurtured would

effectively serve as the umbrella under which the
debtor's
and militiamen's movements coalesced into a powerful
coalition of popular interests.

The Galaxy's charge that

the Federalist Central Committee acted as selfish, "self-

created dictators," supplied the common ground for all
three movements to merge into a single insurgent party.
For Josiah Quincy, the Federalist "wire-pullers" overt

rejection in 1820 caused him great bitterness and

understandable anger. 32

But Quincy also saw opportunity.

His remarkably bold and independent actions over the Maine

bill prompted many ordinary Bostonians to view him

differently from Federalism 's regular operatives.

To many

Bostonians, Quincy seemed to possess something quite unique
for a Federalist leader

—a

highly independent character

consistently unafraid of the

central committee and the

immense political power it wielded.
Some in the Federalist and independent press seemed

confused by the central committee's draconian measures.
The Boston Daily Advertiser asked "why [has] the name of
Mr. Quincy [been] withdrawn?"
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Buckingham's Galaxy viewed

Quincy as one of the -few of our statesmen
[who is]
entitled to the esteem of [our] fellow
citizens ....

[H] is

friends, even those who disapproved of
his warmth and

impetuosity, refuse to acknowledge that he was
an honest
and upright, and independent politician. He
ha[s], in some
way or another," Buckingham explained, "become
unpopular in
the federalist party" leadership
Considering the
(

.

growing political dissension and dissatisfaction within
Boston, this was not wholly bad for Quincy.

As the depression plundered ordinary Bostonians's

household economies while the Federalist leadership did
nothing, being viewed as an outsider from the Federalist

"cabal" or "junto" could be exploited politically.
in March,

1820,

a

Indeed,

coalition of dissident Federalists and

Republicans temporarily formed in Boston to successfully
challenge the Federalist Central Committee's slate for the
town's Board of Selectmen.

with the Galaxy

'

s

In October,

the same coalition,

support, came dangerously close to

upsetting Boston Federalist stalwart, Benjamin Gorham's run
for Congress with its own Samuel A. Wells.

Buckingham

captured the anti-establishment mood of Boston in his

Galaxy

:

"we would sooner vote for Beelzebub than for the

greatest and wisest man in creation, who should be
nominated by

a

secret cabal,

a

junto of purse-proud

demagogues, who care no more for the interest or the

welfare of the middling classes of society than the afore
80

mentioned Beelzebub." 34

Having been purged from the

"secret cabal's- nominating list, Quincy
was viewed
favorably in the eyes of those who supported
the
position

Much to the astonishment of the central
committee,
after his censor from the party, in April of
1820, Quincy
showed up at the Federalist caucus in Faneuil Hall.

According to his son, »[h]is appearance there, which
was... a great surprise, excited as general a
curiosity to

know what he was going to say...— a curiosity probably
not
unmixed with anxiety on the part of those who had
engineered the dropping of his name from the lists of
candidates."

in particular, William Sullivan was there

representing the central committee.

When Quincy rose to

speak before a packed audience of rank-and-file Federalists
in Faneuil Hall, his daughter explained that it was the

"turning point in my father's political life." 35

According to Edmund Quincy, his father addressed the
caucus "in such a strain of humor,

[and] wit" that the "old

walls shook with laughter and cheers."

After sardonically

explaining the "way in which he had been thrown overboard"
by the central committee, Quincy endorsed the same

Federalist ticket that had spurned him.

In so doing,

according to one observer, the oration made him "the most
popular man in the town."

Positioning himself in between

the Federalist leadership and the party's rank-and-file,
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Quincy,

in one speech,

Federalists.

enamored himself with ordinary

He had shown himself to be highly
critical of

the central committee, yet, all the
while, selflessly loyal
to the party as a whole despite its
treatment
of him.

After 1820, Quincy's political strength would
no longer
come from the central committee.
Instead, he would garner

political popularity from

a

Boston electorate that viewed

him as an honest and independent leader who had

successfully stood up to the "self-appointed Federal
dictators" of the central committee H
Quincy's daughter claimed that her father met head-on,
"the desertion of the Federalist leaders," with

"spirit."

a

new found

Also, he had gained the support of many upper-

class Federalists who deemed the committee's harsh

discipline of him unjust.

These men occupied

a

similar

position within the party as Quincy had held before he had
been purged.

Men like John Phillips, William Phillips,

Benjamin Pollard, and William Sturgis were established
Federalist politicians.

Nonetheless, they remained

excluded from the inner councils of the Federal Central

Committee dominated by Harrison Gray Otis, William Sullivan
and Thomas H. Perkins.

It was this group of dissident

Federalists who continued to support Quincy despite the
central committee's order.

With John Phillips's support

and influence, Quincy ran successfully for
the lower house of the General Court.
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a

position in

Federalists loyal to

the central committee made his election
difficult and
Quincy just barely won a seat in the less
prestigious
House.

37

Understanding that he had lost the central
committee's
patronage and aware of the mounting popular
criticism being
leveled at the Federalist leadership, Representative
Quincy
amassed legislative support among both regular
Federalists
and Republicans.
in one of his first acts in the
House,

Quincy angered the central committee by calling for

a

state-wide convention to rewrite the Massachusetts
Constitution.

"At 10 took seat in house of Rep." Quincy

wrote in his diary. "[A]t meeting... on the subject of

proposing to the people an opportunity of amending the
constitution. Argued to pass such
a

committee to draft."

a

resolution and appoint

With the Maine district gone,

Quincy logically and persuasively argued that the old
system of representation within Massachusetts was invalid
and had to be revised.

This caused an unforeseen dilemma

for the Federalist leadership.
1780,

The old constitution of

according to one Massachusetts historian, "was the

pride of the conservative men who led the Federalist party"
from its strongholds like Hampshire, Essex and Suffolk
counties.

Support for Quincy' s motion came from

Republicans and representatives from the back-country

districts like Berkshire and Worcester counties, as well as
dissident legislators from Boston. 38
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By successfully

pushing through a motion for a convention
to completely
overhaul the constitution, Quincy pressed
the central
committee to face democratic reform impulses
which it
rather would have ignored. 39
Employing the talents and influence of Governor
John
Brooks, the central committee lobbied tirelessly
against a
convention.

Claiming the existing constitution had been

"drawn by masterly hands" of John Adams, Brooks spearheaded
the committee's position, arguing that any changes to the

constitution should be drafted in committee by the General
Court and then presented to the electorate for
ratification.

If done within the General Court,

undoubtedly, all reformist influence could easily be

checked by the Federalist dominated legislature.

The

central committee's Federalist press strongly bolstered the

governor's recommendations in editorial after editorial,
but to no avail. 40

Stating that "the federal dictators,

especially in and about Boston," were up to no good, the
Indepen dent Chronicle attacked what it identified as

Federalist subterfuge against the will of the people.
Despite the Federalist leadership's best efforts, the

overwhelming opinion of both rank-and-file Federalists and
Republicans prevailed.
electorate voted by

a

In a state-wide referendum the

margin of two to one in favor of a

convention. 41
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With convention delegates to be elected
in town
meetings throughout the state on October 6
and a

commencement date set on November

15,

the central committee

rushed to devise a new strategy to control the
convention.
Much was at stake.
if the reformers had their
way, the

apportionment of the senate would no longer be based on
regional property holdings, but population. Federalist
strongholds of Suffolk and Essex counties would loose their

over-representation in the upper-house.

As things stood

under the constitution of 178 0, the combined weight of
these two counties sent
to the legislature.

third of senate's representatives

a

Also, reformers demanded that the

legislature have more control over the state-supported

college of Harvard.

Reformers also wanted to end the

state's support of Congregationalism which they viewed as

unfair and discriminatory.

Thus, the Congregational

church's coffers were threatened by constitution reform.
The independence of the state's judicial branch also fell

under reformist attack.

The independent court system,

reformers charged, unfairly upheld the interests of the
elite.

courts.

Reformers demanded legislative authority over the
Also, they called for the codification of

universal male suffrage, though practically, it already
existed.

42

These reforms were only the ones proposed

before the convention met, although there were undertones
that the militia and debtor's issues would be forced into
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the convention's agenda.

Who knew what would emerge at the

convention once the delegates met on November
15th?
Republicans like Levi Lincoln, Jr. from Worcester,

James

T.

Austin from Boston, Henry Dearborn from Roxbury
were

unpredictable and publicly had vowed radically to
amend the
constitution. Making matters worse, the central
committee

believed delegates sympathetic to reform would hold
the
majority at the convention. 43
Understanding its compromised position, the central
committee quickly worked to consolidate its forces in an
attempt to mitigate the potential damage constitutional

reform could wreak on the status quo.

Harrison Gray Otis

discharged orders to his operatives throughout the state to
support conservative Republican delegates who would be

sensitive to Federalist orthodoxy.

In the Republican

power-broker and state Supreme Court Justice, Joseph Story,
the central committee found its most effective champion.

Though a loyal Republican, Story felt dismayed by his

party's consistent attack on an independent judiciary.

Republican and some Federalists reformers were calling for
legislative authority over the judicial branch.

Also, as

the Galaxy charged, "[t]he little state of Massachusetts
[with Maine gone] must still have as many judicial

officers, and pay them as high saleries, as when she had

three times her present territory, and

inhabitants."

a

third more

As the Galaxy further explained, during the
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depression "when the farmer and mechanic are
compelled to
submit to low prices, " why should not they
"expect ... some
method to reduce the expenses of government
by reducing
[judge's] salaries or the number of salaries
44
"z
For
.

Story, who, since 1809, had lobbied in the
legislature for

higher salaries for judiciary members, such
sentiments were
repugnant and secured his alliance with the central

committee against reform. 45

Being perceived as a

Republican partisan, Story would use his influence as a
Republican to pacify the more radical reformist voices at
the convention. 46

Cognizant of the committee's tactics, Republican
reformist, P.

F.

Degrand seemed disgusted with the

ineptitude of his fellow reformers during the elections for

convention delegates.

Writing to his friend John Quincy

Adams, Degrand explained his frustration in trying "to move

our political friends to a sense of importance of electing
[to the convention] their own men." 47

In town meeting's

throughout the Commonwealth, as in the convention itself,
Federalist and Republican delegates were both supported and

denounced by the central committee regardless of party.
Traditional party alignments verged on being thrown into
chaos
On November 14th, a day before the convention opened,

Story was summoned to Boston to meet with the central

committee's newest rising star and Boston newcomer, Daniel
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Webster.

The gathering, which included other
Republicans

recruited to the cause, focused mainly on

a

new and

ingenious strategy to undercut the majority power
of the
reformers. Webster's plan was to divide the
convention
into ten select committees.
Each would have the task of

evaluating each knotty constitutional issue being
addressed
at the convention.
By controlling and framing the

convention agenda in this manner, the most controversial
concerns could be ignored and the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of the entire constitution of 1780, as

a

whole, would never come under guestion, let alone fall

under attack.

Instead, the delegates and the issues would

be sliced-up into ten detached pieces and buried in ten

separate sub-committees. 48
The first essential step for the central committee to

engage their plan was to secure the president's seat at the
convention.

It was the president's responsibility to

appoint the chairman of each of the ten committees.

If the

anti-reformists could place one of their own in key

chairmanship positions, the reformers could easily be
controlled.

Covering all their bets, Webster and Story

decided to propose Federalist stalwart and chief justice of
the Massachusetts supreme court, Isaac Parker and Story, as

the Republican, for the position of president.

No matter

who won, the central committee would have its man. 49
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The next day, with the opening of the
convention,
Webster and Story witnessed the fruition of
their scheme.
Parker won the presidency by sixty-five votes
in a close
election that pitted him against Story. Many
of the

delegates from the western part of the state had
not yet
arrived to the convention. Interestingly, disgruntled
Federalist and Quincy's first cousin, John Phillips's
name
had been on the ballot, nominated as a third party

candidate of sorts, and received fifty votes.

Noting that

many delegates were still making the long journey to
Boston, the Pittsfield Sun of the Berkshire region argued

Parker would have been defeated if the vote had not been

rushed through the convention. 50
Clearly disgusted by Federalist political subterfuge,

Buckingham criticized Parker's election, stating, "this is
the first time that a... judge of the Supreme Court of

Massachusetts has put off the ... unsullied robes of his
office and entered undisguised and naked on the political
arena, converting the hall of justice into a caucus room,

and its bench into a forum for the promulgation of

sectarian sentiments...."

Jettisoning any remains of

honorable disinterestedness, Buckingham exposed
Federalism'

s

preservation.

descent into the petty politics of selfThe Republican Patriot also reprimanded

Parker, but went farther, charging that the convention was

fraudulent to its core: "we very much disapprove [of] the
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design and complexion of the whole [convention].
We cannot
but consider it an injurious [sic] attempt
to influence
the pj-pjjOe., whose business it alone is, to
alter and amend
that Constitution
The people are competent to the task

without the aid of Lawyers...." 51
In spite of such criticism, the convention was

masterfully rigged and the reformers largely defeated
before the debates even began.

elected as
committee.

a

Josiah Quincy had been

delegate despite opposition from the central
Wisely, Parker appeased Quincy by appointing

him to chair a committee which the Federalist leadership

knew would limit his potential to disrupt the convention.
As chairman of the committee selected to review Harvard

college's relationship to the state, Quincy found himself
toeing an anti-reform line.

On Harvard, Quincy' s loyalties

were known and distinctly conservative.

After Maine

separation had so badly damaged the rank of Massachusetts
as a leading state in the nation, Quincy foresaw the

Commonwealth's only hope in regaining national authority
was by maintaining and strengthening its cultural and

educational foundations.

Although the state may have

become "second class in population, and of the lowest in

extent of territory," it could emerge, despite its
numerical inferiority, as

a

national beacon to steer the

moral and intellectual course of the country.

According to

Quincy, the maintenance, support and growth of Harvard was
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crucial for the Commonwealth to reacquire
national
authority. 52 Needless to say, he was also

a loyal alumnus.

Thus, he endorsed and supported the
continuation of state

support for the college, despite reformist cries
that
Harvard was an elitist institution that had been
"built up
by the State," but wholly "above the control
of the State
government.

,|53

The one reform Quincy adopted lay within the dogmatic

qualifications required in the old constitution that any
and all ministers on the Board of Overseers were required
to be Congregationalists.

With Quincy'

s

support and

endorsement, this provision was swept away and the

committee recommended that "the constitution.

..

be amended

as to make ministers of the gospel, of any denomination,

eligible to the office of overseers...." 64

On other

matters, Quincy bucked the Federalist leadership at the

convention.

During the debates on suffrage rights, Quincy

distinguished himself from the central committee's
representatives who fought to maintain the traditional
voting qualifications.

Under the constitution of 1780,

voting rights were restricted to those who owned sixty
pounds of freehold property or earned an income of three
pounds annually. 55

Because, in actual practice, this

translated into universal manhood suffrage, the issue was
largely inconsequential.

Nonetheless, it took on

significant symbolic value in helping to define the
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convention's opposing sides.

Reformers, such as Levi

Lincoln Jr., asked that suffrage be extended
to all of-age
men who paid a state or county tax.
According to Edmund
Foster, a delegate from Littleton, "[m]en
who have no

property are put in the situation of the slaves
of
Virginia; they ought to be saved from th[is]
degrading
feeling." 56

On this, everyone agreed.

On a closely related matter, Quincy presented a

convincing case to restrict paupers from gaining the vote.
Arguing that voting paupers damaged the status of the

working poor, he presented an amendment to the convention
floor.

Quincy contended that his "provision is in favor of

the poor, and against the pauper —that is to say, in favor
;

of those who have something, but very little;" 57

Quincy 's

position was an old argument that distinguished between the
worthy and unworthy poor. 58
The provision appealed to the lower-to-middling

classes and debtors because it distinguished them from

propertyless paupers.

More importantly, Quincy

convincingly argued that to bestow voting rights on a class
thoroughly dependent on wealthy benefactors for its very
survival was fundamentally undemocratic.

Without his

amendment, Quincy explained that "the poor man has... lost
his political all; he has no power of indemnifying himself.

Where as the rich, by the influence resulting from his

property over the class of paupers, has the power of
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indemnifying himself

a

hundred fold."

Comparing the

problems he predicted in pauper suffrage
to his own
personal anxieties about the future industrial
course
Massachusetts was taking, Quincy asked what
barriers
existed "to prevent manufactures [mechanics
and factory
operatives] from being absolutely dependent upon
their
employers
The whole body of every manufacturing
establishment.

.

.are dead votes, counted by head, by their

employers. Let the gentleman from the country consider,
how
it might effect their rights,

liberties, and properties,

if

in every county of the Commonwealth there should

arise... one, two, or three manufacturing establishments,

each sending.

..

from one to eight hundred votes to the polls

depending on the will of one employer, one great
capitalist.

" 59

Quincy' s arguments during the suffrage debates expose

his great fear of a electorate susceptible to manipulation.

Bribery of the weak could lead to

a

managed electorate.

The implications, as Quincy viewed them, would be

devastating to a free and independent electorate.

Paupers

would be forced into economic dependency by unscrupulous
partisan operatives, robbing the society's most vulnerable
of their independence.

The electorate would fall victim to

the corrupting influence of calculating partisans who would

subvert the electoral system.

Powerful interests would

seduce society's most vulnerable members to surrender the
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most revered emblem of citizenship— the
freedom to vote
one's mind. Under such circumstances, the
key foundation
of a democratic society—an independent and
autonomous

citizenry's right to vote— would be placed in
jeopardy.

Whether it be paupers so destitute that financial

desperation drove them to sell their vote, or a future
industrialized world where masses of worker-voters forfeit

political autonomy to "one great capitalist," the result

would be the same.

The independent Massachusetts citizenry

would be coerced into a state of dependence and thus,
surrender electoral freedom.
Quincy's overt attack on the state's manufacturing
interests appalled industrialism's advocates, like Daniel
Webster.

After Quincy's speech, one of the reformers most

vocal representatives, James T. Austin, referring to
Quincy, remarked, "[o]ne gentleman [has forewarned of] our

becoming a great manufacturing people. God forbid."

In

their general opinion of the potential problems growing

industrialization would have on the democratic process,

Quincy and men like Austin agreed.
they did not.

On suffrage rights,

Austin and George Blake, Republican delegate

from Boston, forcefully championed the pauper's right to

suffrage; yet, finding they held more in common than they
thought, Quincy's and Austin's forces worked out a

compromise provision that excluded paupers from voting, but
60
gave the vote to all of -age men who paid taxes.
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As

mentioned earlier, the suffrage issue proved
largely
symbolic.
The codification of new suffrage

rights in the

state's constitution did not increase voter
participation
in Massachusetts after 1821.

61

Despite Quincy's unpredictable nature, he, along
with
the reformers, had fallen victim to the central
committee's

covert scheme.

All the significant issues raised during

the convention were declawed and the constitution that

emerged upheld the status quo.
reform secured

a

Interestingly, militia

spot on the convention's agenda, but all

hopes for any significant changes in the law were quickly
put to rest when Joseph Varnum of Dracut was appointed

chairman of the Militia Committee.

Varnum, a Republican,

was the Major General of the Boston Brigade and, in 1820,
had fallen under severe criticism by the Boston press for

misappropriation of militia funds.

Specifically,

"A Friend

to the Militia," in the Galaxy accused Varnum of syphoningoff militia funds by giving them to his brigade quarter

master, who happened to be Varnum 's son.

Clearly, General

Varnum was highly invested in the maintenance of the
existing militia laws.

Chairman Varnum silenced the

reformist voices in his charge and the committee did little
more than insert a clause into the new constitution that

allowed under-aged militiamen to vote for their officers.
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In many ways, the militia committee
symbolized the

whole convention process.

Despite the great potential for

reform that the constitutional convention
offered the
people of Massachusetts, in the end, the reformers

found

themselves out-classed and overpowered by

a

Federalist

machine that had employed the services of various antireform Republicans.

As an exasperated Republican, reform

delegate, Nathan Martin of Marblehead, somewhat naively
pleaded,

"[w]e know what's right, and what's wrong,... but

it is not to be expected that we can express ourselves so

politely;

[we]

who have not had the education" of the anti-

reform forces. 63
After the convention, Daniel Webster proudly wrote to
his confidant, Jeremiah Mason, that "[w]e have got out as

well as we expected.
numbers.
matter,

.

&

.tho'

..

... It

was a great body, in

.there was a good deal of inflammable

some radicalisms in it. We are exceedingly

fortunate, in finding a considerable number of Gentlemen

well disposed, who might otherwise have occasioned much

trouble."

Webster and Otis's strategy to control the

convention had worked brilliantly.
Joseph Story explained, "[t]here was

Writing to Mason,
a

pretty strong body

of Radicals, who seemed well disposed to get rid of all the

great fundamental barriers of the Constitution. Another
class still more efficient, and by no means small in

numbers was that of the 'lovers of the people, alias the
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lovers of popularity.' The combination
of the two classes
sometimes defeated us, and always posed
us with

difficulties

it was no small thing to prevent sad

mischiefs to the Constitution. The struggle
for our part
was not victory, but for the preservation
of
our

institution. We were for the most part on the
defensive:
and... we have repelled the

t popul ar attacks -""

fflflfl

Although Story did not declare total victory, the
central committee's ability to stave-off popular challenges
to the constitution amounted to

a

significant triumph.

central committee successfully reached all its goals.

The
It

had purged the state of Maine Republicans and maintained

state constitution that benefited its interests.

a

Even more

significantly, the central committee could claim that

neither maneuver had been done in an undemocratic manner or

partisan manner

— no

one,

that is, except Joseph Buckingham.

In a series of articles, the Galaxy, attacked the

convention for ignoring the economic devastation the

depression inflicted on the ordinary citizens of
Massachusetts.'

"What has the convention done?"

Buckingham asked. "Nothing

— absolutely

nothing."

Explaining that the convention refused to address the

depression ravaged state of the Massachusetts economy by
not

"

lessen ing
[

]

the state's expenses," Buckingham

accurately accused the "rich" of rigging the constitutional
process.

"Every article of produce has fallen from 20 to

<)7

50 per cent with a few years. The farmer
and the mechanic

are compelled to submit to lower prices
for their produce
and manufactures, and to many deprivations
.... and had the
right to expect that the convention would
devise some
method to reduce the expenses of government,
either by

reducing salaries or the number of salary-taking
officers.
The Convention itself," Buckingham figured, "will

cost the

state $70,000, at the lowest calculation— and who
is to pay
it? Not the judges— not the clergymen— for they
are all
of

the privileged orders; not the stock-holders in banks—

their tax goes to enrich the funds... to buy every man's
vote.... But the farmers and mechanic

shopkeeper— who will

— the

[on top of] taxes,

labourer; and the

rents,... bad debts,

and though last not least, the whole burden of military

duty," will be forced to pick up the bill. 66
In the same edition of the Galaxy
a

,

Buckingham included

speech given by Quincy at the Massachusetts Peace Society

and followed it up with a very favorable editorial that was

succeeded the next week by an equally positive article on
the same speech.

According to the Galaxy

t

the Peace

Society, despite its being "the subject of sarcasm,"

contained "a few gentlemen.

military fanaticism.

..

.

.who saw and deplored [the]

pervading the country."

Although

Quincy' s speech did not directly illustrate his opinion on

the growing popular opposition to forced militia service,
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clearly Buckingham discerned the connection
when he ran
both articles side by side. 67
The bipartisan alliances made before and
during the
convention hastened and exposed the fragility
of the two
party system in Massachusetts. Just as members
of both
parties fought for reform, so too did bipartisan,
antireform forces campaign vigorously for the status
guo.

During the debates, party alignment and the posturing
of

delegates on a given issue rarely corresponded.
Having distanced himself from the central committee
during the debates, a day after the convention adjourned

Quincy took advantage of the resulting partisan disorder
and cultivated a new base of power.

disaffected Federalists and

a

On January 10, 1821,

remarkable number of

Republican partisans elected Quincy Speaker of the House.

According to the previous Speaker and leading Republican,
Levi Lincoln Jr., "Mr. Quincy had never been so well

understood as since the convention."
Lincoln Jr. and James

T.

Republicans like Levi

Austin, as well as Federalists,

John Phillips and William Stugis, threw their weight behind

Quincy and achieved what Lincoln claimed "no one would
have" thought possible.

As Eliza confessed in her diary,

"I knew that my father was a candidate for [Speaker],

did not expect his election."

Illustrating Quincy'

Republican support, Eliza recounted
with Levi Lincoln.

but

a

conversation she had

Lincoln stated "that no one was more
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I

happy to see Mr. Quincy in the Speaker's
chair than
himself." 68 Considering their past
partisan

warfare, thi s

union between Lincoln and Quincy clearly
revealed the
growing dissatisfaction and fragmentation
occurring within
the Federalist party. 69
Since the beginning of his political career,
Levi

Lincoln Jr. consistently spoke-out vigorously
against the
Federalist Central Committee. Charging the committee
with
"intolerance and oppressive violence in electioneering,"
Lincoln argued that

"

[individuals have been threatened

with deprivation of employment and an instant exaction of
debt to the last farthing as

a

consequence of withholding

federal vote, or rather of not giving one."

a

in his

advocacy to change the basis of representation in the state
senate during the constitutional convention, Lincoln posed
the most formidable obstacle to the central committee's
goals.

He emerged from the convention with the distinction

of being reform Republicanism's most powerful and outspoken

spokesman.

Feared and respected by the central committee,

during the convention Lincoln forced the issue of senate

representation onto the convention floor in the midst of
imposing opposition.

"Our government," Lincoln declared,

"is one of the people, not a government of

property .... Property is incomplete to sustain
government.

.

.

a

free

.Were it not for a government of the people,

the people would be without property .... It is only
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necessary that all who are taxed should
be represented, and
not that they should be represented
in proportion to their
tax." 70 As a spokesman for the central
part of
the state,

an advocate for debt reform and the
central committee's

most influential critic, Quincy saw the
great advantage of
winning Lincoln's support.
Seventeen days after his election as speaker,
Quincy
hosted fourteen of the state's most preeminent
Republicans
and those Federalists who had supported him, at a
formal
dinner in his home on Hamilton Place.
"I never expected

to

see Mr. Lincoln

&

J.T. Austin dining here," wrote an

astonished Eliza Quincy.
that night.

Quincy charmed his dinner company

To Lincoln he stated, "I always told you, Mr.

Lincoln, that

I

was the most of a republican

.

"

Where

Lincoln responded that he "did not expect to find that [he]
was more aristocratic than [Quincy]." 71

The dinner

conversation, according to Eliza, was very jovial, "chiefly

political" and indicates the initial preparations for

a

future bipartisan front to be launched against the central
72

committee

Austin, a Republican activist from Boston, was

considered by both Harrison Gray Otis and Joseph Story as
dangerous and influential trouble-maker.

Writing of Austin

that same year, Story described his fellow Republican as

"hostile

&

impolite; and [someone who] essentially lowers

the dignity of the great department he occupies."
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Nevertheless, »[p]ublic opinion,

"

story warned Federalist,

Jeremiah Mason, "begins to manifest itself
considerably as
to the merits of J.T. Austin
[T]he demagogues approve
it; and the mob cries hurra...." 73
Yet,

if future articles are any indication,

editor of the influential Columbian CentinPl

f

the

Benjamin

Russell, who also attended the dinner, could not be
won

over that night by Quincy or his little circle of cohorts.

Despite an editorial by Russell that had voiced subtle

criticism of Chief Justice Parker's nomination to the
convention's presidency, 71 Russell's political positions
were strictly restricted within the criteria set forth by
the central committee.
loyalty.

He had been richly rewarded for his

In 1819, Russell was admitted into the inner-

circle of the central committee.

Unlike Harrison Gray Otis

and Thomas H. Perkins, Russell was not rich, nor was he

ever going to be.

Indeed, by 1844 he was penniless,

and living in a boarding house.

sick

As a fellow Boston

journalist explained, "Russell was proud of his character
as a mechanic. To the mechanics, as a class, he was

strongly and affectionately attached.

[Having] associated

with men of the highest rank... and even courted by some of
the leaders of his party, he never forgot that he was

a

Russell founded the Massachusetts Charitable

mechanic."

Mechanics Association and served as its president between
1808-1817

75
.

Also, Russell and Quincy enjoyed an old
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friendship.

Quincy knew Russell from the Washington

Benevolent Society where both had served
as high ranking
members and together represented the
cross-class basis of
that organization. 76 it was, perhaps, these
qualities and
feelings that prompted Quincy to believe
Russell would be
sympathetic to him and openly critical of the
central
committee.
Unfortunately, Russell's loyalties could not be
shaken.

Quincy would have to find the editorial support he

needed elsewhere.

By the end of 1821, Quincy found his man

and organ in the fiercely independent Joseph
and his New Engl and Galavy

T.

Buckingham

.

In May of 1821, Quincy' s popularity in the House was

reaffirmed when he was re-elected as Speaker.

After

reform's failure at the constitutional convention, Quincy 's
original position on Maine statehood became increasingly
popular.

With Maine's independence and the convention,

many in the Commonwealth perceived

a

strengthened

centralized political aristocracy in the form of the
central committee that did, in fact, exist in the state and
was,

in fact,

a light,

repressing the rights of the people.

Maine separation seemed

a big

In such

mistake. "Since her

separation from Massachusetts," explained the Galaxy

,

"Maine seems to be making rapid advances in improvements,

while the parent state, clinging with ridiculous veneration
to old, absurd, and anti-republican principles and customs,

jogs on the beaten path; and if an attempt be made to

103

reform an error, to dispense with

a

useless office, or to

reduce an extravagant salary, the author
of it is
immediately selected as a mark for the
displeasure of our
political oracles and aristocratic demigods

m

Maine.

.

.people are allowed to vote for whom they
please,

without danger of oppression from the rich

But in

Massachusetts, and especially in Boston, all the
candidates... for ...chief magistrate of the state
down to
the Keeper of the town ball ,- are selected by the
'Central

Committee.

"•

"The deserving," have been "driven from your

service," the galaxy declared to Boston.

Traditionally,

the central committee so controlled the politics of Boston,
the Galaxy argued that voters "might as well stay at home.
[We ask voters] to break from this ignoble vassalage and

act with independence [and fight against the] mere tools of
a party,

the pandar of a cabal." 77

A year earlier, the Galaxy

,

in similar fashion,

advocated third-party activism in Boston.

had

The first

challenge Buckingham posed to the people of Boston had been
blunted by the Federalist machine.

After the convention

debacle legitimized popular fears of an oppressive
aristocracy, growing economic dissatisfaction, and the

advent of dissident Federalists like Quincy breaking from
the central committee, Boston would meet Buckingham's

challenge in 1822.

This political insurgency would take

advantage of the bipartisanship that grew out of the failed
104

reformist platform at the convention,
the debtor's plight,
the militia reform movement, the early
call for a ward
system, and other local issues that would
arise in
the

upcoming year.
held together by

Most importantly, the coalition would be
a

deep distrust and even a hatred of the

Federalist Central Committee, and by a new reverence
for
revitalized and reconfigured political leader, Josiah

Quincy
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qualification (all of-aged men who paid taxes should be
allowed to vote) was successfully codified in the new
constitution; but reform in the basis of representation in
70.

,
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^L Stat \ Senate

Was not achieved. In the convention's
es on the matter of
S6 ate
" [W]e haVe not
expedient. .to make any ^fundamental changes bought it
in this
department." This proved a significant victory
for the
central committee which would continue to
enjoy Federalist
10n 0 the se ™te due to the over-representation
of
u
°?J^ andH Essex counties; see, Peterson, Democracy.
Suffolk
y
Liberty, and Pjcapexty., 114.
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Both Quincy and Lincoln as quoted in Eliza Susan
Quincy
Y
(daughter), "Diary," Jan. 27, 1821, Ouincvmi r.rn

71.

.

For a full description of the meeting see, Eliza
Susan
Quincy (daughter), "Diary," Jan. 27, 1821, Ouincv mi r.rn.
72.

Harrison Gray Otis' s opinion of Austin is clearly
indicated in, Morison, Life and Letters nf Harrison r,r^y
OjLls, vol. 2, 25. Joseph Story to Jeremiah Mason, July
19
1821 Oliver Fa mily P a p ers: 14T9-iQ46 Massachusetts
Historical Society, (microfilm copy)
73.
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74.
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Columbian Centin^!, as quoted in New England Galaxy
20, 1820, APSmicro
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Biographical information on Russell and quote from,
Joseph T. Buckingham, Specimens of Newspaper Literature
With Personal Memoirs. Anecdotes, a n d Rememberenr.es in two
vols., vol. 2, (Boston: Charles C. Little and James Brown,
1850)
110-115; also see, Buckingham, Personal Memoirs
75.
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121-123.

Russell had worked his way up in the WBS organization,
serving on the standing committee at the organization's
inception in 1812; then in 1813 becoming its 6th vice
president; in 1814, he became its 4th ranked vice
president; in 1815, he ranked as its 2nd vice president
which proved the highest he rose in the WBS, see "Journal
of the Washington Benevolent Society of Massachusetts,"
Leadership Lists, Washington Benevolent Society Records:
1812-1824 MHS.
76.
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Edmund Quincy, Life of Josiah Quincy 389. "Odds
Between Maine and Massachusetts," New England Galaxy March
"Municipal Election," New England
23, 1821, APSmicro
Galaxy March 9, 1821, APSmicro
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CHAPTER IV
BOSTON REBELS AGAIN:

LOCAL CHALLENGES TO THE FEDERALIST ORDER
"'the moon had come nearer the earth... and had
made
some men mad "
an observation of Boston Town Meeting, Dec.
1821
1

—

"The People.
contend.

— William

.

.were determined

it was in vain to

Sullivan to Harrison Gray Otis, Jan. 1822

In the midst of depression and the shrinking local

economy, many Bostonians struggled not only under

burdensome state militia laws and fear of imprisonment for
indebtedness, but also under a corrupt and inefficient tax
system.

What proved truly irksome for all but a few was

the realization that the town had no power to reform its
own tax codes.

Many had expected the state Constitutional

Convention, as Joseph Buckingham put it, to "devise some

method to reduce the expenses of the government."

1

But,

the convention had failed the task and achieved little to

ease the heightened sense of economic insecurity that

average Bostonians felt.
With popular enthusiasm in Boston for meaningful tax

reform peaking in the spring of 1820, integral political
realignments soon followed.

By 1821, vocal, cohesive and

widespread third party activism erupted, shaking Boston's
traditional political status guo.

Defenders of the

militiamen, debtors and Boston's ward voting advocates

consolidated their forces around the call for tax reform

and used the issue to transform Boston's
political
structure toward a much more democratic system.

By the

winter of 1821-22, this coalition directly
challenged the
town's Federalist order. Stemming from what
first seemed

a

fairly benign impulse for moderate reform, a
successful

endeavor to dramatically alter Boston's traditional
system
of governance occurred that ushered in a new
municipal city

structure to Boston.
Coinciding with the rise of this coalitional
insurgency and its demand for the radical restructuring of

municipal governance, Josiah Quincy's problems with the
Federalist leadership intensified to the breaking-point.
His defiance during the Maine statehood guestion and within
the Constitutional Convention placed him and the central

committee at each other's throats.

After being reelected

as House speaker in spring 1821, Quincy escalated tensions

when he began to publicly criticize the Federalist Central
Committee.

Reinforcing popular sentiments in Boston, he

openly lashed out at the party leadership charging that
"the most prominent [fault of the central committee] was

apathy."

On April

1,

1821, he presented a cutting speech

enumerating the severe problems he detected with the
central committee's command of the Federalist party.
"[T]hey care nothing about offices," Quincy alleged, "[a]nd
this is one of their greatest

f aults ....

There is scarcely a

man among them fit for an office. And this is the reason
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why they fish up every crooked stick
that floats... and make
a mast of it."
Clearly still embittered by the committee's
decision not to nominate him to the state
Senate the year
before, Quincy explained in the third person
that "he had
liked the [senatorial] office, and had no
objection
to

serving several years longer. He was snug in his
birth,"

Quincy claimed, "when these gentlemen [the central
committee], without saying, with y our 1p, W| or bv your
l eave

,

turned him out

saltwater."

— tumbled

him overboard into the

Conceding that "[t]his gave him something of

a

shock," Quincy concluded that the central committee was

guilty "of turning their officers over-board and making
shark's meat of them."

He explained that since the central

committee had behaved "rather uncivil to him," he had
reached out to "our good friends the democrats ."

Quincy

speech conclusively attacked the central committee, while
further distancing him from the Federalist party
leadership. 2

The relationship between Quincy and the central

committee had become irreconcilable and each knew it.
many in Boston, Quincy seemed
voice

— one

a

For

concerned and independent

that understood the problems faced by the vast

majority of Bostonians.

The Galaxy carried the whole of

Quincy 's speech and lauded its message.

"There are few of

our statesmen," Joseph Buckingham proclaimed, who were
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"more entitled to the esteem of their
fellow-citizens, than
the Hon. Josiah Quincy."
3

Less than three months after the ratification
of the
new constitution and two months after Quincy
's
speech,

June 1821, the tax revolt ignited in Boston.

in

Eventually

this issue would dramatically change the
governmental

structure of the town and Quincy would combine his
voice

with a host of other outraged Bostonians struggling
to be

heard above the customary Federalist clamor that habitually
enveloped the people's injunctions.
The modus operandi
4

for tax reform ironically developed out of one of the few

new opportunities given to local communities within the

Commonwealth by the new conservative constitution.
Specifically, Bostonians employed section 11 of the 1821

Constitution, which sanctioned the establishment of cities

within the Commonwealth, to achieve some sense of eguity
within the town.
Before the convention convened, beginning in the

summer of 1820, moderate proposals in Town Meeting aimed at

reducing the average Bostonian's taxes were met with fierce

opposition by the county bureaucracy charged with
assessing, collecting and dispensing Boston's tax revenues.

This audacity on the part of the county authorities clearly

demonstrated to most Bostonians the town's inability to
oversee its own affairs.
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In May of 1820, Boston Town Meeting
approved a plan

that would, in the up-coming year, consolidate
the Town and
County Treasurer's offices into one department.
The

original petition modestly argued such

a

merger would prove

much more efficient and help reduce the tax burden. 5

Because the proposition overextended the designated

authority of the town and expanded into Suffolk County's
legal domain, the state legislature had to amend existing
law before the merger of offices could occur.

Secondly, a

gubernatorial appointed judicial body that controlled
county tax monies and made-up of the much hated Justices of
the Peace, the Suffolk County Court of Sessions, also had
to sanction the proposal before the reform could be

enacted.

6

Although it took

a year,

in May of 1821,

both the

General Court and the Court of Sessions approved the plan
as "proper and expedient."'

Boston, on June 11,
its decision.

1821,

Then, unbeknownst to anyone in

the Court of Sessions reversed

At Town Meeting on June 15, Boston's

selectmen had gotten wind of the court's retraction, and
reported that the Court of Sessions had defied the town's
request by appointing two treasurers "at an increased
expense" to Boston's tax paying citizens."
furious.

Bostonians were

"Curiosity is alive," the Galaxy sneered, "to

know the reasons why the purposes of the town has been
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defeated; and

a

spirit of indignation seems to pervade all

classes of citizens." 9
Such "disrespect to the People,
[their]

interests,

..

.utter disregard to

[and] total want of respect to

themselves in their official capacity," led to a Town

Meeting resolution that stated the Court of Sessions was
"unworthy of the public trust and confidence." 10 Also,
tax
paying Bostonians became concerned when the Boston press
reported that $9,763.40 in county tax revenues under the
direct control of the Court of Sessions could not be

accounted for. "How happens it," Buckingham asked in the

Galaxy

,

"that the court of sessions gave a statement of the

probable expenses of the county, $2 0,000, and yet drew upon
the town treasury for $29 762 40?" 11
,

.

A committee, appointed by the town and led by William
Tudor,

immediately formed to look into how the court spent

county tax monies.

Tudor 's committee was to conduct a

thorough audit of the Court of Sessions and the report back
to the town.

Furthermore, an angry Town Meeting on July

2

appointed a second committee, chaired by town selectman and
Boston shopkeeper, Lewis Tappan, to investigate widespread
accusations that the whole tax system was thoroughly

biased

— favoring

Boston's large property owners at Boston's

more modest property holders' expense. 12
For years ordinary Bostonians had grumbled over the

tax code, claiming that it unfairly accommodated "certain
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rich men, who magnanimously retire to
their county
seats... in order to avoid the [Court of
Session's]
assessors." But not until the court had so
blatantly gone
against the will of Boston were concrete
accusations of

corruption leveled on the court.

Without doubt, the

militia exemption policy for all justices of the
peace and
their high incomes (averaging $3000 a year) 13 added
to the

animosity.
By September many property owners with moderate

holdings strengthened their indictments, claiming that
court's assessors accepted bribes from large property
owners who were buying favorable assessments. 14

Assessments held particular monetary significance for
Boston's property owners due to the nature of the tax
codes.

Bostonians who owned real estate faced triple

taxation.

State tax required each citizen above the age of

sixteen to pay a minimum of fourteen cents annually, plus

a

percentage on assessed property; county tax was based on
one's assessed property, as was the town tax.

evasion

— through

If tax

bribing assessors or escaping Boston

during the assessment period

— proved

impossible for the

struggling, small property owner, he would be forced to pay

three levels of taxes. 15
At Town Meeting in September, Tappan s committee, in a
'

carefully worded report, only hinted at corruption while
boldly asserting endemic unfairness in the tax system.
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The

committee found that "checks can and ought
to be made on
[the assessor's]... ability to abate
taxes
[because]

..

.opulent citizens do not hesitate to exert

persevering personal application to the Assessors
until
they obtain reductions of their taxes."
Reaffirming what
most ordinary Bostonians already knew, Tappan
reported

that

indeed many of Boston's wealthy fled to their country

estates during the April assessment period and those who
stayed in town often threatened to leave if their property

assessment outstripped their tastes.

Less wealthy property

owners faced with having to fight off bill collectors

during the depression and who were desperately trying to

maintain their modest holdings within the town deeply
resented such obvious injustice.

Such deceit and

selfishness by wealthy Bostonians who could easily afford
such taxes, exacerbated the growing wedge between the

lower-to-middling and the upper class.

This anger helped

forge a unified middling class-based sensibility that

eventually expressed itself politically.

complained in the pages of the Galaxy

:

As "Brutus"

"the power of wealth

has corrupted the virtue and subjugated the influence of
the many, to the selfish purposes of the aristocratical
few." 16 "Another complaint to a considerable degree well

founded," Tappan charged, "is that the richer classes of

inhabitants are not proportionally taxed with those of

smaller property.

[The small property owner]
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is unequally

taxed in proportion to those who are as
rich or richer." 17
This class-based perception of injustice
would

significantly help define insurgent activism.
After the Tappan report, Tudor rose to deliver
the
results of his committee's audit of the Court of
Sessions

expenditures of county tax monies.

He reminded Town

Meeting that Suffolk County contained only two towns,
Boston and Chelsea, and that, in 1820, Bostonians, as
always, had paid the lion's share of county taxes at

$25,332.25, while Chelsea only contributed $187.63 to the

county coffers.

Since Boston paid over 95% of the county

taxes, Tudor argued that the hub was fully justified in its

attempt to find out where its money went, especially when
(referring to the missing $9,763.40), "[i]t would
seem.

..

obvious that there must be some waste in our

expenditure." 18

According to Tudor, when the committee

reguested to inspect the court's expenditure records, the
justices refused, arguing "that as the court was not

appointed by the Town, it could not... render an account of
its doings."

Undeterred, Tudor 's committee by-passed the

court, going directly to the County Treasurer's office and

demanded to see the records.

The treasurer complied, but

as Tudor explained, the committee "found themselves checked
in the outset,

by a want of the Schedules ... all of

which... have been taken out of the files."

The committee,

19
he confessed still had "not been able to find them."
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Accusing the Court of Sessions with

a

cover-up, Tudor

charged that "this inferior department of
justice seems
liable to many objections under its present
system; that
the immediate expense is perhaps the least of its
evils."
Because "of these circumstances," Tudor' s committee

recommended that the Town institute yet another committee
"to ascertain whether the Court of Sessions cannot
be.

.

.abolished.

"

After printing and distributing the Tudor

Report throughout Boston, Town Meeting on October 22,

overwhelmingly voted in favor of such

a

committee.

When this third committee, spearheaded by Stephen
Codman, concluded that the best way to abolish the Court of

Sessions was for Boston to become its own county, others in
the press and in Town Meeting began urging that an even

better solution might be found.

"If we adopt a city," one

Bostonian argued, "we shall have the same beautiful,
definite and efficient system, which we admire so much in
its operation in our state and national concerns .... The

whole authority ... emanating from the people.

:i

The move

to make Boston a city would intensify conflict between the

Federalist leadership and the aspiring forces of political
insurgency
Even before the tax revolt, Boston's town meeting

system of government periodically had fallen under
criticism.

Many charged that it was fundamentally

undemocratic.

As early as 1820,
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"Brutus" matter of factly

stated that "in Boston,... a monied
aristocracy has
absolutely more sway and is more adverse
to our boasting
republicanism, than a legalized aristocracy
of birth." 22
Even Josiah Quincy who was highly skeptical
of abandoning
the old town meeting system, recalled when
writing
his

history of Boston that not only were there "no
direct check
or control; no pledge for fidelity," on the
"agents
of the

town," but also typical "town meetings were usually

composed of the Selectmen, the town officers, and
thirty or
forty inhabitants" at best. Buckingham's assessment of
Boston's traditional system was even more withering.
"Sometime fifteen or twenty, seldom more... do all the

business of a town that contains near seven thousand
voters," he explained.

Also,

»[i]t is well known,"

continued the Galaxy editor, "that, in Town-Meetings, when
a

subject of great importance is to be referred to a

committee, the moderator ... nominates three, five, or more,
of the citizens present to... select such a committee.

..

.Now

it hath chanced that these gentlemen ... have been under the

disagreeable and embarrassing necessity of announcing
themselves as the fittest persons that could be found to
form the committee. This is a terrible evil," Buckingham
charged, "and to get rid of it no sacrifice can be too

great." 23

"It is yet to be hoped,"

heralded "Brutus,"

"that the middle and lower classes of the community.
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.

.will

tread back the path of error and endeavor
to rescue
themselves" from such domination. 24
Ironically, the direct democracy promised by
the town
meeting system was routinely subverted by a
small handful
prominent Bostonians who dictated policy by their
control
of Town Meeting procedures.
Using the parliamentary rules

and practices of the town meeting system, the policy
course
of Boston fell under the direction of a few men
with

specific economic interests.

Disgusted with selfish upper-

class rule, Boston's middling interests demanded more

democracy while Josiah Quincy sought the means to recapture
the power that had been denied to him by the Federalist
hierarchy.

When Federalist central committeeman, William Sullivan

gained the appointment to chair the committee responsible
for "remedy [ing] the present evils" of the town,

Buckingham's assessment of the exclusivity inherent in the

daily operations of Town Meetings was confirmed.

Yet,

"Brutus 's" appeal to ordinary Bostonians had not been
forgotten.

Meeting with

When the Sullivan committee returned to Town
a

proposition that fell far short of

establishing a city charter,

a

jammed-packed and unruly

Town Meeting overwhelmingly rejected Sullivan's proposal
and demanded that the committee be enlarged to include one

representative from each of Boston's twelve wards. 25

These

independent men, it was thought, could sincerely forge the
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town into

a

city without being influenced by the
Federalist

Central Committee.

Buckingham strongly praised the

independent course taken by Boston's citizenry.

Municipal Affairs of Boston,

"The

heralded the GaJ^xy on

December 14th, "are... to be set right at last.
The long
experience, the profound legal learning, the acute,

penetrating mental powers, and the disinterested
political
views of some of the venerable young members of the
new
committee, to whom the report of the old one was

recommitted, afford solid ground to hope the errors and

prejudices of our

.

.

.

Sullivans

and.

,

.

.

Jacksons, will be

corrected. Old folks used to think young ones to be fools,
but our young folk know the old ones to be so. There can be
no doubt,

..

.that a complete system of municipal government

will be reported, and joyfully accepted by the citizens at
the adjourned meeting ....

our old abuses corrected

[A] 11

and the honors of the new system fairly distributed

,

"'
.

By

'

the end of 1821, a growing consensus in Boston demanded the

termination of the traditional town meeting system and the
drafting of

a

city charter as

a

means of challenging

Federalist rule.
Four earlier attempts to abolish the town meeting

system and institute

a

city government in 1784,

1792,

1804,

and 1815 had drawn great numbers and faced staggering

popular opposition in Town Meeting.

proposals were defeated.

Each time the

In the past,
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Bostonians fought

off any dramatic alteration to the
town meeting system for
fear that a centralized city structure
would weaken

majoritarian rule.

Before 1821, all attempts to change
the

traditional system were instigated by the
Federalist elite
to further consolidate its power within the
town.
On this

issue, a normally inactive Boston electorate
in town

meeting had consistently become active.

Clearly Bostonians

in the past seemed to have understood elite
strategy and

rallied to crush all earlier city proposals by saturating
Faneuil Hall with vocal opponents to the post-charter
plans.

In response, Federalist elites changed strategy and

abandoned their calls for

a

centralized city government.

Instead, they successfully consolidated power in Boston by

assuming leadership positions in Town Meeting which
resulted in their domination of Boston's civic matters. 27
By 1821, popular attitudes dramatically changed.

Boston's new-found acceptance of municipal centralization
was fostered initially by the town's disadvantaged position

within the Suffolk County, the corruption within the tax
assessment process and a distrust of the Court of Sessions.
On top of this, a large voting block came to embrace

municipal change as a means to firmly establish ward voting

within Boston.
disaffected.

Ward voting meant more power to the

Although minor town bureaucrats traditionally

were elected by ward, town selectmen and all state, and
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federal representatives, were elected
at-large in Faneuil
Hall. 28
Since the 1820 state elections, ward-voting
proponents
forcefully advocated the setting up of decentralized

polling stations throughout Boston.

In that year,

numerous

articles and editorials in Buckingham's Galaxy
ridiculed
the at-large voting system as "absurd and ridiculous"—

an

outdated system, "manage [d]

...

to monopolize those offices"

by the Federalist Central Committee "junto." 29

By the

winter of 1821, the supporters of ward voting, some of whom
had taken on the title of the "Middling Interest," viewed
the chartering initiative as a prime opportunity to codify

their aspirations for

a

more democratic voting system into

the new municipal structure of Boston.

Ironically, the Federalist Central Committee also came
to support a city system, but for very different reasons.

Men like Sullivan, Thomas

Perkins, and Harrison Gray

H.

Otis agreed with the popular criticisms of the power held
by the Court of Sessions, but more importantly, they viewed
a

city structure in much the same light as Federalist

elites had in earlier years.
in 1821,

a

To the Federalist leadership

city charter potentially could offer the means

to strengthen its power within Boston, but only if it could

control the charter's drafting. 30

Paradoxically, the two

combative factions had hit upon the same strategy to
achieve their opposing goals.
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For Harrison Gray Otis's

individual political ambitions,

a

city structure meant even

more
Otis served in the U.S. Senate since 1817.

During

much of his tenure in Washington he found
himself
discredited and ineffectual due to his unpatriotic

participation in the Hartford Convention.

in an attempt to

rectify his political reputation, between 1817 and
1818,
Otis spent much of his time collecting and organizing
as
much material on the convention as he could find.

In 1819,

he edited and drafted a public defense of the convention.

Hoping his "Letters Developing the Character and Views of
the Hartford Convention" would finally silence the constant

badgering and criticism he faced on the Senate floor, Otis

published his appeal in the Washington National
Intelligencer under the pseudonym "One of the Convention."
When his defense collapsed, Otis began planning
escape from Washington politics.

a

hasty

As he wrote to

Connecticut Federalist and the Hartford Convention's
secretary, Theodore Dwight, in 1821, "a boundful allotment
of the odium attached to the Hartford Convention has been

heaped upon me."

Claiming "'the hounds are all out,'"

sniffing and baying him, Otis plotted his next political
move

31

Irritated and consistently checked in the Senate, Otis
set his future ambition on the Massachusetts governor's
seat.

His friend and Federalist compatriot, John Brooks
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let it be known that he would not
seek reelection in 1823,
opening up the way for Otis to move in.
Coinciding with

Otis's decision to run for governor, the city
chartering
controversy raged in Boston. Seeing an opportunity
in

Boston's call for a city system, Otis devised a
strategy to
insure his assent to the governor's mansion. He
would

become the first mayor in Massachusetts and use this
highly

visible position to launch his campaign for the
governorship.

As Eliza Quincy recalled, "Mr. Otis... was

put up for Mayor, and it appeared that

plan had been

a

formed by a number of politicians, that he should be the
first Mayor, as a stepping stone to the Governor's Chair,

would then have the arrangement of the City offices
salaries

&

&

&

could then reward partisans who had proposed the

City Charter through the Legislature for this purpose."

In

early January 1822, Sullivan assured the Senator, "[i]f you
incline to live in 'the Mansion House,

stamp for you,

— as

'

I

will mount the

will many other who can do more than

I." 32

Driven by such ambition, by December of 1821, Otis

became highly invested and deeply involved in the details
of the chartering committee.

Sullivan pledged to do all he

could for his old friend and ally, "whom," he "expect[ed]
to see engaged at the labour of putting the [city]

machinery in motion."

Reassured by Sullivan's unswerving

devotion, between December 1821 through January of 1822,
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Otis shot off a litany of firm instructions
to his
operatives in Boston from Washington, thus
securing his
influence in the town committee charged with
forging the
city charter.
"it is easier to manage the town of

Boston,

he advised Sullivan, "by a Lancastrian system
of political

discipline than to institute numerous schools."
"[G]ive.

.

.

[the Mayor] a right

,

without imposing an

obligat i on to ask advise," from other city officials.

The

executive, according to Otis, must have the "veto
upon... laws (such as relating to taxes and taking away

private property)
squalls."

[G]ive him the power to ride out the

Although he had no intention of serving as mayor

for more than one year, Otis directed Sullivan to ensure

that the Mayor "be appointed for more than one year at a
time.... If you [Sullivan] make your mayor respectable by

giving him high authority you will give him auxiliaries to
try the whores and rogues."

Otis also strongly urged that

the mayor should receive a "good salary." 33
voting, Otis was most adamant.

On ward

"If it is done in wards,

the town will be revolutionized." 34

Unfortunately for Otis and his operatives, Boston's
insurgents who supported the charter viewed ward voting as
the essential element to any acceptable proposal for a city

structure.

Indeed, the enlarged Sullivan committee,

charged with drafting a city charter, contained twelve new
members, two of whom were Boston's most vocal proponents of
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ward voting and were the founders of
an embryonic third
party in the form of the Middling Interest:
riding
instructor, from the 6th ward, Michael
Roulstone and the
wealthy disaffected Federalist, William Sturgis
of Ward
10.

35

Potentially, these committee members could
obstruct

Otis's specific designs for the new charter.

Applying similar tactics employed during the
constitutional convention, Otis's forces seduced at least
one of the "venerable young members of the new committee,"

Republican Gerry Fairbanks into the fold.

As a leading

member of Boston's minority party, Fairbanks feared the
politics of Roulstone and Sturgis perhaps even more than
the Federalist Central Committee.

If the third party

activism which these men advocated gained significant
appeal in Boston, it would disproportionately damage the

Republican party much more than the Federalists who
traditionally enjoyed majority status in Boston.

Republicanism's position in the town had always been
tenuous and its chronic vulnerability could be easily

exploited by a third, coalitional party that would address
the grievances of Republicanism's traditional constituency.

Fairbanks correctly surmised that rank-and-file Republicans

would abandon his party for the Middling Interest.

If this

occurred, the Republican party would become even less of

force within Boston than it already was.

For these

reasons, Fairbanks helped shape and solidify Republican

133

a

opinion on the new chartering committee
while reporting his
every move to Otis. Providing Otis with
detailed analyses
of Republican sentiments on the chartering
issue, Fairbanks
was a valuable source of information for
Otis and
his

36

forces.

On December 22, the Sullivan Committee presented
its
proposal to Town Meeting. At first glace, the document

seemed to be a compromise between Otis' s operatives
and the

advocates for ward voting.

But after the charter's

publication and distribution throughout Boston, and the
resulting Town Meeting debates of December 31 through
January

2,

1822, most Bostonians clearly refused to view

the document as a victory for ward voting in any way.

Otis

had feared such popular resistance, but Gerry Fairbanks

assured him that the plan would have the full support of
Boston's Republican leadership.

Five days before the

debates, on December 26, Fairbanks guaranteed the Senator

that the Republican members of the Sullivan Committee were

thoroughly under control. "In fact," Fairbanks assured,
"the prospect for moving for a recommen [dation]

"

that

excluded ward voting, "came from a republican source."
Despite recent articles in the Boston Patriot that

suggested Republicans were making the chartering a partisan
issue,

Fairbanks promised Otis that the Patriot did "not

speak for the sentiments of the party." 37
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Although Fairbanks

's

report to Otis may have been

sincere, Fairbanks seriously underestimated
Boston's

popular opposition to

a

chartering plan without an iron-

clad ward voting component to it.

This omission gave rise,

according to one observer, to "Bedlam" in Town
Meeting.

it

was as though "the 'moon had come nearer the earth...
and
had made

settle

men mad.'"

The stately and orderly decorum

of the exclusive few who traditionally ran and
guietly

dominated Boston's Town Meetings, were overwhelmed by

a

Faneuil Hall filled to capacity with an unruly Boston

citizenry that consistently hissed and shouted them down.
Federalist Francis

J.

Oliver, charged with the unfortunate

task of moderating Town Meeting between December 31 through

January

2,

later described the debates as highly "arduous"

and totally "perplexing."'

Much to the astonishment of Otis, Fairbanks, Sullivan
and other Boston "betters," the deferential character that

had so symbolized traditional Boston Town Meeting was

consumed in turmoil as ordinary working Bostonians like
town-crier, Ebenezer Clough and rat-trap maker, Samuel

Adams actively participated in the discussions by bellowing
out objections and invectives to the Sullivan Committee's

proposed city plan.
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In spite of Otis's objections, Chairman Sullivan,

in

an unsuccessful attempt to appease ward voting advocates,

recommended that a city common council of fourteen members
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be elected in wards.

No longer would Bostonians have to

trek all the way to Faneuil Hall to elect
this body of
local representatives, he claimed.
Committee members and
ward voting advocates, Michael Roulstone and
William
Sturgis had battled hard for this arrangement.

Yet,

as

Sullivan confessed, though Boston's electorate could
vote
for councilmen within their own districts, "it would
not be

expedient to have one Selectman [councilman] for each ward,
as it would tend to divide the town too much into distinct

portions."

William Tudor, an original committee member,

agreed that such an arrangement would "break up old
associations, good feelings,

[and]

..

.there [would be the]

danger of [Boston] splitting into twelve little towns." 40
Thus, though city councilmen would be elected in each of

Boston's twelve wards at twelve separate ward polling
stations, each ward was not guaranteed a representation in

the city council according to the proposed charter.

Having followed Otis's instructions on another matter,
Sullivan, with Fairbank's support, pushed through the

committee a provision guaranteeing that all state and
federal elections would be held at-large in Boston's

traditional central polling station of Faneuil Hall.

As

Otis lectured Sullivan, "[y]ou should give no temptation to

your Town Government to dabble in [state or federal]
politicks,

[because]

if they [Bostonians]
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be democratic

which they will sometimes
State.

"

be— you

may yet be safe in the

41

Again following Otis's instructions to establish
a
"Lancastrian" system, the proposed charter held that

the

city's executive would not be elected by the people
in

wards or otherwise, but by the common council instead. 42
In an attempt to justify this provision, Sullivan

disingenuously argued before Town Meeting that though he
"was always reluctant to take away privileges from the

people:... an executive officer will necessarily come in to

contact with the inhabitants; many will be offended; if he
does his duty he will not be reelected, or he will be so

bending as to be unfit for reelection." 43
If the response to and the fate of the Sullivan

Committee's proposal on the first day of the debates is any
indication, this was not at all what the town wanted nor

had expected.

Some,

like Ebenezer Clough and William

Emmons, so despised the Sullivan report that they switched

their positions and fought against any form of a city
charter.

Others, understanding the limitations of the

single ward voting provision in Sullivan's charter,

revealed that in the past, they had felt too intimidated to
vote their conscience in an open meeting at Faneuil Hall.

Addressing his statement to Sullivan and moderator Oliver,
Samuel Adams explained: "For instance

a

journeyman who is

in your employ. They feel so delicate in your employ, they
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are afraid of offending you."

with voting in wards, Adams

charged, "there would be no more coaxing
mechanics,

threatening them with loss of work.

..

.We know each other

[in our wards].... Here [in Faneuil Hall],"
Adams confessed,

"we are strangers."

Concluding his arguments, Adams

threatened that "the whole will be lost if we don't
agree
to vote in wards." 44
Adams spoke to the common fears of many Boston
mechanics, journeymen, artisans and laborers who resented

that their financial well-being and security was often

directly dependent upon how they voted at Faneuil Hall.
This issue resonated and, much to the Federalist Central

Committee's dismay, refused to dissipate as a key issue.
After much angry debate on both sides, a compromise was
reached.
8,

A town-wide referendum would be held on January

to decide whether all federal and state elections would

be held in ward polling stations or in Faneuil Hall.

45

The next issue that guickly came under immediate and

staggering attack was Sullivan's proposal for the election
of mayor.

Clough successfully argued that the mayor should

be chosen in wards by the general electorate.

Clough,

According to

if this was left to the city councilmen,

the mayor

would "be determined by the rich men... and the poorer

people will have to pay for it." 46

The outcry against this

proposal proved so prevalent, determined and hostile that
Sullivan and his allies quickly acquiesced. 47
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After the first Town Meeting debates on
December 3 1st,
Sullivan and the Otis forces left Faneuil Hall
astonished
and bloodied. The customary reticence of Boston's

electorate on such matters evolved into an articulate
and
potent defiance that firmly rejected Sullivan's motion

for

the election procedure for mayor.

Also, though consensus

was elusive, the proponents of ward voting had gained

a

significant victory with Town Meeting's overwhelming
approval for a referendum to decide on voting in wards.
On January

8,

1822,

both the revised charter and the

question of ward voting were presented to Boston.

By a

vote of 1,805 to 1,006, Boston accepted the revised
charter.
votes.

Ward voting also passed by over four hundred

Although the total of Bostonians who voted came to

an impressive 2,811, close to double that number voted on

the ward voting issue.

The fact that 4,806 cast ballots on

this referendum question indicated that the ability to

elect state and federal officers without the customary

intimidation issued by Federalists elites to control
Boston's voting behavior in Faneuil Hall held significant

meaning for the town's electorate.'"'
Upon hearing the news, eleven days after the

referendum vote,

a

dismayed Otis wrote to Sullivan: "If the

provision respecting voting in wards for political affairs
is irreversible,

But

I

I

am not about to cry for spilled milk

am hard of the conviction of the expediency of the

I

19

measure, and am full of fears,

(if the

federalism of the

town be worth an effort to preserve—
which

enough to question)."

I

may live long

Then, on a more optimistic note,

Otis added, "perhaps the organization of wards,
may be
available for political arrangements in favour of
good men
and measures— though I had wished to see them kept

altogether distinct from each other." 49
Sullivan one day earlier had shot off a long letter to
Otis.

"The People," he explained, "were determined

was in vain to contend against this determination."

it

As if

to hearten Otis, Sullivan placed a positive spin on the

defeat in Town Meeting, assuring the Senator that the

victory of ward voting would not affect his ambitions to be
Boston's first mayor.
in Otis' s letter,

Utilizing the same pragmatic logic

Sullivan suggested that despite the

town's decision that "[t]he mayor and aldermen [were] to be

chosen by the citizens, voting in wards [,]... so long as the

present majority in the town continues, the mayor
and.

..

aldermen, will be agreed on in Caucus. Proper

measures will be taken," Sullivan promised Otis, "to have
this agreement understood at the ward meetings."

This

would insure the Federalist Central Committee's influence
over ward meetings and guarantee Otis the Federalist party

nomination for mayor.

Although their original strategy had

been stymied, Sullivan remained buoyantly optimistic.

wards could be controlled he believed.
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The Republican

The

party continued to be impotent in Boston and
was not a
serious threat. There seemed to be nothing to
block Otis
from becoming Boston's first mayor and, thereby,
achieve
the first phase in his overall design to become
governor.

50

Also, as both Sullivan and Otis understood, the

charter first had to be approved by the General Court
before it could become law, and Otis and the central

committee still maintained significant power there.
prepared for

a

Having

worst case scenario coming out of Town

Meeting, Otis had instructed Sullivan to have the charter

altered after it was sent up to the General Court for
legislative approval. 51

When the charter reached the Senate on February 12,
loyal Otis-Federalists flexed their muscles in a successful

attempt to suppress ward voting in Boston.

In an act of

utter audacity, the upper house quietly scrapped the

provision in the charter.

The Senate's amendment

"provid[ed] that the elections of State and United States

officers shall be holden as heretofore in Faneuil Hall,
instead of being holden in wards as proposed by the bill."
The Senate's actions did not go unnoticed by the town.

When the charter arrived at the lower house, Otis's forces
On February 16, the

were not prepared for the opposition.
much more independent lower house, by
61,

a

close vote of 63 to

refused to accept the Senate's revision concerning ward

voting.

This was a serious blow to the central committee,

141

but Otis's operatives in the Senate had
added another

amendment that slipped by the discriminating eyes
of the
central committee's opponents in the House. Section
30

of

the revised charter stated that nothing in the charter
"shall be so construed as to restrain or prevent the

Legislature from amending or altering the same whenever
they shall deem it expedient."

Otis's opponents in the

House had overlooked the implications of section 30. 52
For his part, Otis had wisely predicted problems in

the House.

As early as January

8,

he had instructed

Sullivan to see to it that once the legislature got a hold
of the charter, the Senate should "insert in the charter
s ome

faculty of obtaining amendments

.

—As

this would be a

privilege, it might be added without [the] instructions

from the town."

Following Otis's orders, Sullivan had

recruited William Tudor to unobtrusively drive section 30
through the legislature.
the job.

Tudor was a perfect candidate for

His nonpartisan role as the town's auditor of the

Court of Sessions and his genuine outrage at the court's

resistance and corruption, made him seem trustworthy to

members in the legislature who distrusted the central
committee.

More than anyone else, Tudor provoked and

instigated Boston to move toward
of reform.

a

city system in the name

Nevertheless, as Sullivan fully understood,

Tudor was no radical reformer, but

a loyal

supporter of

Harrison Gray Otis and would follow the central committee's
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directives to the letter.

Though he strongly supported a

city structure, Tudor had consistently
opposed ward voting.
Having reached no consensus on ward voting,
the legislature
sent a revised charter complete with section
30, and the
ward voting question back down to the people of
Boston to

decide on both issues in yet another town referendum
on
March 4 53
Josiah Quincy had served on the Sullivan Committee and
as usual he had taken an independent stand on the

chartering controversy coming out against any form of city
structure.

Like many in Boston, he did not trust Sullivan.

Only two short years before, it was Sullivan who had

replaced him as the Federalist Central Committee's

candidate for the state senate, and Quincy remained
resentful.

Also, since 1821, Quincy had chaired a Town

Meeting committee to deal with the growing numbers of
paupers who begged on Boston's streets.

Just as he

struggled to navigate through Boston's political

transformation toward

a

popular democracy, he also

struggled to maneuver through Boston's urban
transformation.

Proving himself to be

a

institution man,

Quincy explained "[t]he leading principle," of his pauper
committee, "was,

— the

d uty incumbent u pon society o f

discriminating in its charitable provisions and
arrangements, between the poor b y reason of infancy, age or

misfortune, and the poor by reason of idleness, or vice
143

.

Quincy 's committee had successfully lobbied Town
Meeting in
1821 for funds to establish a House of Industry in
South

Boston that would segregate the "idle and vicious
poor"
from the "worthy poor." By housing and employing
the

"deserving poor" far away from the corruption of Boston's

seedier neighborhoods which naturally, according to Quincy,
bred licentious behavior for the healthier, pastoral

atmosphere of rural South Boston, the "worthy poor" could

rectify their lives. 54
The town had approved the plan and Quincy worried his
pet project would be stalled if a radical change in the

town's government occurred just as the appropriations to
build his House of Industry were being decided upon. 55

Adding to this, Quincy, according to the Galaxy

,

perceptively "saw mischief in the section [section 30]
which gives the legislature unrestrained power over the
charter." 56

Fearing "corruption and abuse," as his son

remembered, Quincy "resisted" the charter "by speech and
pen as long as there was any chance of defeating it." 57

Quincy was not alone in his objection to section 30.
"[I]f the Charter is accepted," with section 30, observed

one Bostonian, "we may have as Mayor, possibly, some worthy

gentleman from Berkshire."
Galaxy that section

30

would provoke "many, who are in

favour of incorporation as

present bill

— presuming

Buckingham predicted in the

a city,

[to]

vote against the

that the legislature has the power
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essentially to alter the charter or constitution
of
government.

.

.without the concurrence of the citizens."

Because of this and another provision, section
22, which
granted authority to the city common council to decide
the

number of representatives to be sent from Boston to
the
General Court, Buckingham opposed the charter.

He closed

his arguments by reiterating Quincy 's fears that the

charter constituted nothing but a plot by the "central
committee" to disarm the power of "the people." 58
One day before the town vote, on March 3rd, William

Emmons stood before Boston's citizenry at Faneuil Hall in

a

final attack against the city charter. "I am fully aware of

the disadvantage, a humble citizen labours under, when

addressing an assembly [at Town Meeting] composed of the
powerful, and that power is their wealth," yet Emmons still

believed that the old system more democratic in the long
run,

if "the voice of the rich will no [longer]

higher than that of the poor."

be raised

Stand with the "intelligent

decisions of a Quincy, and the penetrating eye of an
Austin," Emmons implored.

Vote against the charter. 59

Despite the apprehensions of Emmons, Austin,

Buckingham and Quincy, the day after Emmons's impassioned
speech, on March

4,

1822, Boston accepted the charter by a

vote of 2,797 to 1,881.

On the ward voting guestion, 2,813

Bostonians overwhelmingly came out in its favor, while only
60
1,887 had voted against it.
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After an agonizing year of heated debates,
political
maneuvering and intrigue, Boston, with this vote,
finally

became a city, complete with polling stations in
every
ward.

On April

8,

1822, the city would hold its first

mayoral election and, for the first time, Bostonians would
independently cast their votes with

a

sense of security and

safety in their own neighborhoods.
Despite the imposing influence of Harrison Gray Otis's

Federalist machine working at high-bore, the majority of

Bostonians had earned the sort of charter they wanted.
had not been easy.

It

Boston's "senators and

representatives," railed one angry Bostonian, "not only

opposed the wishes of their constituents, but joined in the
votes which in one instance defeated the purpose of the
large majority of the town.
in the city charter,

..

.We allude to the.

.

.provision

for the election of State and United

States officers in wards." 61
In spite of resentment toward their representatives'

behavior in the General Court,

a

voting system that insured

more democracy to Boston's ordinary carried the day with
little support from their own legislators.

Unlike the

reformist impulse that was effectively sguashed by

clandestine political tactics during the constitutional
convention, in the chartering controversy the central

committee's machinations failed to guell the resolute
voices of democratic reform.
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During the controversy and quite ironically,
the Town
Meeting system and its Straightforwardly
democratic

structure worked
The hated Court

in the
of

interests

ol

Boston's majority.

Session had been abolished and the mayor

would be elected for one year by the people— not
by
councilmen; executive power would be limited by the
city
council; and most importantly to the people
city,

Boston, all

of

state and federal officers would be elected

in

wards.

Almost all of Otis's edicts for the structure of new city

government had been sguarely checked by

a

politically

charged citizenry empowered and inspired with growing

confidence and

a

distinct municipal vision that offered

Boston's lower-to-middling classes

a

voice

in

determining

the new city's future.

This was new to Boston.

What had begun as

a

minor tax

revolt calling for modest reform in the tax codes, resulted
in a full

blown and successful popular challenge to the

traditional deferential nature of Boston's political
culture.

With both ward voting established in the new city

and a raging economic depression that spawned popular-

dissatisfaction with the militia, tax and debtor's laws,
political dissidents like William Sturgis, Michael
Roulstone, and

a

Boston newcomer and Baptist minister,

Francis Wayland saw an obvious political opportunity to
forge a powerful enough insurgent third party to cripple if
not completely destroy the Federalist party in Boston.
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II

Federalism fell in its stronghold, these men believed,
the
party would soon atrophy and whither away to nothing
throughout the state.

Carefully choosing an inoffensive

name, the insurgents formally named their organization
the

Middling Interest and began preparing for its first
challenge

— the

new city's first mayoral race. 62

in the

course of this new endeavor, they had to seek out someone
who would both champion their cause and be able to stand up
to the Federalist machine and its leader Harrison Gray
Otis.
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CHAPTER V

"TEN-FOOTERS," ZEALOTS AND "LORDLY NABOBS:"

THE MIDDLING INTEREST LEADERSHIP AND COALITIONAL
UNITY
"These lordly nabob s] ... object is to keep the
mechanics and labourers in eternal servitude."
Joseph T. Buckingham, 1822
[

'

—

"THE PEOPLE... are not only the real but also the
acknowledged fountain of all authority."
Francis Wayland, 1825

—

"a band of murmurers

— Ralph

a parcel of

demagogues"
Waldo Emerson on the Middling Interest, 1822
.

.

.

Less than one month before the city charter reached

the General Court for approval, on January 16, 1822, Josiah

Quincy resigned his position in the Massachusetts House of
Representatives.

"I relinquish this chair," Quincy

announced to his congressional colleagues, "with a
reluctance, which

express."

I

cannot conceal and yet, which

I

cannot

He assured the House that his experience as its

speaker had been "a source of unqualified delight and

satisfaction."

Speaker Quincy proudly acknowledged he had

earned bipartisan support which he deeply valued and

congratulated both sides of the House for their nonpartisan
allegiance to him.

"From every gentleman of every party,

have, at all times, received and reciprocated the greeting
of a friend and a brother."

Reinforcing this position,

Quincy endorsed Republican Levi Lincoln Jr. as his
replacement

as House speaker.

1

I

"On the motives of my resignation," Quincy
cryptically

stated,
I

"it is not suitable for me,

in this place to speak.

may be permitted, however to assert, that it has

proceeded from a sense of duty, distinct and unequivocal;
and in the existing relations of my mind— irresistible.

Providing no specific designs for his future plans, Quincy,
nevertheless, proclaimed his expectations that the

bipartisanship he had cultivated in the House would
continue and grow once he established himself "in another
sphere."

In the foreseeable future, Quincy challenged

Federalists and Republicans "to join my labours with yours,
in promoting the interests of the people of this great

Commonwealth.

2

As the tone of Quincy'

s

mysterious resignation speech

suggests, and as his daughter confirms, the "irresistible"

position that persuaded Quincy to relinquish his
influential seat as House speaker lay in his ambitions for

higher office.

Specifically, Quincy had set his sights on

the governorship of Massachusetts.

His daughter, Eliza,

recalled that Quincy "thought that some of the Federalists
of that day were on a wrong track."

His opposition to

Maine separation and his consistent defiance of the
Federalist party leadership, Eliza argued, made him
"generally known
&

&

justly appreciated throughout the State

his new friends [wanted to] run him for Governor."

3

Such

lofty aspirations would squarely pit him against Harrison
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Gray Otis, and the bipartisan support Quincy earned
in the
General Court had the potential to seriously divide
and

disrupt Massachusetts Federalism.

Also,

foreseeing future

controversy in the upcoming legislative session, Quincy 's
resignation as Speaker of the House in January proved
highly pragmatic, timely, and politically advantageous.

By

absenting himself from the General Court one month before
the proposed city charter reached the legislature, Quincy

avoided having to take

a

legislative stand on the most

divisive issue the General Court faced that year.

When the

Middling Interest publicly attacked Boston's
representatives "who not only opposed the wished of their
constituents, but joined in the votes which ... defeated the

purposes of the large majority of the town" over the ward
voting issue, Quincy could not be castigated for "utterly

disregard ing]
[

...

the people of Boston."

4

Instead, Quincy evaded the controversy and lobbied to

obtain an appointment as

a

municipal court judge in Boston-

-a position he received and accepted later that month.

Ironically, Quincy 's adversary Governor John Brooks awarded

him the judgeship.

Why is not clear.

Perhaps, from the

Governor's point of view, Quincy would be less troublesome
to him and the central committee as a municipal judge than
as House Speaker.

During Quincy 's tenure as a municipal

judge, he would consolidate power within what was rapidly
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becoming a divided town in the midst of

a

dramatic struggle

to upset Federalist political hegemony in Boston. 5

The news of Quincy's resignation from the General

Court baffled Harrison Gray Otis.

"Mr. Quincy's movement

does indeed surprise me," he admitted to William
Sullivan
on January 19, 1822 from Washington.

"it is a sort of

practical bathos, to jump from the speaker's chair into
that of the Boston old Bailey."

Concluding that Quincy's

"zeal for his friends and party have hurt his popularity,

he probably expects the reward of neglect, which his

friends and party first or last are apt to show towards

those who are too zealous...

— and

as he gets nothing by

being a great man amoung gentlemen, he will try his hand by

showing himself a good one amoung whores and rogues
luck to him say I."

6

— Good

Otis clearly was unaware of Quincy's

more ambitious intentions and had all too quickly written

him off as an insignificant force within the state, let
alone a serious political adversary within Boston.

As

future events would show, Otis's swift dismissal of Quincy

was shortsighted.
Despite the optimism of his sponsors, Quincy's

bipartisan power-base did not have much endurance beyond
the boundaries of Boston

— and

for good reason.

By 1822,

the Republican party's power had grown throughout the
state.

Although Federalism commanded Suffolk, Essex, and

Hampshire counties, the party of "good men and good
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measures" faced decisive and growing opposition
elsewhere
in the state.
The treasonous legacy of the Hartford

Convention continued to haunt Massachusetts Federalism,
providing Republican candidates with an easy, effective,
and engaging line of attack in many parts of the state.
The rural interests of town's like Plymouth, Bristol,
Barnstable, and counties such as Norfolk, Berkshire,
Hampden, and Worcester voiced opposition toward the

mercantile and manufacturing interests so endemic to the
Federalist party platform.

In the fishing communities of

Cape Cod, Martha's Vineyard and Natucket, Republicanism

consistently was the party of choice. 7
Led by a popular and articulate leadership, men like

Levi Lincoln Jr. of Worcester, David Henshaw of Leicester,
and William Eustis of Boston scrupulously sowed the seeds
of Republicanism throughout the state.

Although Federalist

governor, John Brooks, won seven consecutive elections,

often by wide margins, his Republican challengers, Henry
Dearborn, Jacob Crowninshield, and William Eustis still

captured significant numbers throughout the state,

demonstrating Republicanism held substantial appeal.
Clearly, the Republican party of Massachusetts represented
a viable opposition,

perfectly capable of challenging

Federalism on the state level.

8

Indeed, the key to John Brooks's political success

within the Commonwealth was his moderate, nonpartisan
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stance.

Since his first victory in 1816, Brooks had

disingenuously praised Republican leadership in Washington
while masking his predisposition to Federalism 's most
elitist doctrines.

So pronounced was Brooks's nonpartisan

image that President James Monroe, while visiting the
Bay
State, reciprocated the governor's flattery of the

"Virginia Dynasty" by applauding Brooks's seemingly

nonpartisan leadership of Massachusetts.

As the Federalist

organ the Boston Palladium confessed, Brooks publicly

restrained his excessive Federalism and followed

a

much

less offensive course of "moderation and candour towards

his opponents."

Most importantly, Brooks took great care

to avoid being identified as a member of the Federalist

Central Committee.

This was no more apparent when, upon

Brooks's first gubernatorial victory, the Massachusetts
House of Representatives greeted him, proclaiming that the
new governor came from "the same school" as former

Republican governor, Caleb Strong.

Brooks swiftly appeased

his Republican critics by appointing them to public office.

According to one student of Federalism, Brooks "beat back
successive Republican challenges with

a

policy of

moderation," which according to another exemplified "his
artful dodging [that] belied

electioneering image of

a

a

carefully contrived

simple-soldier-in politics." 9

After the Hartford Convention, even in Massachusetts,

campaigning as a staunch advocate of traditional Federalist
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principles would be political suicide.
Brooks adopted the image of

a

Understanding this,

sincere patriot who

exemplified the nonpartisan tranquility of the Era of
Good
Feelings.
His "artful dodging" consistently quelled

Republican challenges to his administration and helped

maintain Federalist dominance in the state.
numbers steadily rose between 1816 and 1821.

His reelection
10

If the Federalist party nominated a candidate with

less bipartisan proclivities as Brooks, the Republican

party could offer numerous creditable candidates who could
run, perhaps even successfully.

state that held

a

For Quincy, competing in a

Republican party that, given the chance,

could strongly dispute the dictatorial character of
Federalism'

s

backroom leadership in Massachusetts,

a

viable

bid coming from an independent third party like the

Middling Interest for the governor's seat was unrealistic.
If reform in the manifestation of an anti-elite, anti-

federalist platform was to successfully evolve and break

Federalism 's traditional, yet increasingly tenuous

stranglehold on Massachusetts, the Republican party could
do the job.
By the early spring 1822, Quincy abandoned his plans

to run for governor and devoted his political ambition

toward the more reasonable goal of becoming Boston's first
mayor.

In this quest, the bipartisan support Quincy had

garnered and was known for in the House, and his reputation
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as a highly independent politician and staunch
foe of the

Federalist Central Committee would serve him well.

Unlike

the political situation in the state, party organization
in
Boston soundly favored Federalism. Despite increasing

hostility toward Federalist elitism, because of tradition
and the party's highly organized machine, Federalism

remained the only viable party in town.

The Republican

party continued to be weak in Boston while Federalism

remained ascendent.

Thus, unlike reformist impulses in the

state, Boston reformers could not look toward Republicanism
as their savior.

Any significant challenges to Federalist

hegemony in Boston necessarily had to develop from a third
party with the ability woo regular Federalists into
insurgent political activism.
By the beginning of 1822, such an insurgency was

refined into a polished and highly defined third party that

gained clarity from a controversial local issue that spoke
to the direct concerns of many of Boston's lower to middle

class voters.

Beginning in 1821, many Bostonians were

growing upset with an old 1803 fire law that restricted the

building of wooden structures higher than ten feet within
the town's limits.

The anger that middling and lower

orders first expressed over state issues such as the

militia laws, the debtor's laws and oppressive tax codes
was reinforced and heightened due to the inability of many

Bostonians to build affordable decent housing.
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The town's

restrictive building codes severely confined the
expansion
of low-income housing in Boston.

These restrictions forced

many poor to middling Bostonians to become dependent
on
landlords who easily sustained high rent rates by

exploiting Boston's tight housing market.

Also, the wooden

building law limited work for many Boston master carpenters
and journeymen, as well as profits for emerging

entrepreneurs interested in raising cheap row housing.

The

1803 fire law forced Boston's poor to search for

inexpensive housing in Boston's poorer, more decrepit

neighborhoods like the notorious North and West Ends.

For

the "respectable" mechanic or master carpenter, the law

greatly obstructed his ability to erect a home or
house that was affordable.

a

lodging

This seemingly innocuous issue

localized anti-elite, anti-Federalist sentiments for many

disgruntled Bostonians whose backs were already bent and
pocketbook's empty

— or

close to it

— because

of the

depressed economy. 11
Boston's popular classes experienced a meaningful

victory over the town's "betters" during the city

chartering dispute while also sustaining

a

struggling

embryonic, yet vocal oppositional third party called the

Middling Interest.

Seasoned by past political action, they

developed a unified group-identity of sorts that clearly
and forcefully would exhibit its class interests in the

once forbidden realm of local politics.
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As insignificant

as the wooden building issue
perhaps seems, it functioned
as the first test-case in public
policy for a newly

energized Boston electorate-one freed
from the bonds and
obligations so inherent in Boston's past
deferential
political structure. The wooden building
issue served to
clarify insurgent third party activism
by grounding
earlier, somewhat inexplicit calls for
reform to a precise
local public policy concern within the
specific confines of
Boston.
In 1821, South Boston resident, Lot Wheelright

petitioned Boston Town Meeting to exempt South Boston
for
five years from the town ordinance that restricted
the
building of wooden structures higher than ten feet.

In

May, Town Meeting voted to grant Wheelright his request,

stating

"

[i]t was Voted, That the Town consent that the

Laws, restricting buildings of Wood, more than ten feet

high, may be suspended for the term of five years, so far

as it relates to that Section of the Town." 12

Taking

advantage of Wheelright' s successful petition, Boston
resident, Josiah Jones presented his own petition that

asked Town Meeting to appeal to "the Legislature to alter
or repeal the Law prohibiting the erection of Wooden

buildings.
town.

.

.more than ten feet high" throughout the whole

Unlike Wheelright

1

s,

Jones's request covered all of

Boston and demanded the total abolition of the 1803 law.
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13

On June 6th, the town committee
charged with
considering Jones's petition presented
its recommendation
to Town Meeting.
Committee chairman and reformer,
Stephen
Codman explained that "it is the
opinion of the Committee,
that the existing Law may now be
modified without any
injury [to the town]; and inasmuch as
it appears to be the
general wish so to modify the Law, as to
meet the wants and
means of a large portion of respectable
citizens, who have
not the ability to erect buildings entirely
of Brick or
Stone [,]... [t] he Committee. .recommend [s] ...
its desire that
the Legislature should be requested so far
as to modify the
existing Law." 14 Codman's proposal overwhelmingly
passed
Town Meeting by "a majority [vote] of four to one"
and the
.

town's petition moved to the General Court for final
approval.

15

The legislature responded to Boston's petition by

granting South Boston the right to raise wooden buildings
above ten feet, but denied the same privilege to the whole
of Boston.

16

Bostonians responded with immediate disdain.

"Mill Creek Wharf" wrote to his fellow "mechanics of

Boston," "how astonished were the petitioners, to hear,

when the bill was brought

in,

that it was entirely contrary

to the expectations and wishes of a great majority of the
town. This astonishment was not diminished when it was

found that the greater part of the representatives from

Boston chose to be absent on this occasion."
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"Mill Creek

Wharf" explained that "after
the bill had received the
signature of the. Speaker of the
House [Josiah Quincy],"
further qualifications were imposed
by Boston
Representative, Nathan Hale that basically
neutralized any
changes distinguishing the 1821 bill
from the original 1803
fire law.
"it is difficult to conceive,"
reiterate the
editorialist, "why, after the petition
had been approved by
the town, any of our representatives
should have been so
much interested as to object ... .MECHANICKS! "
heralded
"Mill Creek," "keep your eyes well to
the right— and
,

steady—and at the next election of representatives,
send
such men to the general court as will do their
duty without
fear and trembling." 17
Less than a month later, on July 13, a fire
broke out
in a wooden boarding house on Union street
destroying at

least eleven buildings after spreading to Salt Lane
and

Creek Square.

One week earlier, another fire ravaged

Charlestown, incinerating at least $20,000 worth of

property before being extinguished.

18

Such outbreaks

seriously diluted, at least momentarily, Boston's outrage
toward the General Court's behavior.

Any significant

reform in Boston's fire laws would have to wait until the
summer fires in and around the town faded from public
memory.

This would not take long.

In January,

1822, while the chartering controversy

simultaneously raged in Town Meeting, John
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H.

Wheeler

raised the wooden building issue
to the town once again.
This time, not only did the petition
reiterate earlier
demands for reform in the fire laws;
it also directly
charged that Boston's "Senators &
Representatives
be

directed to use their influence in
procuring the passage of
a Bill by the Hon. Legislature
conformable
to the... vote

[on wooden buildings] of the Town." 19

As with the Jones's

petition, Wheeler's easily passed Town
Meeting and was sent
to the General Court for approval.
As the petition's
addendum ordering Boston legislators to follow
the town's
instructions suggests, the reformers, this time,
left

nothing to chance.

The petition would arrive at the State

House

a

supported by

town committee hoping to persuade

Boston's legislators to vote in favor of the town's
request.

If Boston's representatives in General Court

snubbed the town once again, there would be serious

consequences

20

Upon hearing the news of the second petition's

overwhelming support and passage, Harrison Gray Otis, from
Washington, shot off orders to his operatives to block the
petition.

"I see with dismay,

the vote for wooden

buildings," Otis anxiously wrote William Sullivan on

January 19, 1822. "It seems incredible
in the legislature befor[e],

— Cannot

you check it

'Ucalegon burns next.'" 21

Being a landlord and having an extensive land and property

holdings in Boston, the abolition of the fire law would
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directly effect the value of
Otis' s properties.
With a
greater risk for urban fires,
insurance rates would soar
while property values would
decline.

Also, if the rental

market in Boston expanded due to
the erection of cheap
wooden apartment buildings, Otis
would face new
competition.
His rent rates would decrease
and his income
would fall. 22

Accommodating otis's directive, Sullivan
orchestrated
an effective counter-attack.
By stacking Town Meeting with
anti-reform, established landlords, Sullivan
forced through
the passage of a formal grievance
refuting the legitimacy
of the Wheeler petition.
According to Sullivan's
remonstrance, Wheeler's proposal was invalid
because it had
not been presented in a referendum. As a
result of

Sullivan's parliamentary tactics in Town Meeting,
the
General Court would first have to rule against the

grievance before it could even address the town petition.
By employing such a strategy, the central committee

crippled reform by complicating the wooden building issue
once it reached the legislature. 23

The Federalist

leadership seemed to be using its political influence to
halt any competition to its economic interests in Boston.

Buckingham was furious.
an editorial,

meeting,

"Certain people," he fumed in

"who never trouble themselves to attend town

— thinking

it rather beneath their honorable and

dignified characters to meet in the same hall with
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mechanics and labouring men, -have
presented a remonstr ance
against the petition." Attacking
reform's opposition,
Buckingham stated that "Tilt
n short,
c v^v-+Lijt is, in
a mere guestion
of self-interest, in which the
purse-proud landlord is
i c=

i

arrayed against the mechanic. The
remonstrance would never
have existed, had not the large owners
of real
estates,

seen in the success of the petition,
a reduction of their
already overgrown incomes from cruel and
exorbitant rents.
They would have no objection to wooden
houses of two
stories, provided they had the exclusive
privilege of

erecting and leasing them."

4

Without reform, Buckingham

explained the "present interest and future prospects
of the
middling and poorer classes," would remain bleak.
"[T]here

are mechanics, who, with the savings of a few years
labour,

might live in decent houses of their own, and look forward
to a comfortable competency— perhaps to independence:
and

this is the reason, why the petition is so violently
opposed. These lordly nabob[

']

s. ..

object is to keep

mechanics and labourers in eternal servitude .... It remains"
Buckingham challenged, "for the legislature of
Massachusetts, to say whether the mechanics and labouring

people of Boston shall be allowed to participate in the
rights of privileges, which any form of government

professes to guarantee to all, or whether all the lands and
houses shall eventually become the property of
landlords

— whether

a

a

few

mechanic may be a freeholder, or
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whether he must be

a

tenant."

'

Despite Buckingham's

appeal, the General Court agreed
with the Sullivan

grievance committee and rejected the
town's request.
Otis -S strategy had worked. Expansion
of the housing
market would, temporarily at least,
be stopped and existing
rental rates maintained.
The town was again outraged by their
legislature's
behavior.
So vocal was the criticism that
many of town's
representatives grasped for the first time the
power and
immense popular support the issue wielded
within
Boston.

Fearing defeat in the next elections because
of their antireformist stance, some Federalist representatives
broke
with the central committee's standing orders and
scrambled
to reposition themselves on the question.
As one Boston

newspaper reported, "a representative from Boston, who
lately remonstrated against the petition for leave to
erect

wooden buildings has set his name at the head of the new
petition for the same object. What can have operated so
potent i a ll y on his mind, as to induce him now to advocate

a

measure which three weeks ago he considered fraught with

mischief and destruction to the town? Is it possible,"
queried the editorial "that the fear of losing his seat in
the legislature at the approaching election can have

wrought such

a

miracle, as unstopping the ears of the deaf,

opening the eyes of the blind, unloosing the tongue of the
dumb, and convincing the understanding of the dull and
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obstinate?-

B y the end of February,

the central

committee's traditional authority
in the legislature
buckled under the weight of
overwhelming popular support
for reform in fire laws.
Even obedient and traditionally
loyal Federalists operatives found
themselves turning their
backs on Otis and the Federalist
leadership
out of

political necessity.

A number of Boston legislators

perceived that to block this particular
popular reform
would be an act of political suicide.
For Boston's popular
electorate, the wooden building issue came
to represent
much more than simply the freedom to raise
more affordable
housing or to reduce rents. By February,
the issue came to

embody all of common Bostonians" objections
with what their
city's wealthy Federalists leaders. However modest
the

reformer's goals, the wooden building issue became the
urban proletariat's symbolic stand against what the

electorate viewed as an elite, Federalist hierarchy.
With

a

petition signed by

Bostonians, on March

6,

a

staggering 4,500+

Asa Lewis reintroduced the issue at

Town Meeting and, after written ballots were taken, the

measure passed by an awesome majority of 2,263 out of 3,411
votes.

This time not only would the town selectmen lobby

Boston representatives, but Town Meeting also granted "the

petitioners [themselves to] be empowered to appear... on
behalf of the Town or City, to advocate, and defend the

petition before the Hon. Legislature." 27
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Buckingham's

Galaxy, commended Lewis and the
petitioners while scolding

Sullivan for having blocked the
provision.
"This result,"
Buckingham snorted, "will stop the
clamour which was made
at the former meeting on the
same subject, because the vote
was not decided by ballot, it is
incontestably proved,"
claimed Buckingham, "that a large
majority of the voters
(of those at least who care any
thing about the business
[of Boston])

are in favour of the present
unreasonable,

unjust, and oppressive restrictions being
removed."
Broadening his critique of the wooden building
issue,

Buckingham squarely fused reformist goals with
the plight
of "the poorer classes [who] are hungry
and homeless." 28
Fearing further defections, the Federalist
press downplayed the issue as trivial. According to Boston's
leading
Federalist organ, the Columbian Cjm&iDJLl, reform in
the old

fire laws was of "no great significance to either
party." 29
By so misreading the salience of the wooden building
issue,

the Federalist press and its masters, unlike dissident

Federalist legislators who switched their position, were
oblivious to the third party activism that had been

smoldering for so long within the town's less affluent
wards.

This third party movement would finally coalesce

and ignite over the wooden building issue.

Also, the

Federalist leadership's response revealed to the town's
insurgents Federalism 's vulnerability

arrogance
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— its

brazen

The Federalist, Daily A
d v ertise squarely illustrated
the party's temerity when it
smugly argued that Boston

mechanics, struggling with high
rents, should be happy with
their prospects and stop complaining.
"As to the rent paid
by the mechanics," the
Advertiser asked, "would it be
better for them to have the price
greatly reduced?" of
course not, answered the Advertiser
because "high rents are
a mark of prosperity." 30
such insolent and insensitive
logic infuriated a Boston working class
that continually
grappled to put food on the table, pay rent,
avoid militia
duty and stay out of debtor's prison. An
incensed Joseph
Buckingham responded to the editorial, stating
that »[i]f
'[h]igh rents are a mark of prosperity,' so are
thefts and
robberies. A pick-pocket steals your purse and
justifies

himself by this convenient logic— 'It is
prosperity; for if you had not a purse,

taken it.

•

a
I

mark of your
could not have

Another rogue breaks into your house; and this

too is a mark of your prosperity, because if you had no
house, he could not have committed the burglary, and a

third murders you—all for your good,

..

.proof that you had

life, and you might not have known it had you never

swallowed his arsenic or felt his dagger."

Making matters

worse, the "writer in the Daily Advertiser," charged an

incensed Buckingham, irreverently insulted all who had

signed the petition.

The Advertiser

,

Buckingham claimed,

"intimates that many of the signatures to the petition were
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procured in grog-shops. This is
altogether in K^lna with
the general tone of the writers
in that vehicle of
aristocracy, it is meat and drink to
them to libel the
mechanic, and middling interests." 31
Indeed, the Centino!

claimed the "tenf ooters,

»

as the wooden building reformers

were called, had "designing intentions,
or to say the least
the intemperate zeal of a few, to
create out of an honest
difference of sentiment on this minor topic,
a general
feeling of hostility which may
[Federalism]

.

.

.

.divid[e] a party

" 32

Although this undoubtedly was the intention of
the
Middling interest, the Centinel boldy underestimated

the

insurgency's broader foundations.

Although the insurgency

remained inadequately organized, it had not developed
on
whim as the Federalist press suggested. Nor was the

a

movement predicated solely on the wooden building issue.
Reforming Boston's fire laws only provided the Middling
Interest with one highly charged and popular plank to be
added to its overall reformist platform.

As Buckingham

explained, the insurgency's principal agenda was to wage

protracted battle against the aristocratic and elitist
course Federalism had recently taken

— to

fight against

those who "see none of [the poor's] miserable tenements,
[and]

bears none of their gleanings

— for

them, he [the

greedy Federalist] has no sympathy, with them he has
nothing in common, but [collecting from] them rent
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.

a

According to Buckingham, unlike
the Federalist party, the
Middling interest championed
»[t]he mechanics of Boston as
intelligent, and as respectable in
every thing, except the
respecta bili ty of w^lth, as any body of men

that ever gave

strength, support and security to any
city or nation on
earth. " 33
For ordinary Bostonians, Federalism's
covert and
consistent opposition to the "ten footers"
seemed

symptomatic of the party's larger intentions:
to maintain
ruling political and economic aristocracy at
their

a

expense.

Two earlier attempts to reform the wooden
building laws by
functioning within established political guidelines
were

crushed by the central committee.

By the spring of 1822,

there was little doubt among the majority of ordinary

Bostonians that the political system was being manipulated
to sustain elite hegemony against the ascension of the

honest and respectable plebeians.

By restricting the

upward mobility of Boston's respectable laborers and

mechanics while exploiting their labor, extracting
excessively high rents, taxing them through the militia
laws and inequitable property assessments, forcing

hardworking Bostonians into debt, while, simultaneously,
demanding and pompously expecting deference, the majority
in Boston lost all respect for the party of "good men and

measures."

As Buckingham asked Boston's ordinary voters,

"shall they [the mechanics and laborers] be forever cowed
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down and kept out of countenance
by

a

contemptible minority

of overgrown landlords,
and speculators, who were
originally as low-aye, and much
lower, -in the world than

themselves?"

These .'haughty lordling [s] and
the princely
nabob [S],... possess no feeling in
common with other men and
[their] sympathies are never
awakened but by the jingling
of dollars."
Because the legislature had disbanded
for an

extended vacation, this question,
according to Buckingham,
would finally be decided upon in
Boston's upcoming mayoral
contest.
The hostile sentiments of the town
indicated that
the Federalist nominee would not run
unopposed. 34
The prospect of having the wooden building
issue
define the city's first mayoral contest
certainly did not
appeal to the Federalist leadership. Harrison
Gray Otis

maintained

a

controlling interest in the Mount Vernon

Proprietors, Broad Street Association, and Mill Pond

Corporation which had resulted in his commanding
estate empire.

a real

The prospect of loosening the town's fire

codes clearly was not in his, nor his various corporation's
interests.

With the abolition of the fire laws, Otis's

empire would be jeopardized by more affordable building.'
Also, although Otis and his operatives underestimated the

strength of the insurgency, by March, he and his handlers
came to understand that the populist rhetoric of the "ten

footer's" potentially threatened the Otis campaign.

Quickly responding to the central committee's new insights
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on the election, the Federalist
press no longer totally
dismissed the "ten footers" as
irrelevant, but instead
attempted to appease and quiet the
dissident factions of
the electorate by calling for
party unity. - C i ]t can hardly
be thought good policy," wrote
the Column gfintinfili „ to
endanger the peace and harmony of our
city" over the wooden
building issue. "Let us not... in the
name of common sense,
permit the evil spirit of discord to
preside at the first
election of our city officers." "Let us
not... create out of
an honest difference of sentiment on
this minor topic, a

general feeling of hostility.

..

[which will] divid[e] a

party who have hitherto acted with no less
union than
success." 36 But the call for party unity came
too

late.

Much to the astonishment of the Federalist
leadership,
the wooden building controversy so vividly illuminated

Federalism 's aristocratic intentions that the party had,
in
fact,

suffered serious desertions as Boston mechanics and

laborers broke for the Middling Interest.

Even worse,

Boston Republicans had been first to rally around the issue
and were swelling the insurgency's ranks.

Finding itself

on the defensive, the central committee was forced to

acquiesce on the wooden building question.

In an attempt

to preserve Otis' s mayoral prospects and salvage Boston

Federalism from the menace of popular insurgency, the
Federalist leadership reversed its position.

As he had

done in the past, Harrison Gray Otis managed damage-control
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from Washington.

"From the signs of the times,"
he wrote

Sullivan on March 21, »l infer that
if you mean to prevent
the triumph of the revolutionary
movement manifested in the
new city, you ought to let the
advocates for wooden
buildings or the Roulstone party or
who ever they are,
understand that your opposition will be
withdrawn....!
go

upon the supposition that the wooden
project cannot be
resisted for any length of time: and as
in the case
of

other popular hallucinations, the mischief
must be yielded
to, or others will follow the train."
Concluding that the
insurgency must be halted or "the Devil will
break loose,"
Otis arranged for Boston's leading Federalists
to publicly
support the "tenfooter's" agenda in the upcoming
Federalist
caucus.
He believed such a preemptive strike would

effectively absorb the political potency of Boston's recent
third party activism.

By coopting the insurgency's most

dynamic issue, the Middling Interest would be crushed while
the vitality the third party had garnered by pressing the

wooden building issue could be exploited to reinvigorate
Federalism among the Boston masses. 37
Initially Otis's strategy seemed to work.

During the

March Federalist caucuses for the state senate, loyal OtisFederalists who recently switched their position on wooden
buildings, gained their party's nomination with little

opposition.

Yet, Otis's cunning did not go unnoticed by

Joseph T. Buckingham who saw through Federalist strategy:
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"We had hoped,'

Buckingham observed in the
Galaxy, "that
the good sense of the mechanics
would have triumphed over
the shallow schemes of those who
pretend to be their
friends, when, at heart, they are
the most thorough-going
aristocrats in the town. We did hope
that the wholesale
dealers in soft-soap who harangued
the people at the late
caucus, and daubed the middling interest
an inch thick with
that slippery commodity; and those who
acknowledged their
sudden conversion to the expediency of the
city charter,
(when they found it getting into popular
favor) would
receive from the mechanics the neglect to which
their
,

unstable, vacillating, toad-eating policy so
eminently

entitles them. We still hope that those, who are
in favour
of wooden buildings, have not pledged themselves
to support
the election of these men, beyond the power of
reconsideration. Anything is better than

a

weathercock

senator— who signs petitions one day and remonstrances the
next

— who,

to gain a vote, will undergo a miraculous

conversion, to the will of the people— and who wheedles

with the oily tongue of

a

republican, though every drop of

blood in his veins curdles at the approach of anything that
is mechanical

.

"

38

By the end of March, insurgent leaders seemed to have

reached the same conclusion as Buckingham.

In a "large and

respectable meeting" held at the Warren Hotel in Boston,
two veterans of the wooden building reform movement,
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Michael Roulstone and William

W.

Blake, presided over the

Middling interest's first formal
caucus.this meeting that the Middling

it was from

Interest first developed a

skeletal program that, in the
months to come, would evolve
into a highly articulate, refined
and popular manifesto
capable of providing an alternative
to Federalism.
The insurgents adopted three primary
resolutions.
keeping with its anti-aristocratic
foundations,

m

the

Middling Interest attacked. the central
committee, resolving
that "no man nor corporation or association
of
men are

better than the community in deciding
leadership in
Boston." Then, squarely confronting the
deferential nature
of Boston's existing political culture,
the insurgents

decreed that "all men... are in danger of being
led by party
names to act contrary to their true interests"
and that
this practice must stop.
Finally, the caucus challenged
the Federalist nominees for state senate with its
own

nominees.

Six office seekers came from both Federalist and

Republican ranks, yet what each held in common was
distrust of the central committee.

a

deep

Heading the insurgent's

list was Josiah Quincy's first cousin, fellow Federalist

dissident and loyal friend, John Phillips. 40
The galaxy heralded the alternative caucus as a

important triumph over "the nomination by the [Federalist]

Grand Caucus, in which every puppet moves as the grand
council of dictators pulls the wires."
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The Middling

Interest's nominations, Buckingham
explained were, »[a]ll
of them[,]...men in whom the
mechanics and Middling
interest men have confidence.'-

Although the third party

slate threatened Federalism, the
insurgency could not
muster enough support for its senatorial
candidates.
The
roots of past deferential behavior,
though weakened,
remained deep. Despite having amassed
notable support, the

Middling Interestmen lost to the Federalist
slate. 42
To some extent, the third party's loss was
to be
expected.
Since the beginning of March, the Middling

Interest primarily focused its efforts on Boston's
first

mayoral race.

More than any one issue, the insurgent

struggle for ward voting during the chartering controversy

distilled and largely shaped popular, anti-aristocratic

dissidence into a compelling, deviant political force
within Boston-proper, but had inspired little activism
beyond Suffolk county.

Although anger over state laws

concerning debt imprisonment and militia laws fueled
populist discord within the town, little could be done to
reform these laws on the local level.

Against significant

opposition, the town had successfully forced ward voting

through the General Court, demonstrating that the state
could be moved toward limited reform, if only on the local

municipal level.

By mid-March and under siege, the State

House seemed to be warming-up to the idea of significantly

reforming the city's fire laws, but, again, this only
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touched within the parameters
of Boston.
To achieve
sweeping statewide reform, without
an established political
organization and a sophisticated
network throughout
Massachusetts, would be impossible.
At best, the

insurgency could and did exploit
these state issues and,
more importantly, Bostonian's anger
over them, to solidify
a local coalition of interests;
but to actually change

state policy with the limited authority
given to municipal
Boston, was as unrealistic as Josiah
Quincy becoming
governor. Also, the initial leadership
for the movement
stemmed not from the state, but the local
level.
Michael
Roulstone and William Blake had little influence
or

experience in state politics.

Their concerns were

predominately municipal in nature, and as such, they
limited their ambitions to winning the mayoralty. 43

Others in the Middling Interest held more inspired
goals. Francis Wayland arrived in Boston in August,
1821 to

head one of only three Baptist churches in the city— the

North End's First Baptist.

As cleric to one of Boston's

poorest wards, Wayland rose to a leadership position within
the Middling Interest party in less than a year after his

arrival to Boston.

Wayland 's activist proclamations

expanded the insurgency's ideological foundations by
illuminating what he believed was the inseparable

relationship between Christian theological doctrine and

American citizenship.

Christian duty and democratic
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citizenship held tangible social
responsibilities that were
inseparable and required devout
citizen-stewards to
organize and act against crimes
to democratic principles.
The result was a doctrine that
justified Middling Intereststyle democratic and social reform
by blending it with
Christian doctrine.
I f the church is
faithful to
herself, and faithful to her God,"
Wayland
11

[

]

preached,

"what

are now called the lower classes
of society will cease to
exist
[The] middling and lower classes
of society

understand the nature of liberal institutions,
and those
who are groaning under the weight of
civil and religious
oppression. The question at issue is, whether
a nation
shall be governed by men of its choice, or
by men whose
only title to rule is derived from hereditary
descent."

As

Wayland revealed to his North End, working class
parishioners, "[w]hatever we would do for our country,
must
be done for THE PEOPLE. ..[ for the people are not
only the
]

real but also the acknowledged fountain of all
authority " u in Boston outsider, Francis Wayland, the

Middling Interest found

a dynamic,

intelligent and

independent voice that offered ordinary people the self-

determination to confront and abandon their traditional
deferential voting behavior.

The health of American

democracy, Wayland pronounced, depended on an independent

electorate freely voting its conscience unencumbered; not
one entangled in a web of class spun by an economic elite.
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As a political leader Wayland
could be trusted.
He
had come from a poor mechanic's
family and had pulled
himself up by his own initiative.
He was born in New York
city and raised within a staunchly
Republican working class
family.
As a tanner and an itinerant
Baptist preacher,
Francis's father fell in and out of
debt.
During the War
of 1812, the family went bankrupt.
At age twenty, Francis
was accepted to Andover Seminary as a
"charity case," and
was the school's only Baptist student.
After graduating
from Andover, he wanted to continue his
education at

Princeton, but because he could not afford
tuition, was
forced to serve as a tutor at Union college
to make ends
meet.
In 1821, he secured the Boston parish at
the age of

twenty-five. 45

When Wayland arrived in Boston he was poor and the

parish he shepherded was even poorer.

Indeed, the North

End of the early 182 0s was second only to Boston's West
End
for its number of brothels and dance halls.

The town's

most famous whorehouse, the "Beehive" stood only blocks
from Wayland 's church.

The neighborhood also housed a

large proportion of Boston's mechanics, small shopkeepers,
laborers, and artisans many of whom worshipped at the First

Baptist.

As with Boston's lower-to-middling class of all

denominations during the early 1820s, Wayland 's

parishioners struggled during the depression.

The young

Baptist preacher soon became renowned for helping people
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struggling with debt.

Plying his powers of persuasion
to

get credit extended or dispensing
what little discretionary
funds were available to him,
Wayland aided northenders
threatened with debt imprisonment.
His popularity grew
within months of his arrival in Boston
and those who
followed him became known as
"Waylandites « "Waylandites"
were mostly young men who proved as
politically defiant and
zealous as Wayland.
Following Wayland 's teachings, they
maintained that religiously defined aspects
of social
justice should direct secular social
policy.
"Waylandites"
composed the core cell within the Middling
Interest, while
Wayland himself emerged as the insurgency's
most
.

charismatic leader. 46
Embracing the Middling Interest, Wayland
distinguished
himself from other insurgent leaders like Roulstone
and

Blake by carefully assembling a sophisticated three
pronged

political program that appealed to a beleaguered, working

electorate that felt unfairly exploited by what it viewed
as an uncaring and self-serving aristocracy.

First,

Wayland passionately believed Christian duty demanded
popular democracy.

Without

a

government by the people,

human progress could not evolve.

According to Wayland, if

the rich and wellborn continued to control the government,

the democratic promise of universal freedom could never be

reached.

The future of the country "lay in the hands of

•the middling class of citizens, that portion of men who
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unite intelligence with muscular
strength-the farmer, the
mechanics,'" and not the wealthy,
the connected or the
gentrified.
In this sense, Way land was a
democratic
idealist who strongly believed that
the voice of the people
echoed the voice of God. Secondly,
Way land attacked both
the Federalist and Republican parties,
claiming that
neither represented the true interests of
their

constituencies and served only the needs and
desires of
party officials. 47 As he wrote to his
friend, Mark

Tucker,

»[t]he longer

that

I

I

look and think, the more

am right.

I

I

am convinced

will not be... the subject of a party ." 48

By distinguishing the Middling Interest from
both

established parties, Wayland's anti-partyism allowed the

nonpartisan insurgency to draw membership from both
Republican and Federalist rolls.

And finally,

like his

insurgent colleagues, Wayland guickly came to dispise what
he identified and distinguished from the rank-and-file as

Boston's oppressive Federalist aristocracy.
While Joseph

T.

Buckingham persistently utilized the

Galaxy to expose the impact of Federalist elitism on the

ordinary citizens of Boston and the state, and consistently
demanded specific reforms, Wayland simultaneously attacked
the corrupting influence of the two party system on the

human soul.

"The spirit of party," he reminisced in 1826,

"pervaded all ranks of society, and mingled its bitter

waters with all the relations of civil and domestic
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life.... [it] infused its
hateful influence into the
services and devotions of the
sanctuary of God.... The
salvation of the soul itself
seems unimportant, in

comparison with the all absorbing
question, which of these
two political parties should be
uppermost." 49 Although
publicly Wayland assaulted both
parties equally, privately
he confessed his rhetoric was
designed to tear down
Federalism.

50

Orthodox Federalists throughout
Massachusetts balked
at the insurgency's public
pronouncements. Recent Harvard
graduate and loyal Otis partisan, Ralph
Waldo Emerson
clearly illustrated his contempt for the
insurgency.

Writing to John Boynton Hill in March
1822, Emerson
explained that the third party was "a band of
murmurers
parcel of demagogues, ambitious. .. of being known,

.

.

.

[and]

hoping for places as partisans which they could not
achieve
as citizens." 51

The Federalist Central Committee viewed

Wayland 's party and his diatribes in
else could Federalism'

s

a

similar light.

How

leadership interpret such

threatening statements being issued from the North End
like:

"the great changes in a nation must always be

commenced [by] the common people?" or "[t]he question at
issue is, whether a nation shall be governed by men of its
choice, or by men whose only title to rule is... from

hereditary descent." 52

Wayland even went after the newly

revised state constitution, stating that it was "utterly
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worthless" because it was not
"written on the hearts of a
people.- with Wayland's vital
contributions to Middling
interest doctrine, Federalism
faced an energized political
force inspired by moral righteousness.
By the winter of 1822, the
disparate and often
fragmented voices of Boston discontent
found a viable home
in the Middling Interest party.
Armed with a litany of

meaningful state and municipal issues,
a sympathetic organ,
the New Enql^n d Oal ay
y from which to disseminate party
ideology and positions, a leadership
that held a distinctly
democratic doctrine zealously fortified by
Christian
,

principles, and a disgruntled electorate eager
for reform,
the Middling Interest party in Boston had
rapidly developed
into a mature, viable alternative to
Federalism.
in March,

the insurgency leadership began searching for
a suitable

candidate to pit against the "aristocracy's" chieftain,

Harrison Gray Otis.
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CHAPTER VI
THE MAYORAL ELECTION OF 1822 AND

THE TRIUMPH OF THE MIDDLING
INTEREST
"The wheels of revolution are in
motion."
—Joseph T. Buckingham, 1822.
"The magic of the many which sets the
world on fire."
—Harrison Gray Otis, 1822.

By late spring 1822, a broad and fractious
coalition

came together under the Middling Interest's
reformist
banner.

"Ten footers" united with frustrated debtors
and
angry militia men. Ward voting advocates and
tax reformers

joined-in as well.

Boston's dissenting electorate

concluded that neither the Federalist leadership, nor
the
ineffectual Republicans could or would satisfy its demands
for reform.

Thus,

it looked elsewhere.

Possessing a new

political awareness, ordinary Bostonians moved beyond past

partisan rancor and embraced the insurgent vision put forth
by Francis Wayland and other Middling Interest spokesmen.

The depression of 1819 initiated a charged atmosphere
of social and economic reform that gave rise to political

unrest in Boston.

As the reverberations of the depression

spread throughout the city, popular resistance to the

political status guo erupted.

Under the weight of

depression, required militia service no longer seemed an
act of patriotism, but an oppressive tax.

Imprisonment for

debt seemed excessive when so many Bostonians were

unemployed, or working harder than
before on ly to avoid the
debtors' gaol.
Boston's fire laws no longer seemed
practical when they helped maintain
high rents and stifled
the "small man's" prospects of
ever owning a modest home to
insure a secure retirement. Small
property owners
condemned a tax code that taxed thrice-over
for no other
reason it seemed than to fill the
pockets of unscrupulous
judges

Even the 1780 state constitution seemed
stale and in
need of change due to a myriad of new
developments within
the state and the people's consistent calls
for reform.
Adding to popular frustrations, once a constitutional

convention met, the reformists were swiftly silenced.
Slick lawyers and unscrupulous judges had rigged
the

convention before it had even convened to quell reformist
impulses within the state.

On the local level, Boston's

voting majority no longer revered the small band of
Federalists elites who controlled Boston's traditional town

meeting system of governance.

Instead, the majority

demanded a representational system where all could vote in
the privacy and security of one's own neighborhood, far

from the prying employer's or client's eyes.

These were the issues and battles

— both

won and lost

that helped bind the Middling Interest coalition together
in 1822.

The single most resonate chord among the variety

of interests within the coalition was a unifying and
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impassioned hatred toward

a

common enemy-the Massachusetts

Federalist Central Committee.

For many Bostonians, the

Federalist leadership of Harrison
Gray Otis, Thomas
Perkins, William Sullivan and
their

H.

lackeys-those "purse-

proud devils," as Joseph

T.

Buckingham called them-no

longer were viewed with deference,
but, instead, outward
contempt.
The adherents of the Middling
Interest viewed
this leadership as having betrayed the
people's
1

trust.

From the central committee's stubborn
defense of the
militia system to its hidden role in blocking
any

significant constitutional reforms in 1820-1821;
from its
stand against ward voting to its neglect of
the
debtors'

plight, the central committee faced an increasingly
hostile

citizenry.

Voters began to detect a pattern in the central

committee's actions.

To Boston's insurgents and their

followers, the Federalist establishment rigidly guashed
any

popular challenges to the deference it had for so long
enjoyed.

The anti-deferential stance toward Boston's

traditional economic, social and political establishment
(as represented by the central committee)

confrontation in Boston.

led to a class

This political and cultural

rebellion challenged the patterns of dominance

traditionally exhibited by the established Federalist
elite.

Specifically, the insurgency exposed the central

comm ittee for what it had become:
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a

prejudicial, closed

fraternity that promoted and
perpetuated, through political
manipulation, its own power and class
interests.
At
the

same time, the central committee
continued to claim a
disinterested and paternal devotion to
all the people
within Commonwealth.

With the committee's cynical responses
to popular
demands for reform between 1819-1822,
many disgruntled

Bostonians became skeptical of the "honorableintentions,
if not the very honor of Federalism's
leadership.
The

deference ordinary Bostonians once voluntarily
bestowed
upon leaders like Harrison Gray Otis and William
Sullivan
turned sour in the wake of depression. With the
Boston
elite's paternal intent under fire, a political and
cultural mutiny arose among the city's rank-and-file

electorate
Like 1814, Bostonians in 1819 endured
But,

in 1814,

a

depression.

the Federalist establishment's prompt

political and economic response had attended to the needs
of the public.

This was not the case in 1819 and ordinary

Bostonians took matters into their own hands calling for

a

variety of political reforms to ease spiraling economic
hardships.

Elite leadership replied to such grass-roots

activism with obdurate resistance and an insensitive
attitude of upper-class superiority.

Drawing support from

both Republican and Federalist ranks, the result was the
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formation of an aggressive,
coalitional insurgency, unified
in its common resentment
toward the upper class's
behavior.

For the central committee and
the interests and class
it served, the development of
such a dissident political
body held profound implications for
its dominance
of

Boston,

if not the state.

For Boston's "commoners" to so

overtly defy the will of their "betters"
demonstrated the
fragility of elite-class political and
cultural hegemony in
Boston.
in this sense, Harrison Gray Otis's
fearful

characterization of the Middling Interest as a
"revolutionary movement" was not without foundation. 2
In the Spring of 1822, the insurgency
formally

introduced its populistic manifesto, reinforcing
Harrison
Gray Otis' fears.
in a widely distributed pamphlet,
the

Middling Interest declared, "[w]e claim from our
Constitutional agents deferens to the known will of the
majority."

m

a thinly veiled

condemnation of the central

committee, An Exposi tion of the Princip es and views of the
l

Middling Interest announced, "we deprecate the secret
influence of a FEW" who ignored the authority of the
majority.

Focusing its outrage on the central committee's

recent political intrigue in blocking various Boston
reforms, the Middling Interest claimed that the people

"have been denied in measures. They have been utterly

disregarded by those, whom the people of Boston elected
into the last Legislature .... Our senators and
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representatives not only opposed the
wishes of their
constituents, but joined in the
votes which in one instance
defeated the purpose of a large
majority
of the town.

..

.We

allude to the petition for wooden
buildings, and the
provision in the city charter, for
election of state and
United States officers in wards."
Ward voting, the

Middling Interest explained, was essential
because -the
majority are, and of right ought to be,

sovereign; and that

there is not, nor can be danger intrusting
to the majority,
when every voter in the Commonwealth
is left
free to form,

express and act upon his own opinion of men
and
measures." Holding that the majority "were
treated with
[to]

contempt," the Exposition assailed those class
interests
that the "FEW" represented and the specific
business

ventures which had helped make Otis, Perkins and
Sullivan
wealthy and prominent men in Boston: "We hold it

preposterous to admit that
successful speculation

in

a

high prize in a lottery, or a

l^n d or merchandize,

confers

knowledge and understanding, and still more admit that any
man can or ought to have influence on any other

qualification than the soundness of his judgement, the
fairness of his mind, and his ability to be useful." 3

Adding a touch of anti-partyism into the Middling
Interest platform, the Exposition stated that insurgents
"pledge [d] themselves to nothing but the suppression of

party spirit, and the violence and overbearing domination
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of those, who seek power
for the gratification of

possessing it, and use the influence
it gives, to control
freedom of opinion and independence
of suffrage."
Addressing the hyper-critical and
obviously threatened
Federalist press, the pamphlet
concluded, »[i ]t has been

sneeringly said, that the Middling
Interest is an array of
the POOR against the RICH. On the
contrary, the Middling
interest are as ready to admit the
just influence
of the

rich as the few, who affect to enroll
all of them in their
ranks, ... [yet] we know many rich men
who have not a
particle of political influence." These
men, according to
the Expos i tion would be welcomed into
the insurgency.
4

,

If anyone in Massachusetts politics
seemed to have

"not a particle of political influence," and
had rebuffed

"enroll [ment]" into the "ranks" of the "FEW,"
it was Josiah
Quincy.
After twenty-years in politics and at the age of
fifty, Quincy «s professional life seemed a profile
in

political decline.

in just nine years, he had fallen from

prominence as a nationally known figure in the U.S.
Congress to a inconsequential municipal judge.

Indeed,

Harrison Gray Otis, in January 1822, had written Quincy off
as a tired, political has-been.

Having fallen out of favor

in the central committee, Quincy found a renegade urban

constituency ready to welcome him.

In his role as a

municipal judge, Quincy first courted and then captivated
this dissenting element in Boston's political landscape.
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The man on the outs with the
central committee, was now
the
champion of the Middling Interest.

While "trying his hand

amoung whores and rogues," as
Otis disparagingly characterized
Quincy's departure from
the State House to the municipal
court, the new justice
promptly distinguished himself as an
activist committed to
reforming what he charged were obstacles
to the "just
.

.

.

distribution and wise execution of the
principles of
justice."
Quincy understood the enmity the
populace
5

toward the judiciary.

felt

As a judge he would use this

animosity for his own purposes.

Beginning with popular

frustration over judicial exemptions from militia
service,
and extending to countless charges of judicial
corruption,
judges of all stripes bore vigorous popular
onslaughts to
their character.

Since the depression's beginning, judges

were attacked for their excessively high salaries.

Their

attempt in Boston to maintain their taxing powers by

preserving the Court of Sessions had raised the ire of most
Bostonians.

"The truth is," wrote Joseph Story to his

fellow judge Jeremiah Mason in January 1822, "the Judiciary
in our country is... open to attack from all quarters

its

only support is the wise and the good and the elevated in
society." 6

It was just this segment of society that the

Middling Interest had declared war on.

As a judge,

Quincy's quickly differentiated himself from the rest who
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were routinely perceived as
unscrupulous and moneygrubbing. 7

Within two months of his appointment
and with an eye
towards gaining the "mass of the
community's" support,
Judge Quincy launched a two-pronged
attack on the same
judicial system he had so recently joined.
First,
he

criticized the practice of judicial sentencing.
Because
Boston maintained only one jail, all
convicted of a crime

within the municipality, no matter the severity,
were
confined to the Leverett Street Jail. There
was

little,

any,

segregation of inmates.

Women, children and

if

men— the

violent, the deviant, and the disturbed— all who
were

convicted, ended up on Leverett Street; violent criminals

freely co-mingled with debtor's and poverty-strickened

children guilty of petty theft.

Such integration outraged

Quincy, for, as he stated before the Suffolk County grand
jury, within a month of Boston's first mayoral contest,

"society itself does little else [under such

a system]

than

plot the ruin of every juvenile offender, and every novice
in crime, when it provides no other alternative for

punishment, than confinement in gaol." "Why should not,"

Quincy asked, "a power be invested in the judges," to
separate criminals on the basis of "age, or sex, or degree
of offense?" 8

Joseph Buckingham's New England Galaxy

concluded that by "degree of offense," Judge Quincy was
referring to debtors and their imprisonment.
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Having

consistently criticized the malady
of debtor's, the
C^xy.
heralded Quincy as "entertaining
such rational and
philanthropic views... [as] to produce
a reformation- in
judicial sentencing. The
ho^J^R^r^r a non-partisan
Congregationalist magazine, praised Quincy's
charge
asserting, "we have long felt, doubtless
in common with the
mass of our fellow citizens, that there
are great defects
either in the laws themselves or in their
execution."
Quincy's second salvo revitalized long-standing
,

9

popular grievances stemming back to the
Constitutional

Convention that accused the judiciary with
inefficiency and
corruption.
In his March directive, Quincy denounced
his

judicial brethren for making "gain from their [the
people's] vices: as making profit by their [the people's]

passions; and as interested to enhance their [the people's]
losses and miseries, by multiplying, or lengthening out

their [the people's] controversies [trials]," while

steadily accumulating excessively high court fees.

Echoing

complaints first issued by reformers during the 1820-1821
Convention, Quincy charged the judiciary with serving its
own selfish interests at the tax payer's expense.

After

scolding his fellow judges for their blatant economic
opportunism, if not out-right corruption, Quincy declared,

"everywhere the robe of justice should be spotless," for it
was the poor who suffered most under
judiciary.

10
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fraudulent

Quincy's widely publicized demands
for judicial reform
undeniably added to his popularity.
As Boston
editorialist, "LABEO," commented,
Judge Quincy »enlarge[d
his argument before the grand
jury] with much force and
eloquence upon the manner in which
justice is administered
to the lower classes of society
by the inferior judicial
tribunals. And he very properly adverts
to that disgrace of
the Statute Book, the act by which
the compensation of
Justices is made to depend upon the number
of cases they
decide; an act that gives them direct
interest in the

stirring up of petty suits, and embroiling
the whole mass
of society." This same criticism of
the judiciary's

compensation had been raised by Stephen Codman in
Town
Meeting one year earlier. 11
As the Codman committee reported to the town,

$1,366.45 was paid "to one Justice between February and

October," while, that same year, three more had divided
the
tidy sum of $3,100.63 between themselves.

12

Justice Joseph

Story estimated the average salary of a state judge stood
at $2,400, not including fees rendered in court.

13

When

the average wage of a common laborer rested at 80 cents a
day,

a

carpenter at 89 cents

a day,

a

printer at $1.22 at

day, and a blacksmith at under $1 a day, the justices'

base salaries of $7 a day (not including their fees) seemed
excessive.

14

Considering that in 1822,

Jamaican rum cost $1.25

a gallon,
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a

gallon of

cord of wood went for

$3.86, and a gallon of lamp oil sold
for $l, the high cost
for life's most basic necessities
combined with their

modest incomes placed great financial
burdens on the
average working Bostonian. 15 Popular
resentment toward the
judicial branch's lucrative earnings
remained high
in 1822

and probably grew as the lingering of
depression undermined
the average Bostonians's ability to
pay off
debts, rents,

and taxes.

Once in the court system, the common
debtor all
too often watched as lawyers, judges, and
plaintiffs walked
away with his hard-earned money, leaving him
deeper in debt
and facing jail-time. 16
Certainly, concerns over debt imprisonment weighed

heavily on the minds of many Bostonians who would vote
in
the April mayoral election. The call for the law's

abolition was as vigorous and incendiary as ever.

In the

spring of 1822, Middling Interest spokesmen seized the
issue stressing it as an essential component in the

upcoming mayoral contest.

Days before the mayoral

election, the Galaxy, now fully committed to the
insurgency, joined the outcry against the law.

much to be deplored," wrote Joseph

T.

"

[l]t is

Buckingham, "that

some kind of law cannot be made to give relief to a very

numerous and very respectable class of people" who, in

unprecedented numbers, were being sent to prison for
indebtedness.

"

[A]

bolishing imprisonment for debt... is

demanded on every principle of justice and humanity." 17
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Other insurgent partisans
concentrated their wrath on the
hypocrisy that Josiah Quincy had
identified in judicial
sentencing. As Middling Interest
spokesman William Emmons
asked, "how long shall we inflict
a cruel,
unholy, and

unconstitutional punishment on the unfortunate
of our land,
while we treat the felon with less
severity than we now
treat poor unfortunate Debtors!" 18

Although Quincy had not directly championed
the
debtor's movement, his condemnation of
sentencing
"respectable" offenders to the same "gaol" as
"vicious"
criminals, combined with his assault on the
integrity of
the bench, earned him the support of the
debtor's wing of
the Middling Interest.
This support only intensified when,
one month before the election, he proposed a solution
for

minor crime such as debt delinquency which he claimed
society was responsible for: How "strange" it was, Quincy

declared "to prosecute and punish crime,

... [when]

there is

little... in our public institutions of the character of

prevention." 19
to humankind

According to Quincy, crime— though endemic

— could

be curbed if all of society faced

itself and took responsibility for its uglier sides.

Quincy believed in the organic nature of community.
Therefore, to stop crime, all citizens held a moral

obligation to work towards its prevention through social
reform. 20
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Quincy's successful promotion in Town
Meeting for the
House of Industry in 1821 was
predicated upon
such

conviction.

It was the duty of the organic
whole to

distinguish between the "vicious" and
the "virtuous"
poor.
Both could be reformed, Quincy believed,
1

but each

required dramatically different types of
disciplinary
instruction.

In 1821,

despite criticisms leveled upon the

exorbitant cost of the House of Industry,
Quincy argued
that segregation of the "vicious" and the
"virtuous" was
the "moral duty... in a republican form of
government,

..

.connected intimately with the very principle,

on which its preservation depends.

In such a form of

government, the great object of attention is the character
and condition of the mass of the community. What ever tends
to contaminate, to corrupt, or to demoralize the mass,
has
a

direct effect, not only on the happiness and prosperity

of the state,

but also its safety; on the security of

property, of life, and of liberty; all of which
are.

.

.directly dependent upon the moral character and

condition of the people ....[ This responsibility] cannot be
tested by any narrow scale of pecuniary expense and
saving."

As a municipal court judge, this philosophy

informed Quincy's decisions in sentencing criminals he
faced in his courtroom.
Faced with what he viewed as an unreasonable dilemma
of having to sentence both debtors and murders to the same
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prison, Judge Quincy distinguished
himself from his judical
brethren by publicly lashing out
at the prison system.

According to Quincy, the "moral
character and condition of
the people"-the very foundation
of "a republican form of

government"— depended upon the benevolent
role of an
activist state which held the power and
duty to prevent the
demoralization of the masses which would lead
to social

chaos.

such an essential obligation of the
government
outweighed any private concerns over the cost
or expense
because both social order and democracy hinged
on
"the

character and condition of the mass of the
community."

The

mixing of the "virtuous" debtor with the "vicious"
criminal
amounted to a dangerous betrayal by the state to the
people.

Such integration, according to Quincy, would

naturally lead to the contamination and corruption of
society.

Remaining true to his convictions, Judge Quincy

served uncharacteristically light sentences to those whose
only crime was their proverty. 23

Furthermore, Quincy"

March pronouncement on the judicial system adequately
distanced the potential mayoral candidate from the
entrenched judicial establishment, helping him forge an
independent course from which to run for mayor.
When,

in the spring of 1822,

deliberated on

a

the Middling Interest

viable candidate to stand against Harrison

Gray Otis and the central committee, Josiah Quincy seemed

exemplary prospect.

First, he desired the position.
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a

Secondly, Quincy had a long
political association with some
of the insurgent leadership
going back to his involvement
in the Washington Benevolent
Society.
One of the Middling
Interest's founders, Michael Roulstone
had served on the
same 1812 Standing Committee that
had asked Quincy to join
the WBS and function as its first
vice president.
Also,

while in the Massachusetts House of
Representatives, Quincy
earned the Republican minority's respect,
especially
from

those representatives from Boston who
had become recent
converts to the insurgency like Rev. Francis
Wayland's
deacon, representative of Boston's Ward
1, Heman Lincoln.

Lincoln had been a loyal Republican before
shifting to the
Middling Interest cause and, like Wayland, advocated
a

Quincy mayoralty. 24

Middling Interestmen who had stood against city
chartering, like Joseph

T.

Buckingham, a dissident

Federalist, and William Emmons, a converted Republican,

supported Quincy as well.

This faction within the Middling

Interest remained leery of the charter due to the excessive

authority over the city section 30 surrendered to the
General Court. 25

Accurately regarding section

30

as a

Federalist Central Committee ploy to control its interests
in Boston,

the anti-charter bloc still viewed the charter

with great suspicion.

Because Quincy shared precisely the

same misgivings, this wing of the insurgency believed if

anyone could be trusted as mayor, it was Quincy.
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As

Buckingham explained, "Mr. Quincy 's
opposition to the
charter may, with some persons, be
a objection to his
eligibility to the Mayoralty. We think
otherwise. He

opposed it because he saw.

.

.mischief in the section which

gives the legislature unrestrained power
over the charter.
He is... still of the same opinion; and...
will be still on
the watch to see that we are not made the
foot-ball of a
foolish legislature, and [he will] be ready
to repeal the
danger when it approaches." Emmons agreed.
Also, it was
remembered that in one of his last acts as Speaker
of the

House, Quincy had endorsed the original bill to
reform

Boston's restrictive fire laws.

Although the Federalist

legislature overwhelmingly struck down the reform bill,

Quincy had supported the Middling Interest's most

publicized policy stand against the "haughy lordlingfs] and
princely nabobs."

The prominence of the wooden building

issue in the insurgency's laundry list of policy reforms

held egual value as ward voting in defining the movement.
It was a reform that would have a consequential impact on

hundreds of carpenters, renters, and ascendent

entrepreneurs

26

Although Quincy 's position on the divisive issue of
the militia laws remained ambiguous, his speech before the

Massachusetts Peace Society in late December 1820 attacking
"military fanaticism which was pervading the country,"
indicated Quincy 's sympathy toward militia reform.
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Quincy

believed war resulted from the
two-pronged evil of an
unreformed society where poverty and
entrenched military
establishments necessitated war. Why
would the poor choose
peace over battle when they -go...
to war
beggars,

[and]

return from it nabobs," their pockets
filled with
"plunder," Quincy asked. with the
maintenance of organized
military establishments, "fighting and
killing one
another," Quincy argued, "is, no longer...
a matter of
blood, but a matter of business."

Though he did not

directly vilify the militia laws, clearly he
viewed them as
barriers towards "improving [the] moral and
intellectual
condition of mankind," which, according to Quincy,
was the
only course society could take to achieve peacef
ulness 27
In many ways, the connection Quincy had made
between

poverty, military organizations and creating a peaceful
society, harmonized well with the anti-militia movement's

message.

The movement had never been based on pacifistic

principles, but, instead, on the growing economic

insecurities of ordinary militiamen who regarded mandatory
service as yet another oppressive tax being heaped upon
them by the elite to protect the monied interests.

militia service drove them into poverty.

Forced

Thus, the

movement's rhetoric emphasized class inequity within the

unreformed militia laws.

As with the debt reformers, after

the militiamen's petitions to the legislature were ignored
or voted down and their voices in the constitutional
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convention silenced, they rejected
past partisan loyalty
and united with the Middling
Interest. 28 Like the tax
reformers, the debtors, and the
"tenf ooters » the
militiamen searched for a candidate
who hated the
manipulations and political intrigue so
often employed by
the central committee.
in Josiah Quincy they found
their
,

man.

indeed, as early as April 1821, Quincy
had accepted

his ostracism from the committee and
began publicly

distancing himself from the Federalist
establishment as a
whole.
His speech chastising the committee for
"turning
[him]

overboard [in the state senate] and making sharks'

meat of [him]," clearly was

a

well-timed jab at the party

leadership meant to help redefine his political image. 29
year later, with his independent stand as

a

A

municipal

judge, Quincy had completed his own personal process
of

political transformation.

To the delight of Middling

Interestmen, not only did Quincy seem perfectly content

with his ostracism from the central committee, but he
seemed happy with it.

Freed from the central committee,

Quincy thrived, putting forth his own reformist vision that
served as a distinct political alternative for dissident
factions in Boston's electorate.
In early March 1822, according to Eliza Quincy,

number of Citizens ... sent

a

"a

Committee to his [Quincy's]

house in Hamilton Place, headed by
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a

Master Carpenter to

ask him [Quincy] to stand [as]
their candidate for the
Mayoralty." Because of Quincy. s
highly publicized
opposition to the Boston city charter
he hesitated at the
request stating "it would be like
choosing Guy Faulkes
[sic] for mayor, for he had done all
he could to blow up
the city." Nevertheless, now that
the governor's office
seemed beyond his grasp, Quincy undertook
a personal

campaign to reposition himself in his race
against Otis for
the mayoralty.
Despite his false modesty, Quincy
immediately accepted the delegation's offer
to lead the

insurgency.

30

Having found

candidate, Middling Interest

a

strategists formed

a

scheme to capture the mayoralty.

insurgents planned to raise

a floor

The

fight at the Federalist

nominating caucus and thus, displace the central
committee's candidate, Otis, with Quincy.

On April

caucus met at the Boston Exchange Coffee House.

4,

the

William

Sullivan served as both caucus moderator and Otis's
emissary.

Many men were nominated for Mayor, but after

a

number of ballots were taken, the contest came down to

Quincy and Otis.
be working.

The Middling Interest strategy seemed to

However, in the final balloting, moderator

Sullivan insured that Otis received the majority by

allowing some Otis supporter's to cast their votes after
the balloting had officially ended.

215

Holding only five more

votes than Quincy, Otis was declared
the Federalist mayoral
candidate. 31

Middling Interest delegates immediately
rejected the
decision charging that the caucus had
been rigged.
The
insurgent delegates, according to the Boston
press,

"contended] that persons [Otis supporters] had
been
permitted to mark after the vote had passed for
the closing
of the marking." The insurgency's charges
were
valid.

As

early as January 18th, William Sullivan had
guaranteed Otis
the Federalist nomination. He assured the Senator,
"[p] roper measures will be taken [during the caucus]"
to

secure the ticket.

Indeed, as the Galaxy later exposed,

the caucus had been controlled by "the exclusive and one-

sided policy [of the central committee]."

In an attack on

Sullivan, the Galaxy went on to explain that "[t]he

moderator of [the] caucus has convenient ears

;

he never

hears the name of an independent man; but he can hear

Whispers from the well known, tried and faithful servants
of the aristocracy, or he can, upon an emergency, take nods

and winks for a nomination." 32

For the insurgent

reformers, the central committee's conduct in caucus

recalled past unscrupulous indiscretions experienced during
the Constitutional Convention and the Town Meeting debates

over the charter.
Even before the caucus, the Middling Interest forces

were at a distinct disadvantage.
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Sullivan had been hard at

work consolidating Otis loyalists.

Beginning in March, the

full weight of the Federalist
machine had been set in
motion to promote the Otis ticket
and crush any other
challengers. On March 19, 1822, the
"fanatical" Federalist
editor, as Joseph Buckingham described
him, John Russell,

heartily endorsed Otis for mayor in his
Boston Evening
The Boston Daily Advertiser, which
Buckingham

declared existed solely to "support a monied
aristocracy,"
followed suit as did the "irritable in the
extreme"
Benjamin Russell, in his Columbian

r^ in ^l

Not only did

every Federalist organ in Boston predictably
sponsor Otis,
but the entire Federalist press in Boston refused
to even
acknowledge Quincy as a candidate. Only on election
day

did John Russell's Gazette grudgingly recognize the
Quincy
candidacy.

Though declining to even identify the Middling

Interest nominee by name, Russell, in one short and

dismissive sentence, unequivocally opposed Quincy' s bid for
the mayoralty.
wrote,

As "citizens and federalists," Russell

"we feel impelled to resist the nomination of this

gentleman.

" 33

Only Joseph Buckingham's Galaxy supported Quincy

against the machine.

On March 29, the Galaxy formally

endorsed the Middling Interest-Quincy ticket stating,
"[o]ur mayor should be

a

man who will consider himself the

chief officer of a large and respectable republic

favored child of [the] junto

—a
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man, who,

— not

the

in executing the

laws, will not know a Tyrian
from a Trojan; and who in

nominating candidates for subordinate
offices, will be free
from the shackles of favoritism.
Such a man
is the Hon.

Josiah Quincy....

[

i ]f

a course of honest and

intemntent

conduct through evil report and good
report-if experience
in the deliberative assemblies
of state and

nation—if

courtesy to political opponents, and
the exercise of
gentlemanly deportment to all, whether high
or low, ri£h__Qj:
BOOT, are to be of any avail, Mr. Quincy is
pre-eminently

entitled to be the first Mayor of the City
of Boston" 34
Despite the galaxy endorsement, Quincy and
the Middling
Interest still faced overwhelming odds.
What the Middling Interest proposed was a
grassroots
challenge to a hostile Federalist leadership that
viewed
Otis' s ascendancy to the mayoralty as the first
crucial

step in its ultimate goal of placing the committee

chieftain in the governor's mansion.

As the Federalists

caucus indicated, the central committee proved willing to
go to extreme lengths to achieve its final objective.

In

this sense, the central committee wagered that the bonds of

deference that had maintained the party's rank-and-file in
the past would hold, despite its conniving behavior in the

caucus
It was within this context that the Middling Interest

delegates broke with the Federalist caucus on the night of
April

4,

1822.

Furious and embittered by the blatant
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scheming of Sullivan and the
central committee, the
insurgents stormed out of the Boston
Exchange Coffee House
to hold their own independent
caucus the next evening in
Justice Quincy's own courtroom. On
April 5, the "Middling
Political Interest" caucus unanimously
nominated Quincy as
their candidate. Quincy, in turn,
heartily accepted the
nomination. 35
"Of course," Eliza Quincy recalled
in a somewhat

bridled statement, "the nomination of Mr.
Quincy was
great surprise to [the central committee]
.... Boston

a

it was

said had never been thrown into such a state
of

excitement." 36

To be more accurate, Quincy's acceptance of

the Middling Interest nomination sent a chilling
shiver

throughout the Massachusetts Federalist establishment
that
proved to have devastating political, personal and cultural
implications.

Having been notified of Quincy's betrayal just hours
after the Middling Interest caucus disbanded, Thomas

H.

Perkins dashed off an agitated letter to Otis who was still
in Washington.

"Quincy has thrown himself into the

•Midling or Medling Interest' and has suffered himself to
be put up as Mayor.

..

.As I gave him my mind very freely on

the subject, we are of course at Swords points ....

[H] e

will

have the high gratification of having split up the federal
party.... Wm Sturgis has been his great 'slang wanger,
he carries with him the 'ten footers,
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•

•

and

and a portion of the

Democracy [Republicans] which is
always the most opposed to
the most conspicuous of the federal
party-Webster, Lowell,
Tudor, all the Judges and those
whom

I

know you to feel a

high respect for, are ardent in the
expression of the wish
that your name should not be taken from

the list.... But for

this most improper conduct of Quincy,
the Election of the
Mayor would have been unanimous." 37

From far-away Salem, Federalist chieftain of
Essex
county, Leverett Saltonstall frantically
wrote to his
Boston friend and fellow Federalist, William
Minot,

are we coming

to— or

"What

rather what are you coming to in

Boston? Quincy v. Otis! This is too bad. There must
be

something in this business of which we at a distance are

wholly ignorant

[T]hat Quincy should swell the triumph

of a wooden building faction

— and

abused him these past 20 years

of a party who have
Is he fascinated,"

Saltonstall asked, "by the miserable vapor
popularity.

..

.Good Lord deliver us!... There must be

extensive jealousies among you."

Explaining to Minot that

the insurgent tide was spreading into his own county, he
wrote,

"I found yesterday master Chander deeply infected

he thought Otis unfairly nominated

&C....I am glad,

I

— talked

of intrigues,

do not live in Boston. It would not do

for my temperament," Saltonstall confessed. 38

Webster was no less frantic.

Daniel

The day after the Middling

Interest convention, he anxiously informed Joseph Story of
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the news from Boston: "We are
in a deplorable state
here
Mr. Q[uincy] has opposed the
City from the
beginning! He now wraps himself up
in mystery,
&

importance— none of his old friends can get
with him-tho I have no doubt a very
active
exists between him,

&

[an]

aujiiej^

communication

a certain other guarter." 39

Clearly, the Federalist hierarchy felt
politically

threatened by Quincy's stand.

As Leverett Saltonstall,

somewhat hysterically, pronounced on the eve of
the
election,

"the Federalists are all

dead— dead— dead!

I

hope

the first election of the City of Boston will
not portend
its fall." 40 But, as these letters also suggest,
the

betrayal affected Federalism 's leadership on a personal
level.

For Quincy to have so publicly betrayed the central

committee not only proved

a

political embarrassment, but it

held profound cultural meaning for men like Otis,
Saltonstall, Perkins, and Sullivan, as well as for those,
like Daniel Webster, who worked so hard for them.

Partisanship, class affiliation and cultural identity

were all tightly wrapped-up together in the minds of these

nineteenth-century elites.

To be a Federalist was to

culturally distinguish oneself from others.

William Sullivan on January

19,

1822,

In a letter to

Harrison Gray Otis'

summed up this sentiment when he wrote that one of the

major reasons for his coming home to govern Boston was "to
train the young leaders of my own breed."
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As one historian

of Boston explains,

"[office holding elevated Brahmins

status [in the first decades of
the nineteenth-century]
through the highly visible symbols
and rituals of the
political process.... [T ]he Boston
political and economic
elites merged and government service
advanced class power
as well as class ... honor » Another
explains, to
.

be a

Federalist meant one "was expected to
adhere to the Federal
standard and acceptable conservative creed.
To renounce
one's [party] was tantamount to admitting
a serious
character flaw." Thus, when the Federalist
Portsmmn-h
Journal of Literatu re and Poli tics offered an
explanation
to its New Hampshire Federalist readership
for the "unhappy

division of parties [that] prevails in Boston,"
it

concluded Quincy's betrayal must have been motivated
by
"personal considerations." 41

Quincy's conversion to the Middling Interest

discredited patrician honor and, by extension, weakened the
class's cultural power that the Federalist establishment

reinforced and championed.

His political alliance with

those whom Ralph Waldo Emerson disparaged as "a band of
murmurers.

.

.

a

parcel of demagogues ... [those] hoping for

places as partisans which they could not achieve as
citizens," demonstrated Quincy's political inclusiveness

while also illustrating that he disagreed with Otis's
reliance on the Lancastarian system of governance and the

deference it demanded.

In other words,

222

for many ordinary

Bostonians, Quincy. actions
s
de-legitimized the structure
of political dominance used
by the political and economic
elite of the region.
in this sense, Quincy challenged
the
legitimacy of elite-class rule by
undermining its

manifestations in politics.
Also, this act of political heresy
exposed a fissure

within elite-class solidarity.

Pierced not by the dreaded

mob of the masses as the Federalist
establishment had
always feared, but by one of its own, the
Boston
aristocracy was taken by complete surprise.
its reaction
to such apostasy was one of disbelief.
Indeed, most

Otis-

loyalists believed Quincy, at the last minute,
would

withdraw from the race, rather than "be made the

instrument of disunion and disorganization of the Federal
party'

"

which would condemn him to the peripheries of

Boston's elite-class society.

As Thomas H. Perkins

proclaimed to Otis, "Quincy has done himself up by the
course he has pursued

[H]e will have the high

gratification of having soiled up the federal party and if
he succeeds in his object[,] will lose the place to which
he has pretended so much devotion."

Let the election "turn

as is may," Perkins explained because there would be

cultural retribution.

"[T]here is no doubt," he concluded,

"that Quincy loses, tho he may gain the majority."

Saltonstall was utterly confused when he wrote to William
Minot: "I have had, as you know,
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a

great regard for Mr.

Quincy, and regret that he should
do anything injurious to
himself," but "that he should be
willing to disappoint
friends who have stood by him firmly,...
is truly
mortifying. " 42

The Middling Interest challenge and
Quincy -s betrayal
shocked loyal Federalists up and down
the eastern seaboard.
Philadelphia's leading Federalist organ,
the National
Gazette and Literacy. Regist e r reported on the
severity of
Quincy -s dissidence.
"A new division of parties has taken
place in the good city of Boston, which threatens
,

to

destroy the political supremacy of the old
'federalists of
the Boston stamp. «... [The insurgency's] object
...[ is]
to

show that they have the power of making

a

selection. It is

probable that they aim at taking the nomination and choice
of public officers, from the particular circle to which
it
is alleged to have been hitherto confined."

According to

Daniel Webster, the world seemed upside-down "when [one]
sees Mr. Quincy the very darling of the Boston Democracy!"

Harrison Gray Otis judged Quincy and the insurgent party in
apocalyptic terms.
and leaders
friends!

&

[It]

"They cry out, desert your old friends

come into our tabernacks! Sir

desert your

is the same which since the world began [,]

corruption speaks to weakness and treachery
seduction holds to virtue.

... [It]

— which

caused sin into the world

and death by sin.... It is the magic of the many which sets
the world on fire." 43
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For his part, Quincy seemed
to thoroughly enjoy the
stir he was causing among Boston's
Federalist hierarchy.

When Thomas

Perkins scolded him for leading
the Middling
Interest out of the Federalist caucus,
Quincy, according to
a shocked Perkins, simply
responded with "a formal bow, and
a stately -good morning,- having
totally dismissed him and
his censure.
The day before the election, Quincy
and his
daughter Eliza were walking down Summer St.
after church,
when they observed Harrison Gray Otis s
son,
H.

•

"hurrying along."

Harry,

According to Eliza, "Mr. Quincy called

after him saying,

'Where are you going so fast, Otis?"'

a

red-faced Harry replied, "'working against you Sir,
as hard
as I can."' Quincy laughed and waved him on
stating,
"'Very well, only take care you don't work too hard

.

<» A4

According to Eliza, while "Mr. Otis's partisans were very
angry [with Quincy

•

s] ...

interference,

"

and Otis's "sons and

sons in law distributed voters" throughout the city in

"every effort" to get the crusty old Senator elected,

Quincy remained very relaxed and satisfied about the

upcoming election results. 45
Not only had Quincy infuriated his old colleagues, as

Webster fumed, by "wrapping himself up in mystery
importance.

..

[so]

&

none of his old friends c[ould] get [an]

audience with him," but he seemed to be rubbing their noses
in it.

Worse, he did not seem to acknowledge or care about

the disruption he was causing.
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According to Webster, "the

dirty squabble of local politics,"
was subverting "her [New
England's] proper character and
consequence .... I feel," he
confessed, "the hand of fate upon us,
and to struggle is in
vain. We are doomed to be hewers
of wood and drawers of
water.... What has sickened me beyond
remedy is the tone and
temper of these disputes. We are disgraced
beyond help or
hope."
Middling Interest founder, Francis Wayland,
4

'

viewed the situation quite differently.

Writing to his

friend Alonozo Potter, the day of the election,
Wayland

optimistically explained, "[i]n all probability
there will
be a revolution in politics
Boston it is thought

will be

democratic shortly, and this will give

a

strong impulse to

the state[;] this will produce a mighty stir in the
[country] ""
.

Realizing that its candidate, George Blake, had little
chance in Boston because the Middling Interest coalition

drew significant support from Republican as well as
Federalist ranks, Republican party strategists took the
only course open to them.

They tried to coopt the anti-

aristocratic platform of the insurgency for themselves by
claiming Quincy was

a

charter-member of the "aristocracy."

Characterizing both Quincy and Otis as elitists brothers,
the Republican press argued, "Upon what American

principles, upon what American feeling can such men be

worthy of the suffrages of American citizens? In the memory
of many a Bostonian such men would not be tolerated in
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Boston. They would,

like the Tea, be thrown into
the bay,
by a parcel of Indians, or they
would be habited in such
suits of domestic manufacture, that
their dearest friends
would shrink from their embraces." 48

The glaring problem with this strategy
was that
Quincy, since 1820, had established
strong connections
within the Republican party. Some of state's
most
prominent Republicans, like Levi Lincoln Jr.,
graciously
had accepted Quincy 's legislative help,
friendship and even
his leadership during the Maine statehood
debates in the
General Court. Also, Quincy' s involvement in the

Constitutional Convention of 1820-1821, further solidified
his relationships with Republican leaders Lincoln and
James
T.

Austin.

Thus,

likening the reformist Quincy to the

chairman of the Massachusetts Federalist Central Committee
seemed totally erroneous and only played into the anti-

party ism of the insurgency.
strategy proved

a

Indeed, the Republican

complete failure.

Out of the 1,200

Republicans who voted in the mayoral election, only 157
marked their ballot for Blake.

Josiah Quincy stole the

vast majority of the Republican vote, seducing a remarkable
802 Republicans into the insurgent fold.

Although the

Republican party had always been ineffective in the Boston,
with the city's first mayoral election, Boston

Republicanism reached

a new nadir.
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But what loyal Otis Federalists
wondered was whether
their party too would meet the
same fate.
The Middling
interest could bank on 600 firm
third party partisans, but
the number of regular Federalists
and Republicans persuaded
by insurgent precepts remained
unknown.
Two days before
the election, Daniel Webster privately
offered his gloomy
prediction to Joseph Story, confessing that
»[n]othing
seems practicable but to go forward and
support Mr. 0[tis]
&

probably be beaten." 50

Undoubtedly, the central

committee's behavior at the Federalist caucus
had increased
the insurgency's numbers.
Other Otis Federalists rejected
Webster's pessimism. Far too much was at stake.
Foreseeing

a

Middling Interest victory, in

minute ploy to insure

a

a

last

third party defeat, the central

committee agreed to throw another candidate's name into the
race.

According to Eliza Quincy, because "Mr.

Quincy.

..

[clearly] was ahead," the committee hoped to

fluster and confuse insurgent voters by introducing another

Middling Interestman, Thomas
ballot.

L.

Winthrop's name onto the

As Eliza recalled, "Mr. Winthrop was put up

without his knowledge, to divide the voters
defeat Mr. Quincy." 51

&

at least

The sabotage succeeded.

Unbeknownst to him, this "other" Middling Interest
candidate, captured

a

total vote of 361.

Ninety-two came

from disaffected Federalists, 90 from Middling Interest

partisans and 179 from converted Republicans.
228

The vast

majority of Winthrop's votes,
presumably, would have gone
to Quincy if the central committee
had not added him to the
race.
Despite this, Quincy gained the majority,
with a
total of 1,736 votes.
Remarkably, his strongest support
came from traditional Republican partisans.
Without
doubt,

Republicans identified Quincy as their
candidate.
mentioned earlier, Quincy earned the lion's

As

share of their

votes, with 802 out of 1,200.

Predictably, of the 600

Middling Interest voters, the vast majority of
510 went
with Quincy.
if there was any weakness in Quincy
's

popularity it came from the Federalist party.

Out of the

1,900 Federalists who went to the polls, only 424 cast

theirs for Quincy.

The overwhelming majority of those who

still identified themselves as Federalist in 1822, had

remained loyal to Harrison Gray Otis.

Nevertheless, in a

political culture that maintained three parties, that
proved insufficient.

Otis only appealed to Federalist

loyalists, garnering 1,384 votes.

Middling Interestman had cast
Senator.

a

Not one Republican or

vote for the venerable

The remaining 62 votes went to a scattering of

nominal candidates. 52
Clearly, the extra-legal manipulations and partisan

zealousness of the central committee spoiled any

possibility for the Otis campaign to appeal to either the
Republican or Middling Interest rank-and-file.
the central committee had offset the worst.
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However,

Webster's

ominous prophecy had been avoided.

Winthrop drew just

enough votes from Quincy to deny
him a quorum as the
charter required.
if the "other" insurgent
candidate had
not been brought into the race,
Quincy would have received
785 more votes.
Armed with a cumulative vote of
2,521,
instead of his 1,736, the Middling Interest
and Quincy
would have easily captured the mayor's
office.
Yet,

because of the election rules and the complicity
of the
central committee, the Middling Interest
candidate would
not ascend to the chief executive position.

53

Despite the

loss, the insurgency found significant solace
in the fact

that it had successfully blocked the "servant of
the
aristocracy.

1,54

Thus, after the initial balloting for Boston's first

mayor on April

8,

the Middling Interest and the Federalist

Central Committee had reached a stalemate.

Each had

stymied the other and both candidates withdrew from the
race.

For ordinary Bostonians, the visible difference

between the two parties was clear.

One had employed dirty

tricks to check the opponent; in stark contrast, the other

rejected such partisan scheming and adopted an honest
campaign the insurgency had promised

— one

based on

integrity and the authority of "the people."
did not go unnoticed by the Boston electorate.

The contrast
In the

second election on April 16, the central committee once
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again would find itself on the
defensive, but this time it
would have to acquiesce to the
coalition's demands.
In the meantime, Buckingham
viciously railed against

the central committee.

Outraged at the central committee's

recent clandestine behavior, the
Galaxy, three days after
the election, charged that »[i]t is
this kind of management
which has produced a divisions in the ranks
off
federalism,

and sown the seeds of a new party, which,
like the fabled
teeth of the giant, will soon spring up and
become an army
that will overpower it predecessor. The party
is the

middling interest, and comprises the men who are so
far
below a state of overgrown wealth, as not to be able

[to]

live without labour, and so far above mendicity [sic]
as
to be too proud or too honest, to live by trimming and

fawn i ng

.

It has been said that there is no such thing as a

middling interest—that the rich have no interest separate
from that of the labouring and poorer classes. This

assertion is false

The rich are in league to put down,

and keep down, the mechanic and the tradesman. They have

trampled upon the worm till it turns, and the mechanic and
the tradesman would deserve still to be trampled to the
dust,

if they did not turn,

and at least endeavor to curb

these purse-proud devils of their will." 55
The public outcry against the central committee's

"managements" before and during the election proved so

overwhelming and hostile after Quincy dropped out of the
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race that Thomas H. Perkins was
forced to deliver an
"explanatory address" to the people of
Boston.
Perkins's
address only roused them more by
insulting the Middling
interest and Quincy. with this address,
Perkins, who had
maintained a low profile during the election,
sealed his
fate as, in Buckingham's words, one "of
the crafty

politicians."

"it is not as... easy," Perkins explained,

"to heal party dissensions, as to

f erment ...

them— let the

responsibility of the latter rest where it ought."

"Amen,"

Buckingham retorted, but "the guestion is," Buckingham
stated,

"[w]here ought the responsibility ... rest? Most

undoubtedly on those [in the central committee], who, at
the [Federalist] general caucus, after the marking for

candidates was declared to be closed, persuaded others to
come and mark for their favorite candidate, thus turning
the scale against the candidate [Quincy] who had the

majority of marks." 56

Buckingham then turned his wrath on

the Federalist press which, he reminded his readers, had
not even "deigned to mention that [Quincy] was a

candidate."

"Our ideas of duty and impartiality,"

Buckingham mocked, "may be very unsound and absurd
they are very unfashionable
feel

.

.

.

;

but,

;

we know

such as they are, we

'impelled' to maintain them; and hope we shall never

feel impelled to adopt that narrow-minded, exclusive sort
of policy, which would seal up the press of this free and

enlightened country, against the expression of the will and
232

:inn

'

,U

<

1

W

-

not

moill

1

'

,„.,

"

" lh

»^pp.Miocl.

Mli,u

'

,,,>(

'»

l

,'

•
'

v
Y

°

(.1

f

1

«'»nil»iii rt

Mr.

*

:,

.unl

open

!,.„,

rtIU ,

:;tM ,

••'•H

1

l>"tW.MMl

the

f

prtmM

int

i„. M olfU?t inn

()(

n,<,

r,rt,,, "- t

'"

,

Ol

in«l

l

M

-

i'hil.ndoiph|

'

is's

,| t

.|,Ml

«•<••••,

qenoy'n nodal eompon

:;

rilil

l"

"

'

such activist

"MM

i

<>xl;!,,,, l

who
I

•'«'

wo

;;

i

i

loci

1

.

.

.

m

known

I

lh.it

"«|:;.

.

.i

.

.

l-'edei

.1

I

t

considei

name

ol

imo,

t

o

l

i

M idd

Conn
t

I

.d»

h<-

idoi

()t

,

w|ij|

(>u(

i

t

i

on

i

nq
nq

I

t

.in

(iom

{lu>

in

MmuHTrtt

neemed

I

nt
t

re,

linn

1

t

a

i

i

Although

.

outlined by

had motiv.it.nl

ho cone nded

01

tli.it

1

yearn

:.<-v<-i.il

<d

Innolvont

Do. lit 01

ho in by

interest,

01

th.it

the

.c:..-:::.,-d

ei ly

ti.it

honton,

in

ndependent

more dot

in

party

in<|

ol

nt ei ont

i

ii.-unpnh

.md Democratic,

poition

„n

i!5

The Portsmouth Journal

n

.md

t

hone

.md Woodon building"

partisans combining with "Insolvent
.»

(1|

tnrnin.,

ol

New

third p.trtyinm

honton oonnint

'i

,„„.,

,

National Gazette and

eonniderat ionn"

connected with

li'cl

•

I

lM

,

into which hont on

.„

rt

the Middling Interest."

the Portsmouth Journal':-, editoi
,lu>

MU

(o

Ul<|

hrtfJ

.

tunned

|

oi Literature and Polities
intuit

.it

"The „„vlu„ir:; .md other

.

allied to |Onincy

>

,.

t

the part ion'

Literary Register, aeenned Qniney
•

only

t

i

O.lb.ll ."'

.1

ion ol

t

,,ivid -

,l,nh ,f)f,i, V

1

1

The uoatun Daily Advertiuel explained
that

«'^»"r-» of

°

'

honton'n Federal

«n.nyc»r,

hrttl

i

,

'

I'l'MMU

1

lnt<,t

'<»

0
OI

',

'

Dobt or s
|

which h.m

.

|

.

.

count

i

t

ut

es

t

ho

lately assumed

"'"
.

ho economic onv ronmont
i

Portsmouth Journal'"'
.Ml

«

t

•

1

1

1

.

»

t

ive

ol

honton

ideni

it

.it

I

ho

icat ion oi

the specific interest groups
that formed the insurgency's
rank-and-file members seems highly
accurate.
The
depression that first sparked popular
political activism i
Boston had not ended by the mayoral
election and continued
sending many poor and overextended,
middling citizens to
Boston's debtor prison. Just weeks
after the April 8

election— beginning
into

June— Boston

were "compelled.

.

in the middle of May and continuing

faced a severe shortage in specie.

Bank

.to demand immediate repayment of
their

debtors, for such notes have fallen due. In
many case,"
reported Boston's Evening Gazette, "such compulsion
has
been attended with extreme hardship, and has
required

numerous sacrifices." 59

The blighted economic atmosphere

that originally fostered the insurgency was not getting
better.
On April 12, the Middling Interest forced an open

caucus to nominate an acceptable nonpartisan, compromise
candidate.

Meeting once again in the Boston Exchange

Coffee house, and led, this time, by a humbled Thomas

H.

Perkins, insurgents, Republicans and Federalists

congregated to announce
Bostonians.

a

nominee tolerable to all

When John Phillips was chosen, clearly the

Middling Interest held the upper-hand at the meeting.
Having been outraged when the central committee punished

Quincy by taking his state senate seat away from him in
1820, Phillips, ever since, had proven a strong political
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supporter of Quincy.
beyond question.

Personally their relationship was

They were first cousins, life-long

friends and had suffered through
Phillips Academy together.
More significantly, John Phillips
had stood as a Middling
Interest candidate during the March
state senatorial race
despite his past Federalist partisanship.
During that
race, Joseph Buckingham bolstered
the Phillips candidacy,

stating that Phillips was the sort "whom
the mechanics and
middling interest men have confidence." since
then he had
served as the President of the Senate and was
described by
Republicans there as a "moderate, intelligent,
independent
man." On the April 16 election, Phillips ran
unopposed

and

overwhelmingly won by 2,467 votes out of the total
2,661
cast.

60

With Phillips's victory the Middling Interest declared
victory.

As Joseph Buckingham gleefully announced to

Boston: "The cabal which has so long managed the federal

party has received a blow from which it will not ... recover
and will never again carry on its purpose with undisputed

sovereignty.

" 61

When Otis began the long journey home from Washington
in May,

1822, he must have been filled with despair.

He

had actively maintained a hand in local Boston politics
since he had offered to sacrifice himself in the senate as
an "ambassador of peace and good will from Massachusetts,"

and now the Senator could not even get elected mayor of his
235

hometown.

He had consistently attempted
to manage damagecontrol for his party from a far,
but "Boston

federalism of

the old stamp" lay in shambles
despite his best efforts.
He had publicly offered to "yield
to the wishes of his
fellow citizens," and become the city's
first executive
because his "humble services," he thought,
"might be useful
in the organization of the new
government," yet he had been
attacked as an elitist, "purse-proud devil."
Also, he had
indulged the luxury of envisioning himself
seated in the
Governor's mansion, but now that too seemed out
62
of reach.

On May 12, when he rose to the floor of Faneuil
Hall
to address the city of Boston, his despair seemed
to have

turn to self-pitying rage.

"I wish that every man of the

middling interest was within reach of my voice, when
ask," bellowed Otis, "where are the tenants whom

ejected— the Debtor's
have pinched.

..

I

have

I

have

sued— the Labourers whom

.The poor whose faces

I

I

I

have ground."

Providing Boston with his version of the trickle-down
theory, Otis-style, he explained that "[i]f the stream of

wealth sets in one channel it runs out by another, and the
reservoir between both is connected with each other,"
therefore, "there can be no permanent middling interest."

Because of the flow of wealth from rich to middling and the
rise and fall of personal fortunes, "[t]he people who

a few

years ago composed the middling interest now live in homes
of brick," and have become rich.
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The "middling interest,"

Otis argued was not a real
party, but

a

rabble of

malcontents-"warm opposers to an
imaginary, privileged

order"— "a mere

name, calculated to break down
[Federalism]

and to build up its adversary."

Arguing that "V[t]hree

parties can no more continue in

a

country, than three men

can continue to fight in a single
combat," Otis pleaded
with his ex-Federalist brethren who
had joined the
insurgency to return home. Otis maintained
that the
interests of the insurgency and Federalism
were

"essentially the same."

if he had sacrificed the mayoralty

to bring this misunderstanding to the
attention of all

Bostonians, then so be it.

popularity.

I

"I

ask not a return of

lament not its loss," Otis firmly explained.

"But your esteem is

a

vested [right]— I am entitled

to... having earned it for good considerat ion--This
you

ought not withdraw without good cause— If you do so, you
rob me [of honor]."

Then in

a

quite melodramatic

statement, which, according to the Galaxy, provoked muffled

laughter from certain quarters of Faneuil Hall, Otis
declared,

"I

feel it might be the last time in which

shall ever address you from this place

Candidate for any office

— My

—

race is run

I

I

am no longer a

—

I

am delighted to

give way to other com[er]s of higher, middle and better
speeds.

» 63

Otis' s speech provoked the Nile's Weekly Register

correspondent in Boston, to sardonically report back to his
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Washington office
e

'

"npvprnever.

.

Ch a n
.shall

t
I

meet with any assembly

comprising so much private
worth and such elevat^
Patr i oti s m and the HARTFORD CONVENTION!!??"
Joseph
Buckingham was astonished by the
speech.
"Mr.

Otis," the

Galaxy reported, "took leave of his fellow
citizens ... on
Sunday evening." Explaining the
Senator rose before the
crowd "evidently embarrassed," Buckingham
continued by
addressing every point Otis had made and
trouncing it.
"When Mr. Otis pretends to see no cause
for a disruption of
the Federal party, he pretends to a
degree of mental
blindness
His arguments against [the Middling
Interest]

were altogether inconclusive and absurd

Why should,"

Buckingham asked, "the middling interest be forever
chained
to the car of the monied interest

Why should not the

middling interest do everything they can do, to overthrow
the power, or at least, to neutralize the operations
of a

monied aristocracy, whos[e] patriotism is nothing but
selfishness and the love of power, and whose public spirit
is deposited,

for safe-keeping,

in the vaults of the bank?"

Addressing Otis' s appeal for Middling Interestmen who had
once been Federalist to come back into the fold, Buckingham

predicted that this would never happen because "[t]he
materials are [now] too discordant to amalgamate."

"[T]he

wheels of revolution are in motion," Buckingham declared
and nothing could now stop

it.'
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CHAPTER VII
"THE STEGE OF BOSTON IS ONCE MORE RAISED ":

THE BETRAYAL OF THE THIRD PARTY'S MAYOR AND

FEDERALIST DEATH SPASMS
The "aristocratic band has been abolished, but a more
oppressive and more horrible, and more odious
one... has arisen to fill its place."
"Agricola," 1822.

—

Before an over-flow audience in Faneuil Hall on May

1,

1822, Chief Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Court,

Issac Parker, swore into office Boston's first mayor, John
Phillips.

Resting on

a

table before the speaker's platform

sat the newly written Boston city charter enshrined in a

silver case.

After taking his oath of office, Phillips

rose to deliver Boston's first mayoral inaugural address.
the
The speech took less than ten minutes and foreshadowed

naive and often disinterested course that the Phillips

administration would take in guiding Boston through its
first year as a city.

1

serious
Like his cousin Josiah Quincy, Phillips held

misgivings about the charter.

But unlike Quincy, Phillips

dexterity to
lacked neither the will nor the political
had served
remedy any piece of it. John Phillips
years, first as
Massachusetts Federalism for twenty-five
then as a fair-minded
Suffolk county's state Senator, and
observing the central
public prosecutor in Boston. After
Quincy, Phillips had
committee's treatment of his cousin

become highly suspicious of the
Federalist leadership and,
by 1822, was a Middling
Interest insurgent.
Despite his
alliance with Boston's insurgency,
the Phillips

administration proved to be extremely
conservative and
timid.

"Prudence, caution, and conservatism,"
according to
Josiah Quincy, "were [his cousin's]
predominating

characteristics.

2

Employing a literal interpretation of the
charter, the
new mayor proved powerless to mend its
deficiencies.

Although Phillips happily had accepted the
mayoralty to
placate both the Middling Interest and the
Federalist
parties, he had neither the inclination, nor
the apparent
legal power as mayor to engage in a municipal
administration of activism.

The insurgents who elected him

expected a mayor who would proceed aggressively to
fulfill
their aims.

Less than three months into his term, Phillips

faced severe criticism for his lackadaisical and

ineffective approach to his new position, and his

administration fell under fierce criticism from his former
followers.

"For what was our town government exchanged for

that of city, but to break the bonds of an aristocracy, and

relieve the oppressed?" asked

a

thoroughly disappointed

Middling Interestman who had supported Phillips's
candidacy. "[W]e protest against [the city's] arbitrary
laws by which the free born citizen is oppressed and his

rights wrestled for him."

Reflecting back on Phillips's
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tenure, another argued that
Boston's first mayor had done
little accept "slept on his post,"
while receiving a salary
of $2, 500. 3 Clearly, this was
not what the insurgency
wanted, or expected in its first
mayor.

Phillips faced two principal barriers
in fulfilling
the activist role that Boston's
insurgents expected of him.
The first was personal. Phillips had
entered the mayor's
office severely ill and weary of politics.
After serving
on the General Court for twenty-five
years, the fifty-two
year old statesmen mistakenly viewed the
mayoralty
as a

non-confrontational, nonpartisan position of honorable
retirement.

He assumed the city would largely run
itself—

turning to its executive only for benevolent
facilitation

during occasional minor sguabbles.
Also, Phillips had contracted a mysterious disease

that would kill him one month after he left office,

exhausted in 1823.

As the course of his administration

would show and as his inaugural speech suggested, Phillips
trusted in an archaic notion of Boston's Christian

character and benevolence.

Inflicted with a terminal

illness, Phillips, because of these factors and the

compromise that put him in power, was not inclined to
foment significant changes in Boston.

Besides, extensive

restrictions in the city charter also impeded the new

mayor's ability to employ executive power even if he had
wanted to.

In his inaugural address,
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Phillips explained

that order and welfare would be
maintained under his
administration through the »[p]urity
of manners,

[the]

general diffusion of knowledge
added,

[and]

above all," he

"a firm,

practical belief [in] Divine revelation."
Harkening back to Winthrop's Puritan
"city upon the hill,"
"love of order, benevolent affections,
and Christian
Piety," Phillips explained, "distinguish
... the inhabitants
of this city." And, thus, the city
government, according
to Phillips, held little, if any, new
responsibilities/
Instead, Phillips extolled the virtues
and

memorialized the old town meetings as "testimon
ies] to the
wisdom. .. [of our ancestors." Deeply troubled
[

by the

]

changes represented in Boston's abandonment of
the Town
Meeting system, Phillips placed Boston in stark
contrast to
"[m]ost of the towns in this Commonwealth [who]
may.

.

.continue to enjoy the benefitfs] of those salutary

regulations" inherent in town meetings.

Only because of

"the great increase of population in the town of Boston,"

Phillips sighed, was it forced to become
new city, Phillips explained,

"

a city.

[d] if f erence of

In this

opinion must

be expected, and mutual concessions made, in... the

interests of

a

large community," but the new mayor made it

explicitly clear that he would take no responsibility over
how those "concessions" would be mediated.

"I will not

encumber you with unnecessary forms," Phillips promised the
City Council, "or encroach on your time
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[B]revity will

be carefully studied."

with this statement and after

Placing the overseeing of Boston
in the hands of the "Holy
Spirit," the mayor of Boston
stepped down from the podium
and abandoned any leadership role
in the new City Council 5
Adding to Phillips's passive approach
toward his new
job, the charter also restrained
executive powers.
During
the charter debates, Middling
Interest spokesmen on the
chartering committee had feared a strong
executive largely
because of democratic sentiments and
because their
opponents on the Federalist Central Committee
had pushed so
hard for one.
Indeed, Harrison Gray Otis, on December
17,

instructed his operative in the chartering
committee,
William Sullivan, to give the mayor the "veto
upon some of
the... laws (such as relating to taxes and
taking away
1821,

private property)" and then followed up a month later
with
a letter demanding that the mayor be "give[n]...a
right

[to

widespread executive authority], without imposing [on him]
an obligation to ask advise" of other city

representatives."

Insurgent leaders, Michael Roulstone,

Isaac Winslow, George Blake, and William Sturgis, who

served on the committee, balked at such demands and crushed
the Sullivan/Otis initiative in Town Meeting.

Although, at

the time, the Middling Interest counted this as a victory,
by so limiting the authority of the executive in the

revised charter, the insurgents had gutted from the

document any practical function for the mayor's office.
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Even after a charter change in
1854 and various subsequent
amendments in 1885, Boston mayor
during the early-i890 S/
Nathan Matthew Jr., still bitterly
complained that "the
mayor was little more than a figure
head" due to
limitations imposed on the executive
that were left over
from the original 1822 charter.
7

Mayor Phillips could neither appoint
city officials,
nor could he fire them; he had no
power to veto city
legislation or control the finances of the
city.
The only
direct powers solely allocated to the mayor
consisted
of

summoning meetings of the eight member, elected
at-large,
Board of Aldermen, and the Common Council, a
group of
forty-eight elected officials who represented
Boston's
twelve wards.

After 1822, these two municipal branches had

taken-over the responsibilities of the Town Selectmen
and
Town Meetings. The mayor could appoint committees
that
would report their findings to the City Council (the Board
of Aldermen and the Common Council in conference)

and he

served as chairman to the Board of Aldermen, but received
no special veto or voting powers over it.

In January 1822,

Sullivan had assured Otis that the aldermen would be
"nothing more than... an advisory council to the executive,"
but this too had not come to pass as hostile insurgents

insured that the popularly elected aldermen would have

significantly more power than the mayor.

Making matters

worse, five independent town government boards, the Board
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of Health, the Surveyors of
the Highways, the School
Committee, the Overseers of the
Poor, and the Board of
Firewards, had survived the
chartering process and stood as
autonomous municipal agencies that
zealously protected

their traditional municipal domains.

Because these were

elected boards, the City Council held
little authority over
them.
The council could cut off their
funding, but had no
prerogative under the charter to then
fulfill the municipal
functions of these agencies.. Almost
immediately after the
establishment of the new government, the City
Council found
itself hopelessly dependent on these
independent municipal
boards to oversee many of the basic functions
8
of the city.

Despite the weakness of his office and the
decentralized, dysfunctional nature of the city's
organization, the mayor remained the symbolic leader of
the
new city government.
In the people's eyes, responsibility
for the city's legislation and how it effected them,
rested

with him.

They had fought hard for a city charter and

wanted significant results from their first mayor.

Far

from being a tranquil position from which to honorably

retire from a life of active political life, as Phillips
had hoped, the mayoralty left him exposed to levels of

popular criticism that he had never before experienced.
Worse, because of the limitations of his office, there was

little the chief executive could do about it.

Unfortunately for Phillips, during his tenure, the mayor's
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office essentially functioned as
a sounding board for
numerous gripes and complaints made
by the city's citizens.
By July 1822, Boston's first mayor
began to discover the
true nature of his job.
The small and ordered, puritan Christian
community
that Phillips had referred to in his
inaugural address
clearly no longer existed. As Josiah Quincy
understood,
Boston had become a city, and not just by
legal title.
Not

only had Boston grown to over 44,000 people
by 1822, but it
contained a socially and economically diverse
population
most of whom were hard-pressed by economic depression.
By

the late teens, many English Protestant and Catholic
Irish
farmers, financially ravaged in their native land by

Parliament's passage of the Corn Laws and the Acts of
Enclosure, escaped to Boston.

Thomas H.

0' Conner,

According to historian

by 182 0 Boston held some 2,000 poor

Irish Catholics and by 1825 the number had risen to exceed
5,000.

Historian Peter Knights estimates that newcomers to

Boston composed the majority of the city's growing

population of poor during the early-nineteenth century.
Most in-migrants to the hub came from the country-side

unskilled and "drifted into and out of

a

variety of low-

level jobs." 9

The demographic changes that occurred in Boston during
the first two decades of the nineteenth-century shocked

shoemaker, Robert Twelves Hewes when he returned to his
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hometown of Boston an old man in
1821.
drew my first breath and formed
my

"The place where

I

most endearing

attachment," Hewes reported, "had to
me become a land of
strangers. Not only had my former
companions and friends
disappeared, but the places of their
habitations were
occupied by those who could give no
account of them."
their place had come mostly young men
from the hinterlands
of New England like Moses Adams from
Ellsworth,

m

Maine.

1816, Adams arrived in Boston seeking his
fortune.

in

After

apprenticing for a merchant and a blacksmith,
he worked on
the docks and eventually signed on as a
common seamen to
the merchant ship Atlas in 1820. Upon his
arrival in
Boston as an outsider, Adams quickly forged
alliances of
comradeship and fraternity with other outlanders who
held
similar menial jobs and were also new to the city. 10

Within such an evolving urbanized world that grew in
size and complexity from year to year, Phillips's approach
to the mayoralty must have seemed archaic to most ordinary

Bostonians.

The Middling Interest had supported him to

curb the unbridled power of Harrison Gray Otis and the

central committee.

qualifications as
a

Less a decision based on Phillips's
a

insurgent and his disposition, and more

reactive move, the insurgency had not anticipated

Phillips's antiquated vision of Boston and municipal
governance.

Although sympathetic to insurgent charges of

an uncaring and selfish political and economic aristocracy
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that bastardized Boston's
character, the new mayor clearly
would not provide strong leadership
in the struggle against
the "FEW.
One of his first acts as executive
foretold his
skewered attitude towards his new
job.
Immediately after
his inauguration, Phillips met
with the city aldermen to
work out future procedure and decide
on some various minor
municipal appointments. One of the few
significant powers
the charter bestowed exclusively on
the mayor and aldermen
was the replacement of the town's elected
Board of Health
with a less autonomous commission that
would be answerable
to the mayor and aldermen.
The old town Board of Health
had fallen under such severe criticism for
corruption and

inefficiency that the General Court had added
to the charter abolishing the board.

a

provision

During the Town

Meeting winter debates over the charter, most state
legislative alterations to the charter were met with
intense suspicion and meticulously scrutinized.
of Health amendment received no discussion.

The Board

Clearly, on

this matter, Bostonians agreed that the corrupt board

should be terminated.

On the day of his inauguration,

Phillips inexplicably reappointed the same board members to
the Board of Health.

Without delay the board successfully

reestablished sovereignty over its municipal realm.
been given a reprieve from extinction, the board
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Having

immediately consolidated itself and
directly challenged the
authority of the mayor and aldermen. 11
On June

4,

1822,

the mayor and aldermen received
a

stern order from the board's secretary,
John Winslow,
summoning them to stand before the
Board of Health and
explain why the city had not cleaned up
"a quantity
of

filthy, putrid, and nauseous substances
on the premises

belonging to you, and under your direction.
You will,
therefore," the summons read, "appear before
this Board on
Monday... and show cause, if any exist, why the
City
of

Boston should not remove," the garbage.

Although exactly

whose obligation it was to extricate the garbage
remained
unclear, the board laid down the gauntlet and
challenged
the jurisdictional authority of the Phillips
administration
and the new city government.

The predicament the new mayor

and his administration faced was whether they could engage
one of the few powerful mechanisms the charter gave them
and assert municipal authority over the board, or shrink

from the challenge.

Would the mayor's office and aldermen

claim municipal supremacy or succumb to

a

subordinate

board, and thus, set a dangerous precedent of yielding

under pressure to an inferior municipal division? 12
Phillips held the letter for
it with the aldermen.

a few

days before sharing

Eventually he delivered the summons

and the aldermen acquiesced to the authority of the Board
of Health.

Although the city refused to clean up the
257

garbage, Phillips had not claimed
executive jurisdiction
over the matter thereby abdicating
the authority expressly
given to him and the aldermen in
the charter.
Garbage
continued to rot "on the westerly side
of [wharf] T " and
the rectified Board of Health
affirmed its municipal
,

dominance over the executive and aldermen
of the city. 13
Because the garbage incident received
little,

if any,

coverage in the city press, Boston's
insurgents were kept
in the dark about Phillips's bungling.
Despite his
less

than awe-inspiring inaugural, Middling
Interestmen remained
optimistic about their mayor. And, in fact, early
on
in

the Phillips administration, there seemed to
be reason for
them to be hopeful— though it had little to do
with the

mayor's leadership.

In late July, Phillips and the

aldermen were briefly heralded by the Middling Interest
organ the Independent Boston ig n for supporting

a

piece of

city legislation that dealt with one of the insurgency's
most pressing grievances.

14

In July, the Board of Aldermen, headed by Phillips,

approved a plan to extend prison limits for debtors.

Although abolishing debt imprisonment which Middling
Interest partisans had advocated since 1820, clearly fell

within the General Court's jurisdiction, the city aldermen
and mayor decreed authority to decide upon the areas within

Boston where debtor prisoners on temporary leave could and
could not go.

The Overseers of the Poor traditionally
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allowed almshouse inmates

a

certain number of hours duri ng

the day to seek employment,
visit their families, and
pickup odd jobs in specified
areas around the city.
These
areas, in the past, were designated
by the Town Selectmen
or the courts and were usually
highly restrictive.
inmates
on leave were usually restricted
to Boston's docks and
poorer neighborhoods, often imprisoned
debtors were not
allowed to enter the location of their
shops or place of
employment.
with the aldermen's initiative, the
whole city
opened to the debtor inmates who could
now move freely
throughout Boston seeking work or plying their
trade by day
and return to the prison at night. The
Middling Interest's

Independent Boston
arguing,

an

supported the mayor and aldermen,

"we feel aaaaxgd that more debts will be honestly

paid [this way], than by any system heretofore
adopted— at
least 'tis worth a trail." 15

According to the Bostonian

,

the vast majority in

Boston viewed the extension of prison bounds as sensible.
Simply put, more debtors could pay-off their debts under
such a system, which pleased creditors as well.

Others,

however, opposed the ordinance and the city law immediately
fell under severe attack.

"The extension of the prison

limits has caused great excitement amoung

a

class of people

commonly styled pettifogging lawyers," reported the
Bostonian- "After having experienced
business.

..

a

severe relaxation in

[due to] the late humane provision of the
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oppressed, they have resorted to
the last and only means to
Place the system in a way most
congenial to their own
feelings, viz. by remonstrating
to, and petitioning the
honorable Mayor and Aldermen, to
reconsider their vote by
which the limits have been extended,
and to confine them
[debtors] within ... Tremont and School
streets." 16

Until 1807, colonial custom dictated
that insolvents
in prison had the prerogative to
practice their trade
during the day to help pay-off their
debts.

m

1807

Massachusetts Chief Justice Theophilus Parsons
struck-down
this liberal policy as more sophisticated
methods of debt
collection became more pervasive in the early
nineteenth
century and significantly restricted the bounds
of

debtors.

17

Despite claiming authority over the Supreme

Court and ignoring the "pettifogging lawyers,"
editorialist
"D," explained that he had "full faith in the
integrity,

intelligence and humanity of the honorable Board [of

Aldermen]" to uphold its recent extension of prison limits.
The board had been approved by the Middling Interest and

would not acquiesce to "these enemies of humanity [who]
have ruled" by "afflicting [the] rod."

with the depression

of 1819 gutting the Boston economy and more and more

respectable, middle class voters falling deep into debt and

filling debtor's jail, the mayor and aldermen had

unilaterally overruled the Supreme Court's 1807 decision
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and returned to traditional
custom.

when the lawyer's

petition reached the aldermen,
it was summarily scrapped.
With this defiant act, the new
municipal government
and, by extension, Mayor Phillips
seemed to have adopted
the activist role that the
insurgents had so desperately
wanted.
The aldermen had flexed their
muscles
and

professed supremacy over "trading judgesand "pettifoggi
lawyers." But there proved another
side to prison
extensions unrecognized by those who
heralded the
administration's extension policy.

By extending the

boundary limits of insolvent inmates, the
board
strengthened the powers of the Overseers of

the Poor.

Being exclusively in charge of the Leverett
Street
almshouse/ jail, providing "outdoor relief" to
the

impoverished, controlling an operating fund of over
one

hundred thousand dollars, and

a

second discretionary fund

of twenty-eight to thirty thousand dollars that
could be

drawn from the City Treasury on

a

need-basis without havi

to account for it, the Overseers already held commanding

power in the city of Boston.

19

By extending prison limits, the Phillips

administration only enhanced an already powerful
independent municipal agency.

As David Montgomery has

suggested, during the early-nineteenth century these

guardians of the poor typically operated more like
indentured labor-brokers than benevolent stewards of the
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poor.

often they contracted out
almshouse inmates en mass
as a cheap labor force to
local manufacturers,
Accused
of using their municipal
positions to dole-out patronage,
restricting geographic bounds of
prison labor would
undercut the Overseer's powers.
Thus, by extending prison
limits the mayor and aldermen had
inadvertently

strengthened the Overseers in Boston. 21
Reacting against the city's seizure of
power, early in
1823 the General Court made overtures to
employ Section 30
of the city charter that gave the
legislature discretionary
veto power over any or all city laws, to
override
the

aldermen's prison extension ordinance.

By February the

legislature succeeded, claiming sole authority
to set
prison limits in the city of Boston. Rank-and-file

Middling Interestmen throughout the city were outraged.
The legislature, charged the Bostonian and Mftrhanj

^

Journal

,

"has thought proper to take the power from the

Mayor and Aldermen of assigning the Jail Limits, and by
this measure, have virtually annulled the humane decree of
that body, passed last season, fixing them to the bounds of
the county of Suffolk

[T]his very state,

in 1823, passed

an act TO ABRIDGE THE RIGHTS OF THE POOR DEBTOR, HUMANELY

GRANTED HIM BY THE MAYOR AND ALDERMEN OF THE CITY OF
BOSTON."

The editorial continued, demanding the abolition

of debt imprisonment throughout the state. 22
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The society for the Relief
of the Distressed, which
had published the now defunct
and
represented the debtor's interests
within the insurgency,
took a pro-active position on
the recent legislature's
decision.
Explaining that »[t]he society is
composed of
some of our most enterprising
and respectable citizens, who
have in many instances, done much
towards ameliorating the
condition of the poor but honest debtor,
who has been

D^p^^rnal

subject to the persecutions of an
unrelenting creditor.
[Our] object is not to combine
against the
law and

justice... but to use every honorable and
justifiable way to
get a repeal of those laws, or abol
ishment of wmizomste
for debt To... inform [our] fellow citizens on
the subject,
.

and to get such men elected to office in our
national and
state legislatures as are favorable to an

amelioration.... The late act of the legislature respecting

prison limits, has produced

a

general excitement and alarm,

it is almost universally deemed oppressive and
cruel, and

has had a tendency to rouse our citizens to action." 23

Although the Phillips administration had stood-up to
the "pettifogging lawyers," it refused to confront the

legislature by petition or by taking the General Court's

action to court.

Partly because Phillips continued to

abdicate leadership to others on the City Council and

partly because, throughout the spring of 182 3, various
members of the city government were in the midst of secret
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negotiations with state legislators
on another matter.
mayor and aldermen backed off,
accepting the authority
Section 30 gave the General
Court to override this
municipal ordinance-and for good
reason.
The cloaked
negotiations that were held between
the legislature

The

and

some in the city government
depended upon the power Section
3 0 gave the state.

Incredibly and in direct violation of
the wishes of
Boston's citizenry, in the spring of
1823, city officials
sent a secret proposal to the
legislature asking it
to

engage Section 30 to eliminate the ward
voting provision
from the charter. Although Josiah
Quincy had opposed the
whole chartering proposal because of the
"mischief" he

foresaw in Section 30, most Middling Interestmen
had not
heeded Quincy -s warnings and supported the city
charter
largely because it contained provisions for ward
voting.

As Boston's Independent Chrnnin.iP explained
before the city

chartering in March 1822, "[t]he chief reason for our
friendship towards the city bill... is that it will
introduce into power the Middling Interest

,

an interest

among our citizens, which if it had assumed to its due

weight [through a fairer democratic system of voting],
would long ago have swayed the government of our town."

By

the end of the Phillips mayoralty, rank-and-file Middling

Interestmen

1

s

eyes were opened.

The ward voting provision

was the most important clause in gaining enough votes from
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ordinary Bostonians to pass the
city charter.
As rank-andfile insurgents saw it, the
charter held no validity

without the guarantee of ward voting,

without it, Boston

would return to its old deferential
patterns of politics
and the "FEW" would continue to
24
dominate
the "many."

When the news of the proposal by
the Phillips regime to
abolish ward voting leaked, insurgents
throughout the city
rose-up in arms against the mayor
and his administration.
The BPstonian and MesJianiss
laarm] exposed the scheme
and first accused the Federalist Central
Committee of being
the true force behind the plot.
"Among the pitiful shifts
resorted to by the FEW, nothing is more
contemptible,"
charged the BPStonian in an article written
for

"Mechanics!," "than their threats to withdraw their
custom
from those who may differ from them in opinion
The game
has carried on so long in 'the head quarters of
good
principles'

[the Federalist party], that the labouring

classes are no longer content submit to dictators." 25
old doctrine of passive obedience

a nd

nonresi^nnp

,

"The

has

long since exploded," editorialist "Alfred" explained, "and
we trust will not be revived by the citizens of
Boston.

..

.The monied few are yet to learn that wealth alone

will not entitle them to honors or distinction in this

republican government. The industrious mechanic and the

virtuous tradesmen are entitled to equal privileges as the
most wealthy, and they are possessed with
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a

spirit that

will prompt them to maintain
their rights, not withstand!
ng
the growlings and complaints
of a

P^rx^i^r^d

nob il ity ...We are not of that servile
race," declared
"Alfred," "who bow in adoration to
the proud aristocrat
because he has money." 26
.

The Boston ia n and "Alfred's" commentary
on the city
government's attempted betrayal, articulated
the rank-andfile insurgent's continued fear of
an oppressive, monied
aristocracy dominating city politics. As
had been the case
since the insurgent coalition's inception,
those most

guilty of perpetuating the "old doctrine of
pas^iye
obed i ence and passive r Ps
n p 0| n according to the

i^

Middling Interest, were the Federalist "junto"—
the
Federalist Central Committee.

But unlike the past, others

outside the hated "cabal" were at fault too.

Turning on the mayor and his administration, the

Bgstonian attacked the city government's betrayal: "How far
a

change of Municipal officers of this city may be

necessary, must be obvious to every elector who is not

blind to his own welfare, and to the prosperity of the city
charter. Aristocracy or the assumption of power never

intended to be delegated to city officers, should be

received with extreme jealousy by every Bostonian who is
independent enough to think and vote according to dictates
of his own reason.""

The attempt by city representatives
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to outlaw ward voting vividly
exposed the duplicitou
nature of the Phillips
administration.

Although the city government had
won accolades f rom
many in the Middling Interest
for extending prison limits,
Phillips and his administration
already had weathered
significant condemnation for other
municipal actions by
many in Boston.
Even before the ward voting debacle,
Middling Interestmen's ire had been
raised.
Specifically,
rank-and-file insurgents had objected to
a city ordinance
brought forth in the early-summer of
1822 that intended to
clear the congestion of Boston's narrow
streets.
The
ordinance severely limited truckmen from
plying their trade
within the city by restricting where they
could and could
not go.
The truckmen of Boston not only carted
products
from the docks to retailers throughout the city,
but also,

sold products directly from their carts at
deflated prices.

Their role in Boston's local economy was essential
to those
who could not afford the higher prices imposed by

established merchants.

When the ordinance also outlawed

truckmen from setting up their carts on Boston's sidewalks,
it put many of these men out of business and dramatically

effected

a

shadowy, yet vital local economy which many poor

Bostonians depended on. 28

Where are they to go, asked

editorialist "Agricola," if "they are to be driven from the
stands which they have long occupied .... This is not only

oppressing the truckmen

,

but the merchants
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;

for they cannot

tTMSK as cheap when two or three miles
from the
wharf.... [W ]e protest against
arbitrary laws by which the
free born citizen is oppressed
and his rights wrestled from
him." 29
During a period of severe depression,
the Phillips
administration's action seemed, as the Bostoni.n

^

Mechanic* loarnaJ put
"to trample.

.

it,

"a bare-faced affrontery" created

.the honest and industrious citizen."

Not

only did the law hurt truckmen, but it
crippled both small
merchants, whose costs would increase, and
those consumers
who depended on the truckmen to sell goods
below
retail.

"Why not, before they are forced off,"
"Agricola" pleaded,

"provide them a suitable place for their stand [s]." 30
The Phillips administration ignored "Agricola s"
1

suggestion and suspicion toward the mayor rose.

Far from

being viewed as the champion of the "industrious"

workingman who would crush the "purse proud devils,"
Phillips began to be seen by some as an enemy to the
"honest" workingman, and those small merchants who had

elected him.

From their point of view, he was taking food

from their tables for no other reason than to clear

Boston's streets.

Both the Bostonian and Mechanics Journal

and the Castigator ran articles and editorials opposing the

new city law.

The Bostonian argued,

"we can see no reason

why an industrious and hard-laboring man, in this country,
and especially New England, which professes to make no
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distinction between the rich man
and the poor ... should be
denied the common right of every
citizen, that of walking
or standing in the street
-Where is the justice of such a
law?" the Zostenian asked.
The Castigator approached the
issue differently by glorifying
Boston truckmen
.

as the

back-bone of American citizenry and
exposing "gentlemen"
who refused to pay for trucking services—
all the while,

railing against the elitism of "the new
City Authorities"
who have "grappled... by degrees without
[the people's]
consent or knowledge" "the privileges" of
citizenship. 31
Adding fuel to the anti-Phillips fire, the
passage of
another ordinance by the city revoking a number
of liguor
licenses to long-time, established bars outraged
the

Middling Interest.

As with the truckmen issue, this action

was harshly looked upon as

a

direct attack against the

"respectful and worthy citizen," who was already hard

pressed due to the city's depressed economy.

Unlike the

arguments against the truckmen law, the licensing

controversy introduced a surprising new element into the
attack against the Phillips administration.

"[T]o license

foreigners," argued the Independe nt Bostonian

,

"and deprive

the respectful and worthy citizen of his right, his only

measure to support himself and his family, is tyrannical,
worse than the arbitrary laws of monarchy." 32

Although

personally Phillips detested the more cosmopolitan social
composition of Boston and pined away for the Boston of
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Winthrop, his administration
seemed to be issuing patronage
in the form of liquor licenses
in a muoh more democratic
way than in the past.

Railing against the new restrictions,
a frustrated
Middling interestman asked, »[w]Ould
it be right to pass by
the peaceable industrious native
born citizen, whose
character has ever been distinguished
for integrity and
uprightness, and patronize the
foreigner who has not been
with us a sufficient time to. acquire a
character?
Shall we

continue to support the ostentatious
pretensions of
adventurers from abroad at the expense and ruin

of our

citizens at home? ...

[W] e ...

hope and believe that our new

constituted authorities will ever be guided by
patriotism,
justice, and national partiality."

Amazed that the

proposal for the ordinance had even come up, the

Independent Boston

an

pleaded: "Where are the Middling

Interest men?" 33
In early August, the licensing restriction was passed

by the Mayor and Aldermen, and became law, reaffirming for

many that they had made
his administration.

a

grave mistake with Phillips and

"Is this the harbinger of what our

City rulers intend to do?" asked an angry insurgent.

"

[I]f

it is, we may expect soon to see [in] Boston ... complete

anarchy .... For what was our town government exchanged for
that of a city/ but to break the bonds of an aristocracy,
and relieve the oppressed." 34

The Castigator went so far
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as to charge the city
aldermen with overt corruption.

its

editors claimed that aldermen
were threatening to close
down bars in the city if these
city officials were not
given private rooms to gamble in.
Another editorial noted
that aldermen who owned retail
shops were keeping their
stores open past the ten o'clock
curfew that the city
imposed on retailers, thereby
undercutting competing
merchants who would have their retailing
licenses pulled
for breaking the curfew ordinance. 35
There had been harsh criticism leveled
on the Phillips
administration before the ward voting debacle,
but most of
the disgrace that might have destroyed
Boston's first city
government had been deflected by the city's
seemingly

heroic and selfless stand on prison limit
extensions.

in

early April 1823, with the public disclosure
exposing the
Phillips administration's attempt to abolish ward
voting,

any remaining support for Boston's first city
government
and its first mayor guickly evaporated. 36

The secret

proposal to the legislature only confirmed what many

Bostonians had already suspected: that Phillips and his
administration, the darlings of the Middling Interest in

spring of 1822, had, by 1823, sold them out.
On April

published

a

5,

the Bostonian and Mechanics Journal

front page spread that not only reiterated the

insurgency's political philosophy and its abhorrence of the

Federalist Central Committee, but also articulated the
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broader consequences of the
Phillips administration's
betrayal: "We ... renounce the
assumed guardianship of a self
constituted
who have usurped and exercised
our rights,
only to abuse them.... We would
transfer the sacred rights
of political self-government,
from the drawing rooms
of

Aristocracy, to the public assemblies
of the Sovereign
People.... He who... bows to the iron
rod and unauthorized
proscriptions of a dictatorial Esh, we are
compelled to
regard as ojor enemy, and hQ£>$ he may not
prove the enemy of
himself and the Commonwealth .... intimately
connected with
the Aristocratic policy of the
Zew. leading the
Many,

is the

fundamental maxim of all Oligarchies, that the
People are
not capable of instructing, and should not
possess
the

power of controlling their Representatives, it
is to be
deeply regretted that this anti-republican notion,
which

grew out of ignorance and venality of the European
mob,
should be most injuriously applied to the virtuous and

intelligent citizens of this country and boldly acted upon,
as it has very recently been,

in this our native city." 37

Connecting the licensing dispute and the truckmen's
issue to the recent ward voting affair, in its next issue a

Bostonian editorial demanded the Phillips administration's
ousting.

"The conduct of our city government the last

year, with regard to many of the acts, has produced much

excitement and claims the attention of the electors. Their
conduct with regard to licenses
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,

the Truckmen and the last,

though not least, their unjustifiable
exertions in
procuring an act to be passed, by
the legislature, to
prohibit the meeting inj&rds,,"
dishonored, the

editorialist argued, all who had supported
Phillips in
1822.
"Mechanics!," heralded another,
"[c]omplaint has
been made in this part of the country,
against southern
slaves being entitled to representation
in the Congress of
the U.S. at the whim of others, although
it appears,

in

this enlightened age, that in Boston the
boasted home of
Adams, of Hancock, and of [James] Otis,
the enemies of

oppression and the promoters of the glorious
result of the
American Revolution, a new kind of slavery is struck
out,
by those who are ambitious to drive the labouring
classes
like task masters." "The Siege of
Boston is once mgxe.

raised," proclaimed the Boston i an. "Not only the City, but
the whole Commonwealth, will feel the happy consequences
of
a victory,

which will do more to raise us in the estimation

of our sister States, than any political occurrence among

Bostonians since the revolution." 38
For most of Phillips's tenure as mayor, Joseph T.

Buckingham's Galaxy

,

a

major Middling Interest paper,

remained uncharacteristically restrained.

On prison

limits, Buckingham reserved judgment, stating only that
"

[wjhether this will be

a

measure conducive to the general

good, time alone can determine."

Concerned with the broad

latitude the ordinance gave to "rich rogue[s], who
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voluntarily becomes bankrupt, and
refuses to make any
satisfaction to his creditors, some of
whom may be much
poorer than himself ... ought never,"
Buckingham concluded,
"to have the advantage of any limits
beyond the walls of
prison." Also understanding that the
ordinance "amounts to
a virtual repeal of the [state]
laws relating to
imprisonment for debt," which clearly was not
within the
jurisdictional authority of the city government,
Buckingham
remained skeptical of municipal prison reform.
On the

truckman issue he was mute. 39

Throughout the Phillips administration, the pages of
the Galaxy indicate that Buckingham seemed more
concerned

with the Middling Interest forays into state issues and
national elections than the governance of the city.

Buckingham continued his attacks against the state militia
law and persisted in calling for the state to abolish the
law.

40

Also, he devoted much time covering the 1822,

Suffolk county congressional race for the U.S. House of
Representatives.

This particular race intrigued Buckingham

because it exhibited both the great strides and the

frailties of the Middling Interest movement.
In Boston's November 1822 congressional race, the

Federalist Central Committee mounted Daniel Webster to
stand as its candidate, calculating

a

fresh, young face

would change the damaging image the party had acguired in
recent local battles.

Understanding that it had to garner
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sizable numbers from ranks of
the Middling Interest in
Boston to achieve victory,
Federalist strategists seized
or
one of the insurgency's most
dynamic issues-ant ipartyismand exploited it as their own.
Despite Webster's
invaluable service to the Federalist
party during the
Massachusetts Constitutional Convention
of 1820-1821 and
his consistent loyalty to the
central committee's local
agendas in Boston, the 1822 Federalist
caucus presented its
nominee as a disinterested civil
servant who "would be
above the littleness of party feeling."
one caucus member
portrayed Webster as a man who "has a
hotf and... a
who understood that "the safest place
is in the middle;"

h^,"

and,

in fact,

such

a

portrayal of Webster was not

altogether inaccurate.

By 1822, Webster became alarmed by

the narrowness and provincial approach to
politics the

central committee had taken.

In a private letter to Joseph

Story, Webster confessed that,

"[w]e [Federalists] are

disgraced beyond help or hope by these things. There is
Federal interest, a Democratic interest, a Bankrupt
interest, an Orthodox interest, and
but

I

a

Middling interest,

see no national interest, nor any national feeling."

To Jeremiah Mason, Webster went ever further, proposing

that Massachusetts Federalism should drop its party name

because it had fallen to such disrepute in minds of so
many.

a

To maintain traditional Federalist economic and
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political interests, Webster argued
the party should change
its name and its insular
behavior. 41
At their caucus in November,
Federalists disassociated
themselves and their candidate from
the partisan carnage
and the divisive course Boston
politics had recently taken.
It leveled all blame for stirring
up Boston's traditional
placid political atmosphere on insurgent
agitators who had
polarized and confused the electorate.
Claiming Webster
would restore political harmpny to Boston,
one caucus
member explained that the Federalist candidate
"would not
represent the 'middling interest' merely but
the general
,

interest of the whole."

in his statement in favor of

Webster, Benjamin Gorham reiterated this theme and
expanded
upon it. According to Gorham, Webster should be
supported
not only because he would be "firm and independent" in
his

decisions and would transcend "local prepossessions, and

narrow views" of partisanship; he would understand that his
most important role would be to counter "the gigantic
influence of the southern states, whose representatives act
in concert on all national questions .... The south," Gorham

argued,

"would never consent to lose her influences by

dividing it amoung

a

number of candidates," and, therefore,

neither should the North.

"We want," Gorham continued,

"representatives from the north, who cannot be drawn from
their purpose by persuasion, nor driven by fear, but who
can be heard, and felt, and respected; who.
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..

[will] be able

to beard the southern members
in their own way." 42
its
approach to the Webster nomination,
the Federalist
leadership resurrected a tried-and-true
strategy of
creating a monolithic, Southern
monster ready to gobble-up
Northern interests. what was new
about its approach was
that the Federalist leadership
fused this message with the
popular and local anti-party principles
of the Middling
Interest.

m

The Federalist party leadership
realized that it was
exposed by insurgents as self-serving,
elitist, corrupt and
essentially undemocratic. Attempts by the
Federalist

leadership to counter this popular perception
through mindnumbing explanations and defensive partisan
tactics that
bordered on illegality had proven costly and
embarrassing,
and also had largely failed. The party could
not run and
win by allowing local issues to define the campaign.
By

1822,

Federalism' s credibility as a party willing to

confront municipal grievances was highly suspect.
Therefore, Federalism, under severe popular censure for

past partisan improprieties, turned to the only available

course open to

it— to

broaden the political debate to

include national issues and thereby exclude the partisan

hazards of localism.

The Federalist caucus' portrayal of

Webster as a nonpartisan defender of regional duty undercut
insurgent fervor over local grievances and temporarily

weakened Middling Interest dissent and insurgent unity.
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The Middling Interest party
quickly responded to the
Federalist tactic by hammering
away at Webster as a
Federalist tool who served elitist
interests.
To portray
Webster as an anti-party man, was
absurd, the insurgency
claimed.
Middling Interest operatives reminded
Bostonians
of Webster's connections to the
central committee and his
history of avid Federalism.
"You have already witnessed,"
stated the Bostonian and MPch ani ^ s Jniirn
in early
^
November, "the commotions excited by
measures that are
calculated to lull into repose the privileges
of the
1

MIDDLING CLASSES [of this city -measure that
are likely to
advance into power and eminence, the
]

champion, the id^l, in

fact, the l£Mej: of an aristocratic

party— a man [Daniel

Webster] who has ever opposed your interests—
who would
have the basis of your liberties founded on wealth
and
,

who,

in the late Convention for the revision of the

Constitution, called to action all his eloquence, his
rhetoric, and his logic, to promote the ascendancy of the

monied aristocracy over intelligence and virtue
gentleman.

.

.

This

.would have prostrated the liberties of your

State, which may have placed you in the power of a class of

beings, who pant to extinguish the spark you hold next to
life itself," suffrage.

43

From the Middling Interest

leadership's point of view, Webster's recent nonpartisan
pose was disingenuous.

After all he had been nominated in

the Federalist caucus and enjoyed the backing of the
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central committee.

Nevertheless, Webster's recent
adoption
of the insurgency's antiparty
message, potentially

threatened Middling Interest
solidarity.
Ex-Federalists
who had recently joined the
insurgent cause out of disgust
with the central committee's
partisan trickery in local
Boston issues and its egregious
self-interest, might find
Webster's nonpartisan and regional
message attractive.
Here seemed a very different type
of Federalist from what
Bostonians were used to. 44
When the Republican caucus made a
remarkably
unprecedented and pragmatic move to capture
the

congressional election by disbanding its own
caucus to join
the Middling Interest's, ex-Federalist
insurgents abandoned
the Middling Interest en mass. Although
a last ditch
effort was made to salvage Federalist support
for the

insurgency at the caucus by moderate George Sullivan
by
proposing Webster as the Middling Interest candidate,

he

was shouted down by the Republican contingent at
the
caucus.

After numerous flattering speeches, Republican

stalwart, Jesse Putnam "unanimously" received the Middling

Interest nomination.

When the speeches were over and the

votes taken, the Republican party proved it had

successfully coopted the insurgency caucus when it placed
its man to head the insurgency ticket. 45

The Middling Interest Bostonian and Mechanics Journal

supported the caucus's choice of Putnam claiming he was
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a

"thorough-going Middling Tnt^stman," "a friend of the
MIDDLE CLASSES... who is not biased
by ambitious and
aristocratic views." Vilifying Webster
as a many faced
"hydra that has now reared his head
against your
lawful

rights and privileges," the

Federalist nominee as

Bosnian

a tool of the

condemned the

"aristocracy." 46

Despite the fcssj^niiin' s prediction that
Jesse Putnam would
"unite the whole strength of the MIDDLING
INTEREST,

in his

support," the Middling Interest-Republican
nomination had
done just the opposite. When Webster
thrashed Putnam by a
solid 1,081 votes, the insurgency's nomination
of

Republican, Jesse Putman clearly had alienated

a

large

number of Middling Interest voters who temporarily
returned
to Federalism to vote for Webster.
Even Joseph Buckingham
was surprised.
"Mr. Webster's majority over the opposing
candidate, Mr. Putnam, was... a majority much larger than
was expected by his most sanguine friends." 47

Buckingham had reported extensively on Boston's

congressional race, but uncharacteristically he offered
neither candidates the Galaxy 's endorsement.

Although the

"electioneering contest was warm and spirited," the

election was "not acrimonious," Buckingham stated with
approval.

Buckingham praised both Webster and Putnam

supporters for not "resort [ing] to the aid of personal
abuse to attain their objects." 48
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With the coming of Boston's
second mayoral race, the
GiLUxy. editor reengaged in municipal
politics and once
again became a unifying voice
for Boston's insurgents.
Perhaps writing more to himself
than anyone
else,

Buckingham urged his readership to
begin to "think on their
municipal concerns, to see whether
they have been managed
the past-year with prudence and
discretion, and whether the
laws have been executed with the promote,
and vigor
that

might have been expected under the new
[city]
organization."

Reestablishing his editorial link with the
Middling Interest, Buckingham renewed his
attack on the
Federalist Central Committee and pronounced
the continued
need for third party activism in Boston.
"While King Log
[the Republican party]

is despised," Buckingham explained,

"let it not be forgotten that King Serpent [the
Federalist
party]

is to be feared [most]. A wise people," Buckingham

concluded, "will not invest either with power and
supremacy.

" 49

On the Phillips administration, Buckingham aligned

himself with the Bostonian and Mec hanics Journal arguing
that "the general tenor of the measures pursued by the city

council has been...

— oppressive

in many cases to

individuals, and in most cases injurious to the public."

According to Buckingham,

a

dramatic shift in the mayor's

office and on the City Council was needed to save the city
from what he perceived as the prevailing "corruption" of
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the Phillips administration.

»

[T ]welve separate,

petty

oligarchies," Buckingham charged,
"in each of which there
is enough intrigue as there
formerly was in the whole
town." on the City Council,
Buckingham saved his most
scathing criticisms:
»[A]s a body, we know nothing they
have done to entitle them even to
such a poor reward as a
vote of thanks for their services.
That the genius of
intrigue has been busy is evident from
a variety of

circumstances— witness the famous [suspension
of ward
voting] bill which was smuggled through
the legislature for
amending the city-charter." What was needed,
Buckingham
theorized, was a strong, independent executive
who would
curb warring partisans and municipal corruption
so endemic
to the Phillips administration. 50

Under such decisive condemnation from those who
had

supported his election only

a

year earlier, the Phillips

administration's scheme to alter the charter and abolish
ward voting failed.

Feeling the heat and recognizing that

the urban insurgency's message potentially would translate

just as well in rural Massachusetts as in the city of
Boston, the legislature let the ward voting proposal die.

The times had changed and the metamorphosis of Boston's

political culture would not sustain such overt oppressive
action.

Although he probably was not personally involved

in his administration's complicity with the General Court,

Phillips faced most of the blame for the ward voting
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affair.

Exhausted, disgraced and disillusioned,
he decided
not to run for re-election in
1823, citing ill health.
The
man who inspired the Middling
Interest to declare victory
over the "dictatorial FEW" in
Federalist Central Committee
left office viewed as a traitor
to the insurgent cause
whose followers had elected him.
Sadly, he would die just
weeks after he stepped down from
office, a broken and

misunderstood man. 51
Although the Federalist Central Committee's
congressional candidate, Daniel Webster,
managed to
convince enough Bostonians to win a seat in

the House, this

election would be the last significant victory
for the
central committee. As Middling Interest leader,
Francis
Wayland predicted early in 1822, the defiance
first

expressed by Bostonians toward the Federalist party
in the
1822 mayoral contest quickly spread throughout the
state.
Feeding on Boston's defiance of 1822 and starved by

economic depression, the people of Massachusetts in a

resounding mandate finally abandoned the Federalist party,
leaving it behind to atrophy and die.

Despite Harrison Gray Otis's 1822 declaration that he

would never again run for any public office, in 1823 he
decided to stick to his original scheme and campaign for
governor.

Not understanding the depth of popular hatred

toward Otis within the state, arch-Federalist John Lowell
thought Otis a fine choice and encouraged the Senator.
283

Lowell believed the average
Massachusetts Federalist would
have no choice but to vote the
Otis ticket, rather than

defect to Republicanism.

indeed,

it had worked for

Webster.

Only if a third party candidate
emerged like the
"memorable treachery of [Quincy 's alliance
with the
Middling Interest] March last," Lowell
wrote to the exSenator, would he have trouble carrying
the state.
Lowell
calculated that, "the -oi Polloi' must follow
us, because
they have qd^Iss to follow....." After
Webster's victory
in the congressional races, Lowell's
logic certainly seemed
reasonable, especially to the ambitious Otis.
"[T]he washy
Federalist must act with us, unless a third
Candidate shall
be run," Lowell counseled Otis less than two
months before
the election.
Even dissident Federalists like Quincy and

Phillips would come around Lowell predicted.

would Q [Quincy]
&

&

P [Phillips]

&

For "[w]hat

all the P's [Phillips's]

Q's [Quincy's] become, if Democracy gets... well seated in

the saddle...?," he asked.

Besides "we have

ojig

hold of

them in this Election which appears to me too strong to
break. They know, that on ye power of the party their very

existence as publick men depends .... They will never again
be heard of [if they once again betray the party]. They

will eat no more Corporation dinners, nor be regaled any
longer with the odoriferous praises upon which they have

subsisted heretofore." 52
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Where Lowell's analysis proves
sort sighted is in its
assumption that the first party
system could not mutate
into something new-that the
Quincy's of the world, had to
be either Republicans or
Federalist of the "old stamp."
Unbeknown to Federalist strategists,
the political culture
of Boston and Massachusetts had
changed.
The "oi Polloi"
no longer blindly followed the old
men of the Federalist
party who they now viewed as, at best,
out of touch with
their needs, or worse, self-serving and
corrupt members of
an oppressive elite regime.
Nor did many of the "higher
class," as Lowell called them, care about
being "regaled"
at "Corporation dinners."

The "power of the party" was

highly vulnerable in the 1822 mayoral elections
and could
do little but damage the political ambitions of
politicians
like Quincy.

Indeed, Webster had won his seat in Congress

not because of the central committee's support, but
despite
of it.

As Webster understood, his victory had depended on

playing the peace-maker among warring local partisan
factions

— to

present himself as

a

narrowness of partisan sguabbles.

candidate above the
In other words,

himself to Middling Interest principles.

adapting

By redefining the

issues from local to national, Webster discovered a viable

vehicle to ascend to Congress, even running under the
Federalist party name.

Portrayed as the nonpartisan

defender of the region's survival, the Boston electorate
overlooked Webster's affiliation with central committeemen
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like Otis, Sullivan and Perkins.
luxury.

Otis would not have this

B y 1823 as Otis would learn,

had become

a

being a Federalist

political liability.

After 1822 the Federalist party existed
only in name
and in the stubborn imaginations of
the upper-echelon
members of the Federalist hierarchy who
were late in

perceiving what had happened to them and
their party.
realization that the times and rules had changed,

The

and that

their proud party, in the end, had been
undercut by its own
rank-and-file membership's alliance with the
Middling

Interestmen and the Republicans was
first, refused to go down.

medicine that, at

a

The final death-blow to the

Massachusetts Federalist party was hastened, ironically,
by
the party's leadership's own insecurity and stupidity.
Scrambling to salvage the Otis campaign, the

Federalist Central Committee botched

a

covert attempt to

undercut the opposition late into the race,

with this,

most loyal Massachusetts Federalist abandoned the party out
of disgust.

In the spring 1823, Boston's Middling Interest

leadership made significant headway spreading the insurgent

message to other parts of the state.

Provoked by the

Federalist's nomination of Otis, insurgent committees began

popping up in communities outside of Boston to stop the
central committee's candidate.

Such state-wide, Middling

Interest organization was exactly what Lowell and other

well-connected Federalists had feared.
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The central

committee aggressively responded
to the challenge by
undercutting any emerging statewide
third party
organization.
From Worcester, an Otis operative
reported
to the central committee in
Boston that »[s]pies have been
[successfully] placed in several of
[the Middling Interest]
committee's so that almost everything
they have undertaken
has failed in consequence of the
information they have
given to our veteran leaders." Unfortunately
for the
central committee, this letter had fallen
from its

operative's pocket and been retrieved by

a

Middling

Interestman in Worcester who immediately sent
it to the
editors of the Bostonian and MP,rha n j C s Journal 53
.

The public disclosure of the letter in the Bostonian

horrified the city.

,

"We perceive in th[is] electioneering

campaign [of the central committee] the last mad struggle
of Aristocracy," explained one infuriated Boston
insurgent.

"They [the Federalist leadership] call upon us in the most

pathetic manner to vote for their cand darp-- their arty.
p
How long is it since they tried to lull us to sleep by
i

singing to us 'their is no party '--this is the 'era of good
f eelings

cease?"

•

.

.

.

.

When will the mad ambition of these men

Then articulating the ultimate goal of the central

committee, the editorialist condemned the anti-republican

political perspective of the Federalist party.
striving to perpetuate in

a

"They are

few families their connections

and dependents all the 'high places."'
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After the 1823

gubernatorial race me n like Lowell
were forced to absorb
new political realities. No
longer would the "people"
follow the "FEW." By 1823,
Federalist elite of

Massachusetts lost any regaining
political legitimacy still
associated with it. 54
Otis suffered a devastating loss
to Republican William
Eustis.
For the first time in the party's
history, it lost
the Federalist strongholds of
Hampshire and Essex counties.
Boston was no better, with the
hackneyed Federalist
machine at its breaking point, Otis
achieved what he could
not the year before and carried Boston.
But even in this
traditional Federalist stronghold, the once
well oiled
party machinery clogged with age and rust
within the fresh
and fertile democratic troposphere of the new
urban

realities of Boston.
votes.

Otis won Boston by a meager 108

out of a total of 5,564 active voters in Boston,

Eustis gained 2,728 votes to Otis's 2,836, indicating
that
the Republicans captured all the Middling Interest
and

Republican votes, and, perhaps now not so surprisingly,
good number of rank-and-file Federalists.

a

Equally

significant, close to two-thousand more people participated
in the 1823 gubernatorial race than had in the mayoral race

of 1822.

According to Samuel Eliot Morison, an Otis

descendent, "[w]ith the defeat of Otis, the Federal [ist]

party lost its last state." 55

288

Although Morison laments his
ancestor's defeat
Middling Interestman in the

^mian

an.

a

M^nlsaJournil

heralded the Republican victory,
claiming it for himself
and his party: "Certain great men
of the city, have
asserted, that there is no such thing
in existence among us
as a Middling Tnter^t. This may
be very true, when
affirmed of those wretched countries
where nothing meets
the eye but Palaces and the Mud-Cottages.
But that this

assertion is not true of Massachusetts,
a thousand
arguments might be adduced to prove; and

the best argument

of all is the success of EUSTIS. Had
the people been

blindly devoted to party, Mr. Otis would have
been elected,
for the Aristocrats had previously carried
a

majority

But Mr. Otis was no sooner proposed than the

people excersized their Reason instead of their Leader's.
They saw their interest and that of the Aristocracy

,

led

different ways. Otis recommended by his subserviency to his
Party, but the people preferred a man subservient to their

own Interest

.

And they chose plain sense in a good cause

in preference to splendid talents in a bad one ." 56

,

Calling

himself "A friend to Political Equality," another Bostonian

proclaimed Otis's defeat

a

triumph for the Middling

Interest, but explained the battle would not be fully won

until the "Aristocrats" were driven from the City Council.
"The ranks of Aristocracy are broken, and with one effort
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more," "a friend" predicted, "we
shall destroy that
dictatorial power which has so long
bound us to service." 57
Ironically, the mayoral candidate
that the majority of
the Middling Interest supported
would turn out to
be one of

Boston's most dictatorial mayors of
all time.
Nevertheless, Josiah Quincy would govern
Boston in a
different way than Boston's past leadership.
He would not
bind the people "to service," but instead
display a respect
for the electorate's power.
Unlike the dominant political
order before the Middling Interest movement,
deference,
under the Quincy administration, would be
earned and not
expected.
The course of the city no longer could simply
be

determined by a select number elites with mutual interests
in a unilateral manner.

Instead, municipal policy would

have to meet with the approval of a highly critical
and

politically empowered electorate.

Also, despite the future

mayor's autocratic approach to municipal governance,
insurgent, rank-and-file Bostonians would demand an

independent leadership that curried favor to no one

particular set of interests, least of all those set forth
by the central committee.

Instead, Quincy would court the

collective interests of the majority in Boston. 58
The Phillips administration had been a disaster.

Absent of any executive leadership or direction, the city
was left to the bidding of Boston's independent municipal

boards and a City Council determined to gut the people of
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their democratic rights.

in one year, the majority of

Bostonians had gone from extolling
the chartering and the
Phillips mayoralty as a clear triumph
for the "many" over
the "FEW," to condemning the
administration as a corrupt
agency ruled by the "FEW. " By the
mayoral election
of

1823, the Phillips betrayal seemed as sinister
as any of

the Federalist Central Committee's past
actions.
Indeed,
the duplicity of the ward voting affair
struck many

insurgents as extraordinarily, familiar.

As one Middling

Interestman put it, the Federalist Central
Committee,
»[t]hat aristocratic band[,] has been abolished,
but

a

more

oppressive, more horrible, and more odious one...
has arisen
to fill its place." 59
the city's second mayoral

m

contest, Boston's insurgents would purge this new "more

horrible.

.

.and odious" band, and place their confidence

once again in Josiah Quincy.
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CHAPTER VIII
THE POWER OF LOCALISM:

POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION AND THE
"PERSONALITY" OF POLITICS
"'ICHABOD, the Glory is Departed.'"
—Joseph T. Buckingham, 1823.
"We have lost that lay priesthood
who were once the
e
m delS ° f
Uving and » h °-.- ^rect red]
?he st^e "
Josiah Quincy, Jr., 1888.
'

—

The success of the Middling Interest
coalition during
the gubernatorial race of 1823 shook the
Federalist party
to the core.
As Joseph T. Buckingham explained, "the

federalist party of Boston, signed its death-warrant"
by

choosing Harrison Gray Otis as its candidate.

"Boston

federalism," Buckingham revealed, might as well now
"'hang
out its banners on the outerwalls,
and inscribe thereon,
«

ICHABOD, the Glory is Departed.'"

1

Daniel Webster agreed.

He had predicted the ruin of Otis would seal the fate of

Massachusetts Federalism.

Writing to Joseph Story after

the election, Webster criticized the "miserable, dirty

squabble of local politics," that surrounded the

gubernatorial race, and confessed that he was "not

disappointed at the result of the election.
he revealed,
I

..

.My 'agony,'"

"was over before the election took place,

for

never doubted the result. Indeed," Webster admitted, "I

could have enjoyed the triumph of neither party." 2
Despite Buckingham and Webster's foresight,

Federalism 's crushing defeat to the Republican party in the

1823 gubernatorial race baffled
most of the city's pundits.
Hardly anyone in the Bay State
anticipated the degree of

damage Massachusetts Federalism
incurred in 1823.
Even
Buckingham described the election's
outcome "as unexpected
as it was mortifying to the
federalist party." "That [Otis]
should fall so far behind his adversary
in the political
race could never have been believed
till the fact
had been

proven.

3

Scrambling to make sense. out of what had
happened,
most of the Boston press attributed the
upset to what

the

Republican, Boston Patriot identified as "sir
Harry" Otis'
past "treason" at the Hartford Convention.
The Republicanleaning Boston Statesmen agreed, but posited
that Otis's

Unitarianism, a sect "devoted to the propagation of
a

particular creed, and.

..

exerted an undue and highly

prejudicial influence [which] depress other ... denominations
of Christians," also played significantly in his

overwhelming defeat.

4

Although both explanations may shed

light on why some Massachusetts voters turned on Otis,

neither the Patriot nor the Statesmen took into account the
turmoil Middling Interest insurgents generated within the
ranks and organization of the Federalist party.
Less a matter of past Federalist indiscretions at the

Hartford Convention, and more an overwhelming rejection of
the "self created [Federalist] central committee of THREE
[Otis,

Sullivan and Perkins]," 14,909 new Massachusetts
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voters turned out in the 1823
gubernatorial race to subdue
the "Aristocracy
the "Cabal "-the
»
,

»ZM.

In Boston,

increased voter turn out parallelled
the general upsurge in
the state.
1,864 new voters went to the polls in
Boston,
the vast majority of which, the Boston^n

^ N-tnnjr-

jQUrn ^

claim ed, had voted Republican because
there was no
third party candidate.
Clearly, such wide-scale Middling
interest and Republican voter participation
in Boston and
throughout the state could not be simply
attributed to
1

5

Otis's role in the Hartford Convention.

As Buckingham

explained just days after the election, »[w]e
take no
notice of the slang about... the Hartford
Convention" as
sufficient reason for Otis's loss.

Dismissing such

suggestions as mere "electioneering tricks" which had
had
"very little effect," Buckingham advised his readers
to
look elsewhere to discover the genuine reasons why

Federalism had been thoroughly thrashed throughout the
state.

6

Buckingham credited Federalism' s decline to the vital
role a new generation of voters played in the election.

According to the Galaxy

,

young voters flocked to the

Republican candidate because Federalism' s leadership had
barred them from any participation within the party.

"We

apprehend," Buckingham explained "that [the young adopted
the Republican candidate because of] the course of

favoritism and exclusion which has been pursued by the
301

federalists."

The "great political questions
effect!ng
[the] state" had little to
do with Harrison Gray otis's
defeat at the hands of this new
generation of voters,

Buckingham argued.

Instead, they had chosen the
Republican

party over the Federalist because
the central committee had
contemptuously spurned them. "[WJhat
prospect is there for
the gratification of [the youthful
and ambitious
voter] by

uniting with the federalist party of
Massachusetts?"
Buckingham queried.
"Not the slightest. When has it been
known, within the last ten years, that
any young
man,

whatever may have been his intellectual talents.

.

.has

attained to distinction in the federal ranks?
The leading
men in the federal party cling to the honours
and offices
in the gift of party with an affection
stronger than
death.

.

Wealth and parentag p,

(we speak particularly in

reference to the Boston federalists,) are the universal
and
exclusive passports to office and distinction [and are
issued by] our old superannuated nabobs and their special
favourites.

7

After its editors mulled over the dramatic political

realignment in the state, the Republican, Boston Patriot
eventually reached the same conclusion, confirming that a
new generation of young voters "who have attained manhood

since the termination of the late war [of 1812]" had

rejected the Federalist party en mass.

Such young men, the

Patriot posited, dismissed Federalism as archaic and had
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"ranged themselves beneath the
banner of democracy [the
Republicans]." indeed, William M.
Penniman's newly
established, Middling interest leaning
catered
to exactly this new bloc of Boston
voters and had squarely
endorsed the Republican ticket in 1823
over that of the
"aristocracy." To these young voter's
Harrison Gray Otis
seemed a haughty, old Federalist
silk-stocking— hardly
someone who would address their growing
economic

Y^n^l^

insecurities.

Before the election, the Federalist press

inadvertently reinforced this perception of Otis
by
devoting most of its copy defending the Federalist

chieftain's involvement in the Hartford Convention.

Also,

it heralded the Senator's congressional
efforts in getting

the federal government to reimburse Massachusetts
for costs

incurred by state militias which had defended the coastline

during the War of 1812.

For the first-time voter with only

vague memories of the War of 1812, these concerns seemed

anachronistic and insignificant when compared to the more

pressing issues the depression was generating in the state
by 1823

8
.

Even staunch Federalist editorialist, "Anti-

Gracchus," bitterly conceded in the pages of the Columbian
Centinel that his party had politically miscalculated and
that race had come down to
not much more.

a

question of "personalty" and

9

Fundamentally agreeing with "Anti-Gracchus s" point,
•

the Middling Interest organ, the Bostonian and Mechanics
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Journal, claimed that the Republican
victory indicated the
fruition of the insurgency's hard
organizational work, the
immediacy of the insurgent message,
and ultimately

evidenced the firm establishment of
the Middling Interest
party in the city of Boston.
"it is asserted," the
Boston ifl n reported after Otis carried
Boston by a scanty
108 votes, "that the results of the late
election in this
City has converted at least one thousand
of the late
predominant party. The ranks of the Middling
Interest are
filling up with unexampled rapidity, it
is scarcely

possible to find a man who claims any affinity
with the
crest fallen aristocracy. Yesterday all was
party with
them, today they belong to no party." 10
The political culture of Boston had changed
enough to
sustain political alternatives to Federalism, with
no

substantial disagreements on national issues being

presented to define and distinguish the Federalist party
from northern Republicans, local grievances relating to

Boston's economy and management, generational differences,

political personalities and partisan style became the

predominating factors in determining who Bostonians would
vote for governor.

Local gripes and resentments were

voiced through oppositional politics and took priority over
traditional partisan voting behavior.

Provincial, single

issue, and highly volatile insurgent cells emerged out of

past political complacency and partisan uniformity.
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For ordinary people, economic
depression precipitated
mounting popular resentment toward
those who seemed
untouched and proved uncaring; the
politics
of

"personality

or,

perhaps, more accurately, the

"personality" of politics, came to
redefine political
culture in Boston. Underlying and
defining the
"personality" of politics, rested deep-seeded
bitterness
predicated on obvious class distinctions
between elites and
everyone else. As Buckingham explained,
"[t]he honour and
emoluments of office are fair objects for
competition
amoung ail classes and professions, and
its is right and
proper that it should be so." 11 The artisanal
class and
petty merchants united with their employees with
enough

property to vote, consolidating against the common
enemy.
Not excluded from the coalition was the voting
independent
laboring class of truckman, stevedores, draymen, and
peddlers, all of whom rallied against the undemocratic

character of the city's traditional, elite elders.
Although somewhat concerned by, what he called, the
"distracted state of our politics at this unhappy period,"

Josiah Quincy enjoyed his independent status as
judge and political pundit.

a

municipal

His apostasy from the

Federalist Central Committee made him one of Boston's most

popular characters.

At the Federalist caucus that

nominated Otis for governor in spring 1823, the Bostonian
reported that Quincy delivered "one of the merriest and
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most humorous speeches we have
ever heard in the cradle of
liberty." Quincy "harangue [d] »
the caucus's choice for
governor.
Exploiting the popular image of Otis
as a
condescending and rich aristocrat,
Quincy sardonically
claimed that inflicting the gentle
Senator's constitution
to the harsh rigors of the
governorship would be unfair to
the aristocrat's natural disposition.
Declaring »a diamond
necklace should not be converted into
a drag-chain,
or an

Arabian courser turned into a dray-horse,"
neither should
Otis be forced to toil the bureaucratic
rigors and drudgery
required in serving as the governor. Humorously
reminding
the audience of "the failure of Mr. Otis
in his struggle"
for the mayoralty in 1822, Quincy argued
that with Otis as
the Federalist nominee, the Republicans would
easily win

the election.

He then shocked his audience by denouncing

the Federalist party leadership.

Boston i an

,

According to the

"Judge [Quincy] concluded by hoping that the

Federalists [at the caucus] would [choose] Mr. Otis and

thereby give the Democrats [Republicans]" the governor's
mansion.

Although some Federalists listened to Quincy'

speech with outrage, the "harangue" was conveyed in such a

amusing manner that the Bostonian concluded "[t]he learned
Judge, was, as usual, inveterately popular " when he left

the hall.

12

Clearly, this was Quincy 's intent.

Ever since becoming a municipal judge, Quincy had

consolidated power around himself
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— often

testing the limits

of his judicial authority
to reach this aim.
The activism
of the Quincy court was widely
covered by the insurgent
press.
Hardly loosing himself "among the
whores and
rogues ," as Harrison Gray Otis had
predicted, during his
tenure as a judge, Quincy remained
prominently in the

public spotlight.

Never having given up hope of becoming

mayor, Quincy -s decisions on the court,
though often

criticized by lawyers as dictatorial, were
skillfully
designed to lay the ground work for his

future campaign. 13

His brutal attack on Otis at the Federalist
caucus proved a
timely maneuver in a well laid strategy to
receive

frustrated Federalists, Republicans and Middling
Interest
support.
In mid-December 1822, and after dropping
out of

Boston's first mayoral contest, Judge Quincy ruled
on a
highly visible case that assured him the continued
support
of Buckingham.

His opinion outraged conservative lawyers

throughout the state while it delighted the anti-lawyer
sensibilities of many Republicans and Middling Interestmen.
In the fall of 1822, the Galaxy published a number of

scathing articles that arguably slandered roving, itinerant

Methodist preacher, John Newland Maffitt.

Maffitt was

a

highly popular evangelical whose flair attracted
overflowing audiences who often climbed through church
windows to hear his sermons.

In a series of articles,

Buckingham presented the famous preacher as a con man and
lecher whose wanton behavior was "unbecoming
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a

gentleman

a

and a christian."

Maffitt,

it seemed, had a strong

propensity for strong liquor and underage
women, and the
galaxy had said so. 14
After the Galaxy's exposes on Maffitt,
the Methodist
preacher sued Buckingham for libel. The
case ended up in
Quincy's court. Maffitfs lawyer presented
Galaxy articles
that clearly tarnished the minister's
character and argued
that the case, therefore, was clear cut.
Quincy responded
by boldly redefining the libel law.
He would allow

Buckingham and his lawyer to prove the truth of the

Galaxy's articles.

if they withstood scrutiny, then,

Quincy charged, they were not libellous and Buckingham

would be acquitted.

Quincy claimed that freedom of the

press was at stake and that, under the Massachusetts
Constitution, the liberty of the press transcended an

individual's right to privacy.

On the other hand, Quincy

decreed that if Buckingham had fabricated the Galaxy 's
stories, then they were written with malicious intent only
to slander Maffitt, and, therefore, Buckingham should be

found guilty of libel.

This interpretation of the

Massachusetts Constitution was highly unorthodox.

15

According to Quincy 's son, his father "argued that the

common-law doctrine, that the truth could not be admitted
in evidence under an indictment for libel,

— or,

as usually

put that 'the greater the truth, the greater the libel,'
was overruled by the express provision of the Constitution
308

of the state, which made a
specific reservation for its
citizens of the liberty of the press,

-a

unknown... to the common law,

liberty

-and declared that

all parts

of that law repugnant to that
liberty are not to be

considered law under the Constitution."

After two days of

hearings filled with witnesses and
affidavits, Quincy ruled
that Buckingham had written the truth
and,

innocent.

therefore, was

"This was the first time," Edmund Quincy

explained, "that such a ruling had been made
in the case of
an ordinary indictment for a libel on a
private individual,
and it excited much discussion and no little
censure at the

time." 16

Having acquitted Joseph

T.

Buckingham using such

an intrepid and radical interpretation of the
law, Quincy

insured the galaxy's and its editor's loyal support
in the
future

Quincy fully understood that maintaining Buckingham's
support was even more essential to his 1823 campaign than
it had been just a year earlier.

Just as the Middling

Interest fissured over the Webster/Putnam congressional
contest, the insurgency would split over Quincy, and the

patient mayoral hopeful knew it.

Much had changed in the

past year and the Middling Interest's Bostonian and

Mechanics Journal refused to endorse Quincy for mayor.
Instead, it went with the Republican candidate George Blake

and for good reason.

17
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After Otis's dismal showing in
the gubernatorial
contest, the central committee
turned on its renowned

chieftain in a desperate attempt to
revitalize the party in
Boston.
To achieve this the central committee
focused on
winning the mayor's office. The dilemma
for Federalist
operative William Sullivan was how to
appeal to Middling
Interestmen on local issues. Running a
partisan Federalist
within such a hostile political environment
would clearly
result in defeat. The committee had to find
a unique
candidate who the electorate trusted. Remarkably
and

despite Harrison Gray Otis's ardent objections,
the

committee decided to approach Josiah Quincy to run
on the
Federalist ticket. As Eliza Quincy explained,

Massachusetts "had become democratic [Republican], and Mr.
Sullivan and other Federalists came and requested Mr.

Quincy to consent to stand for Mayor as the last hope of
[the Federalist] party,''

''as

his popularity with the people

gave [the Federalists] their only chance."

To have, of all

people Quincy «s arch-nemesis, William Sullivan, come, hatin-hand, and beg him to save the Federalist party, must

have seemed to Quincy a just reward for the party's past

betrayals of him.

Also, Quincy was clearly not a

Republican and the insurgency's recent shift toward that
party made it difficult for him not to accept Sullivan's
offer.

However, Quincy remained highly skeptical of

Sullivan's proposition.

Hesitantly, Quincy accepted the
310

nomination, but on his own terms.

He stipulated that all

members of the central committee
would take a back seat in
the election.
Like Webster, Quincy understood
that the
strong presence of central committee
members in his

campaign would severely undermine his
chances of victory.
Instead, Quincy 's campaign would be run
by two of his most
loyal Middling Interest supporters,
insurgents Francis
Way land and Heman Lincoln.

Instead of doing the bidding of

the central committee, Quincy turned the
tables and the
committee lay utterly beholden to him as its
party's last

salvation.

The combative insurgents who the Bostonian

spoke for viewed Quincy 's embrace of Federalism
with great
suspicion and refused to overlook it, siding with the

Republican candidate. 18
Thoroughly embittered by the Federalist choice,

Harrison Gray Otis and his partisans were appalled and
deeply offended by the committee's nomination of Quincy.
How could the committee endorse the same apostate who had
so seriously betrayed the party just one year earlier and

had publicly disgraced the honor of Boston Federalism 's

most distinguished standard bearer

weeks earlier?

Gray Otis just

For Otis and his partisans the central

committee's action proved
bare.

— Harrison

a

betrayal too burdensome to

To them, all seemed in chaos and they bolted from

the party.

Upon Quincy 's nomination, Otis broke from the

central committee and launched
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a

campaign to destroy the

Federalist candidate even if it
meant a Republican sitting
in the mayor's office.
The politics of "personality.,
had
caused an irreparable fissure
within the Federalist
leadership.

Facing an internal reactionary
rebellion
within the ranks of its leadership,
the already beleaguered
and besieged Federalist party could
not withstand the
pressure.
Ironically, those who led the
insurrection had
been the party's most orthodox leader
and its most loyal
partisans. Just as the Federalist nominee
for mayor
splintered the insurgent coalition, Quincy's
nomination
cracked open the once impenetrable fortress
of Boston

Federalism— the central committee. 19
Otis supporters began zealously searching for
a
specific issue to discredit and destroy Quincy.

m

Maffitt

vs. Buckingham, they found their dirt and
unsparingly

exploited Quincy's unorthodox ruling to lead an assault
upon his intelligence, legal skill, and character.

Before

the election a pamphlet rumored to have been written
by

Harrison Gray Otis, circulated around Boston.

The author,

who identified himself only as, "A Member of the Suffolk
Bar," disingenuously claimed to have been a "busom friend
[to Quincy], his

'council's consistory' in all bright and

all dark periods of our nation's history for the last

twenty-five years."

But after the judge's ruling in the

Maffitt case, "A Member" explained, that for the good of
the Commonwealth, he was now forced to betray his
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friendship and expose Quincy as
dangerous to the sanctity
of the Commonwealth's law.
charging Quincy with stupidity
and "aggravating] evil" while
serving on the bench,
"A

Member" reprimanded the Maffitt
decision as "evidence of
[only] a superficial acquaintance
with the law." According
to "A Member," Quincy was so
driven by petty personal

ambition that he overlooked that
fact that his ruling was
thoroughly "inadequate" and "illegal."
"Determined to
override... the supreme court," and make
a

name for himself,

"A Member" charged that Quincy had
not only botched the

decision, but had broken the law.

The invective portrayed

the municipal judge as a ambitious
amateur— a dangerous
incompetent.
Due the timing of the pamphlet -s release,
the
clear intent of Otis partisans was to
discredit Quincy 's
mayoral campaign by attacking his character.
if it could
be shown that Quincy had proven corrupt and
inept— an utter
failure as a lowly municipal judge— certainly Boston's

electorate would not vote him into higher office. 20

Otis

partisans wagered that in the wake of Middling Interest
charges that the Phillips administration was corrupt and
incompetent, such indictments against Quincy would be

seriously considered by Boston's insurgent voters.
The Federalist press took a neutral stance over the

controversy.

In a quandary over which faction to follow,

Federalism 's organs decided not reprint or report the
reproach as Otis partisans presumably wanted.
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Realizing

that "A Member's" charges
were as much an indictment
of h
as Quincy, Joseph T.
Buckingham rushed to his candidates
defense.
The Galaxy addressed each of
"a Member's" points,
squarely dismissing them as either
illogical and/or
1

III

selfishly motivated by petty
personal partisanship.
Buckingham urged Bostonians to
disregard the pamphlet as
simply an ujigejitiejjianiy attack
of an anonymous
writer... destitute of
goojUaaimfira. .and quite derogatory
to the character and official duty
of Judge Q««
.

who had

served the court admirably.

Harrison Gray Otis was accused

of authoring the assault out of
petty personal vengeance
and the dispute immediately became
politicized.
Catapulted

from the realm of judicature into the
broader sphere of
Boston's personality politics, the Maffitt
decision helped
define the mayoral campaign of 1823.
m his own pamphlet
which enjoyed a reprinting in the Galaxy, "A
Citizen-

explained that the

leg.il

controversy was driven by personal

partisanship and nothing else.

Squarely identifying

Harrison Gray Otis as the first pamphlet's author, "A
Citizen" revealed that "[w]hen the rancorous zeal of party
shall have subsided, when the vindictive violence of

personal enmity shall be spent, and when the voice of the
false,
will

insidious friend [Otis] shall be silent,

his title to applause be admitted."

[only]

then

Realizinq their

ploy had back-fired, Otis operatives vigorously denied that
their leader authored the denunciation of Quincy's decision
HI

in the Maffitt case, but
few in Boston believed them.

Although the anti-Quincy invective
was, in fact, written by
the old Federalist chief tains impulsive son, Harrison
Gray
Otis was held accountable. The
impact of the pamphlet wars
only added to Quincy's popularity
among wavering insurgents
and rank-and-file Federalists
who were appalled by the
unscrupulous and hostile nature of the
Otis pamphlet,
although Boston cynicism toward such
methods of politicking
had risen to such a level that few
21
were
surprised.

Quincy's past record as

a

vocal Boston citizen and

jurist also reinforced the sense in
Boston that he was
driven not by personal or elitist interests,
but by an

incorruptible love of Boston.

Though the provision

(section 30) within the city charter endowing
the General
Court power to unilaterally alter local Boston
law and its

municipal structure had not been

a

burning issue during the

city's first mayoral contest, after the Phillips

administration's attempt to repeal ward voting using
section 30, middling Bostonians fear of the provision

magnified in 1823.

Bostonians had learned from the

Phillips administration to dread the potential power
section

30

gave to the General Court over their lives.

At

any time and for what ever reason, the General Court could

usurp the autonomy of the Boston citizenry.
By the 1823 mayoral race, anxiety over section 30

proved one of the few remaining cohesive chords that bound
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-stents

^^W^™
together.

Although the

^

and the

represented the two opposing
wings of
the insurgency and could
agree on little, both
printed
scathing attacks of section
30 before the election.

Identifying section 30 as an
undemocratic strategy
implemented by the General Court
to impose its mastery
over
the city, some Middling
Interest pundits went
so far as to

recommend that whole charter be
revoked and replaced by the
old town meeting system.
Quincy had advocated this since
1821 and his spokesmen were sure to
remind Boston's

electorate of their candidate's
stand.
William Emmons evoked the "intelligent

Insurgent leader,

decisions

of... Quincy," when he railed
against the charter in an
crowded Faneuil Hall. indeed, as
Joseph

Buckingham

explained, Quincy had consistently
fought the charter
because "he saw. .mischief in the
section which gives the
legislature unrestrained power over the
charter." As
mayor, Buckingham posited, Quincy "will
be still on the
watch to see that we are not 'made the
foot-ball
.

of a

foolish legislature.'" 22

Between Quincy's 1822 and 1823 mayoral campaigns,
he

appealed to insurgent sensibilities on other matters
as
well by using his position as a municipal judge to address

pressing local concerns.

As a judge, Quincy had shown

sympathy towards the truckmen's grievances.

The case of

the Commonwealth v. Solomon M. Levengston is representative
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of

Quincys dis p osition toward
this group

of independent

petty .erchants.

Levengston was arrested and
charged with
hawking his products directly
to the public and
shopkeeper
below retail and established
wholesale

rates-seething he

^y

did not have a citv licence
license +•«
to do.
Also, because of the
city's new truckman law
passed by the Phillips

administration, Levengston had
broken the local ordinance
by selling his products
23
openly
from his cart.

Levengston-

attorney and Republican partisan,
Andrew
Dunlap, argued that, in his
client's case, the local
s

ordinance was unconstitutional
because it restricted an
individual's right to earn a respectable
living and gave an
unfair advantage to well established
retail merchants

within the city.

if » [a] man has a right to
earn an honest

livelihood by trade in his shop, fixed
to

a

certain spot,"

why,

Dunlap asked, should his client "not
have this same
right" even if his shop is his cart?
Claiming that the
licensing law did not apply to his client
because

Levengston 's "case was not at all analogous
to the
restrictions upon innholders and retailers of

liquor; for

those restrictions are imposed and required
from

a

regard

to public morals; but no such grounds existed
for the

support of th[e] law" that Levengston was charged with
breaking.

All his client had done was sell products to

individuals and shops below competing retailer's and
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wholesaler's prices.

Certainly, there could be
no har m
with that, Dunlap maintained. 24

Summing up his plea, Dunlap
placed the case squarely
within the political storm
that had circled Boston
for the
past four years. The law
Levengston was charged with
breaking "gives an exclusive
advantage to one class of
citizens, and imposes a partial
burden then upon another;
and, therefore, is
unconstitutional." Judge Quincy
agreed,
"CT]he law," according to Quincy. s
ruling, "was certainly
of a dubious character" and
Levengston was acquitted. As
the
explained, because the Levengston
case "was the
first case, which had arisen upon
the law since its
enactment," Quincy 's charge authenticated
him as a friend
to the truckmen and petty merchant. 25
On the eve of Boston's second mayoral
contest, the
Federalist party was racked with factionalism.
Joseph
Buckingham had been precisely right when he,
in retrospect,
pronounced that "the federalist party of Boston
[died],

when it voted for

a

city charter."

Indeed,

in the end,

local municipal issues first introduced and
then stubbornly

pressed and doggedly pursued by the insurgent coalition
facilitated internal party feuding within the Federalist
Central Committee.

Tormented by the abolition of

deferential voting behavior, surrounded by growing numbers
of voters with louder voices demanding a political

leadership devoid of "aristocratic" pretention, exposed as
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"political zeal ot s and party
inquisitors," and besieged
by
the democratic principals
of
"measures, not men; the

People, not the Cabal; the
Many not the Few," the
Federalist party leadership
fractured into hostile camps.
Under such extreme and mounting
pressure, Boston's "lay
priesthood," as Otis, Sullivan
and Perkins came to be
described, splinted into two
opposing sects that devoured
each other. 26

On the eve of the city's second
mayoral contest,
Boston's electorate no longer could
rely on any semblance
of a cohesive party system to
direct its voting behavior.
The mayoral election of 1822 had
been complicated enough
with four candidates and three
parties anxiously vying for
votes.
that election voters were asked to
choose
between, Federalism's Otis, the Middling
Interest's Quincy,

m

Republicanism's George Blake, and the mysterious
forth
candidate, Thomas L. Winthrop, snarling the
process.

Despite the clutter, each of the local parties
in 1822
forged and articulated divergent agendas that
represented

substantial differences in popular opinion.

On the

surface, 182 3 seemed much less complicated with only
the

Republican and Federalist candidates making a bid.
However, underneath what seemed to be a return to a simpler

two party competition lay only the broken hulls of past

party structures and organizations.
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Flailing about with no
particular direction or command
structure, and after a battle
that bankrupted them both,
the Federalist party and
the Middling Interest

coalitionalist insurgency discovered
in 1823 that their
fractured organizations no longer
represented any
meaningful programs for the future.
Federalism descended
into the petty politics of
personalities resulting
in its

ruin as Webster had predicted.

The Middling Interest's

hatred of the "FEW" had been
successfully exploited by the
Republicans to force a schism within
insurgent ranks that
resulted in the syphoning-of f enough
numbers so that the
Middling Interest had no chance to further
develop a viable
party structure in the city, let alone
the state.
Although
Republican accomplishment within the traditional
Federalist
stronghold of Boston seemed impressive, it was
not enough
to insure Republican dominance in the city.
So where would
the majority of Boston's voters turn in 1823?

Acting as both a Federalist and

a

Middling

Interestman, Josiah Quincy invited them to come to him
and,
on election day, the majority of Boston's electorate

answered his call.

A new coalition formed, this time

around the character of one of Boston's leading citizens.
With the Galaxy's loyal support and the hard work of
Francis Wayland and Heman Lincoln,

a

broad-based Quincy-

coalition narrowly defeated the Republican candidate,
George Blake by 32 5 votes.

Quincy had snatched victory
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fro, the hands of the
Republicans who had been
waiting
breathlessly for the demise of
Federalism.
the
municipal elections for the
city's Aldermen and Common
Council, Boston spoke even
more forcefully.
All eight of
the Phillips administration's
bipartisan aldermen were
forced out of office. Of the
forty-eight who served on the
Common Council only eighteen
survived the election.
Significantly, William Sullivan who
represented Ward 6
during the Phillips administration
as a city councilman,
watched in horror as his ward
turned Republican.

m

m

1823,

it had gone with William
Eustis in the gubernatorial race

and Blake in the mayoral contest.

Adding insult to injury,

in the municipal elections of
1823, Republican William

Wright challenged Sullivan and won. 27
Voter turnout in the 1823 mayoral race
dramatically
surpassed that of 1822, with 1,061 new
voters going to the
polls for a total of 4,764. Although voter
participation
in the mayoral race fell short of the
number involved in
the 1823 gubernatorial race by 881, this
proved
to be in

Quincy's advantage.

According to Joseph Buckingham, this

number of nonactive voters disproportionatly represented
"the particular friends of Mr. Otis [who] absented

themselves from the polls," rather than casting their votes
for the apostate Quincy or the "Jacobin," George Blake.

Although Quincy easily won the traditionally Federalist
eighth and ninth wards (gaining 63% of the vote in the
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eighth, and 65% in the
ninth), he had not carried
the, by
the overwhelming margins
Otis had earned just weeks
before
in the gubernatorial race
(Otis carried the eighth
with 65
of the vote, and, the
ninth by 72%).
those wards
combined, Quincy lost nine
percentage points, which
presumably represented disgruntled
Otis partisans who
stayed away from the polls.
But what Quincy had lost in
the eighth and ninth, he
gained by carrying the twelfth
ward-a ward Otis had lost. where
Otis held six of

m

Boston's twelve wards, three of
which he had retained by
very slim margins (Ward 10, by
48 votes; Ward 11 by 38
votes; and Ward 4 by only 15 votes),
Quincy had gained
seven and won them with significantly
higher numbers (Ward
10 by 84 votes; Ward 11 by 98 votes; Ward
4 by
votes;
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and he won Ward 12 by 72 solid votes).

On the whole,

in

the Republican-leaning wards that both
Quincy and Otis
lost, Quincy lost by less; and in wards
both had
won,

Quincy had won by more (see Figures 8.1 and
8.2).
Throughout the city, Quincy captured 2 3 percentage
more than Otis (see Figure

8. 3).

points

28

Quincy 's margin of victory was more than triple that
of Otis's

(in Boston,

Otis won by a margin of 108 votes to

Quincy 's 325), yet the new mayor's success over Blake
remained ambiguous and certainly did not indicate
mandate.

a

He had gambled that the Middling Interest

coalition would unite around him despite his acceptance of
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Figure 8.1 1 823 Gubernatorial R, C e: H. a. otis v w,
Results by ward, % votes won, # of votes won by
EuslLls.
Source:
Abel Bowen, Plan of Boston (1824 map) reprinted
in
Snow, History of Bosto n
1-2.
Columbian Conti^y April 9
1823 and April 16, 1823, A£S_.
,
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Figure 8.2 1823 Mayoral Racp
J. Oui.ncy v. ft. Blake
Results by ward, % votes won by, # of voters won by.
Source:
Abel Bowen, Plan of Boston (1824 map) in Snow
History of Boston 1-2. Columbian Centi n P
April 9 and
April 16, 1823, AAS
;

.

1

,

r

.
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Figure 8.3 Comparison, in %. between Otis and Quincy in
Mayoral and Guvernatorial Elections, by wards.
1823
Source:
Abel Bowen, Plan of Boston (1824 map) in Snow
History Of Boston 1-2.
Columbian Centinel April 9 and
April 16, 1823, AAS
:

,

r

.
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the Federalist party's
endorsement.

Tn is had not happened,

in a bizarre and hurried
coalition formed from past
bitter

enemies, distrustful Middling
Interestmen and vengeful Otis
partisans sided with the Republicans
in an unsuccessful

attempt to rout Quincy.

Although for entirely different

reasons, each group, by 1823,
viewed Quincy as an apostate.
After his acceptance to run on
the Federalist ticket and
led by the Etonian
Mprh^ni^^j augnaly a mi norit of
y
rank-and-file insurgents refused to
deem Quincy a Middling
Interest leader as they had in 1822.
Supporting

^

Blake,

this Middling Interest-Republican
bloc of voters demanded
that Boston's next mayor be from the
middling classes.
Articulating this bloc's position the
BjasJtojiian

stated,

"the Mayor of London is a brewer, and the
Mayor of

Philadelphia is a hatter," why could not the
next mayor of
Boston be from the middling sort? 29
Having impulsively bolted from Federalism, Otis

partisans also turned to the Republican party solely
to
deny Quincy political ascendancy. As Buckingham
reported
in the galaxy

,

"Mr. Quincy was selected at the federal

caucus, as the candidate for mayor; but instead of

receiving the unanimous support [from] the federal part[y],
the particular friends of Mr. Otis.
the democratic candidate!"

.

.gave their votes for

Severely criticizing Otis's

followers, Buckingham charged them with "imprudent
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stubbornness," having "sacrif
ice[d]
"

Pr i vate and p ^i-fr^ p ai vi OMg

-

"patriotism" for

i.ao

Although the opposition held
significant strength, the
Quincy forces persevered with
a similar coalition as
the
one he and Phillips forged
in 1822.
Though the Phillips
administration's policies had
alienated some Middling
interestmen to such an extent
that they refused to follow
the nominee of their leadership,
thereby forcing them into
a Republican party that
greeted them with open arms,
the

majority followed Quincy as they
had done the year before.
Due to his past battles with
the
central committee,

Quincy's recent affiliation with the
Federalist party in
1823 could hardly be taken too seriously
by knowledgeable
Bostonians.
Stressing this point, the Middling Interest's
most
prominent leaders continued to vigorously
work for him.

Although Buckingham, Wayland and Lincoln could
no longer
deliver Quincy one unified insurgent bloc as

they had done

in 1822, they did hold the majority.

Their candidate's

unconstrained and independent positions on various
municipal policies provided them with weighty material
to

work with.

Quincy had forged his own sovereign course that

withstood the electorate's cynicism and disorientation
towards Boston's chaotic political environment.

Quincy

wisely had not precisely categorized himself as a
"Federalist" or

a

"Republican," or even as a "Middling
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interestman...

instead, he ran as an
incorruptible

outsider-an individual who had
taken the nonpartisan
ideology

f irst

expressed by Middling Interest
and lived up
to it.
When certain cells within the
insurgency allowed
themselves to be coopted by the
Republican party, they
betrayed the Middling Interest's
founding principles of
remaining nonpartisan-beyond the
pettiness of party
interests.
Quincy. s actions, it seemed to
many Bostonians,
were unsullied by local partisan
warfare that had destroyed
or seriously damaged all three
parties in Boston.
indeed, after the election, Francis
Wayland came to
Quincy to congratulate him on his victory
and offer some
advice to the mayor-elect. According to
Eliza Quincy,

Wayland advised the Quincy "not to lose his
popularity,
which gave him such... power to be useful.— But
Mr. Quincy
only laughed," Eliza recalled, "and told him
popularity was
the last thing he should think of, he should
do whatever he
considered his duty,

&

soon as they pleased." 31

the people might turn him out as

After the baffling and often

vengeful provincial politics that had dominated Boston for
the past five years, these sentiments were exactly what

many jaded Bostonians longed for in

a

leader.

As mayor, Quincy carved out a place to accommodate the

truckmen.

His proposal for enlarging Faneuil Hall market

place would serve their interests, while also, as Quincy
later explained, help to "reduce the prices of provisions,
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for the poorer classes."

This, coupled with his
ruling in

the Levengston case, further
indicated that Quincy
understood the profound impact the
city ordinance
restricting truckmen had had not
only on the truckmen, but
also on Boston's extra-legal,
urban economy that so many
depended on. When the truckmen
ordinance was first
proposed the Middling Interest demanded
that the city at
least "provide them [the truckmen]
a suitable place for
them to stand." The call in 1822
was ignored; it would not
be under the Quincy administration,
within his first year
as Boston's mayor, under a pall of
criticism from

established land owners, Quincy single-handedly
expanded
the market place two-fold. Truckmen were
given a central
location to sell their wares. These small-time
peddlers
and the shady urban economy within which
they worked were
given a new sense of legitimacy and respectability
under
the Quincy administration. What became to be
known as
"Quincy »s Market" proved such

a

success for truckmen and

minor retailers that the new mayor never lost their
support.

32

On other burning issues that had helped to incite

political insurgency in Boston, Mayor Quincy quickly proved
his administration to be malleable to insurgent demands.

During his six year reign as chief executive of the city,
Quincy refused to touch the ward voting provision that the

Middling Interest had fought so hard for, establishing that
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elective system in Boston for
future decades.
Although
Quincy had held misgivings about
the repeal of the ten-foot
fire law, once mayor he did not
try to revoke it.
Instead,
Quincy professionalized Boston
-s fire department to
deal
with the perpetual threat of
fires in Boston's congested
environment.
Before Quincy -s administration,
sixteen squadrons of
highly competitive volunteer
fire-fighter companies
contended with each other to gain the
honor of putting
fires out around the city.
Competition between these
companies was fierce and proved extremely
inefficient.
On
occasion, two competing companies would
meet each other,
both rushing to a fire only to engage in
street fights
rather than lose out to the other. Customary
etiquette
dictated that the use of water hoses to fight
fires was
dishonorable.
Instead, bucket brigades were used under the

volunteer fireman's belief "nearer the fire the
higher the
honor." Naturally, under such a system, fires often
were
allowed to spread out of control as contending firemen

fraternities waged war blocks away or when "honor" and
small pails of water could do little to extinguish a raging
inferno.

33

According to Quincy, the existence of wooden buildings
higher than ten feet within the city proved largely
inconsequential to the problem of fires within urbanized
Boston.

The real problem as Quincy saw it rested with the
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city's antiquated fire-fighting
system.
During nis third
administration, Quincy consolidated
Boston's volunteers,
Placing them under his authority.
He appointed a chief'
engineer to replace the city's
Firewards.
Coordination of
Boston's volunteer fire fighters
would no longer be
haphazard.
instead the chief engineer would
have direct
control over both the professional
and volunteer fir,e
fighters.
At first, Quincy faced stiff
criticism f or
_
abolishing the fraternal orders of
volunteer
firemen' s

autonomy, yet after the city hired
some twelve hundred
firemen on either a part-time or
full-time basis, censure
of the mayor's action quieted.
Also, the modernization of
fighting fires significantly reduced the
ravages of fires
in Boston.
With twenty engines, a professional
"hook and
ladder company, eight hundred buckets, seven
thousand feet
of hose,

and twenty-five hose carriages," Boston's
semi-

professional fire fighters proved much more effective
in
stopping outbreaks and protecting lives and property.'
1

Quincy 's reform in fire prevention represented the
fierce activism of his administrations.

Not only had he

squarely addressed the problem of fires within the city

without imposing "oppressive" municipal building codes that
threatened middling, entrepreneurial interests like those
of the past, but he had also confronted the city's high

unemployment rate by establishing

a

municipal department

that offered Boston's lower sort wage-earning municipal
$3]

jobs.

Needless to say, dispensing
uunicipal patronage on
such a wide-scale did not
hurt Quincy. s annual
re-election
bids.
In 1822, Quincy had lost
the mayoralty by a hair.

m

1823, his election proved tough,
but he won with a slim
margin. After he was well
seated in mayor's office, Quincy

would run five more times and
as his first four elections
show, his appeal among the
electorate grew.

For four years

he dominated Boston politics.

m

1824 and 1825, Quincy 's

popularity proved so overwhelming that
he ran uncontested.
In 1826 and 1827, the Republicans
mounted two separate

candidates, but Quincy handily routed
both of them with
ease.
He consistently and successfully
presented himself
as a disinterested municipal leader
whose main objective

was not personal ambition, but the material
progress of
Boston and its citizens. 35
One crucial element to Quincy 's success rested
in his
ability to wrestle municipal services away from the

independent boards that had so bogged down the Phillips
administration.

By seizing their municipal functions and

placing their authority squarely in the mayor's office,
Quincy incrementally consolidated power around himself.

Contesting the power of Boston's independent municipal
boards was

a

bold move, yet Quincy 's various coup d'etats

during his administrations should not have surprised
anyone.

In large measure,

insurgents who supported
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Quincys election had voiced
their disillusionment with
the
Phillips administration's
timid acquiescence to
Boston
various boards by voting for
the outspoken judge.
when
Quincy insinuated the abolition
of all autonomous municipal
boards in his first inaugural
address, he set into motion
a
Plan that would establish him
as Boston's most powerful
'

mayor of the nineteenth-century.
"In every exigency," Quincy
claimed to, "endeavor to
imbibe and to exhibit, in purpose
and act, the spirit of
the charter." Placing his
administration in stark contrast
to the unassertive Phillips
mayoralty, the new mayor
assumed broad executive powers that
were only implied in
the city charter.
Quincy pronounced that the "spirit of
the charter" accorded him the right
to enforce the "laws of
the city," evaluate all "subordinate
officers,"

"prosecute.

.

.and punish" "all negligence,

carelessness,... and violations of duty."

The independent

municipal boards, Quincy asserted were "great
defect [s]"
that existed only to shelter one another from

any "blame"

for problems within the city. "The remedy
attempted by the

charter," Quincy declared, "is to provide for the

fulfillment of all these duties [executed by the
independent boards], by specifically investing the chief

officer of the city with the necessary powers... for their
efficient exercise."

Then mapping out his specific

jurisdiction, Quincy stated all of Boston's "public
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institutions, its edifices,
hospitals, almshouses, jails,
should be made the subject
of frequent inspection"
by the
mayor.
it would be his duty to
insure that all "errors
corrected, » and all "abuses
exposed." 36

Quincy then tempered his speech
by appealing to the
nonpartisan sentiments of Boston
insurgents.
"of local,

section, party, or personal
divisions,

[the mayor]

should

know nothing, except for the
purpose of healing wounds they
inflict; softening the animosities
they engender; and

exciting, by his example and
influence, bands, hostile to
one another in every other respect,
to march one way, when
the interests of the city are in
danger." 37 After this
call for unity, Quincy got down to
the business
of

dismantling Boston's entrenched independent
municipal
boards
The first to be purged was the Surveyors
of the
Highways.

appoint

a

One of Quincy 's initial actions as mayor
was to

Superintendent of the Streets whose authority

superseded that of the Surveyors.

The Superintendent

marshalled gangs of laborers that set to work nightly
to
clean and repair the streets of Boston. Though this
directly infringed on the Surveyor's jurisdiction, the
Superintendent and his crews assumed responsibility over
Boston's streets and did the job much more effectively than
the Surveyor's methods.

Having proven the efficiency and

superiority of this new system, and just two weeks after
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his inaugural address,
Quincy called a general meeting
of
the people of Boston to
vote on a referendum to
abolish the
board and place responsibility
for the maintenance
of the

streets under the authority
of the Mayor and city
aldermen.
Quincy 's referendum passed,
and on June 11, i 82 3 the
legislature approved the measure.
Quincy had gained
control of Boston's streets.
Next to be purged was the
powerful Overseers of the Poor-a
board Quincy particularly
disliked. 38
Ever since Quincy had proposed
the House of Industry
to better house imprisoned debtors
in South Boston, the
Overseers had challenged the idea, yet
the House of
Industry was not completed until 1823,
so conflict had been
avoided during the Phillips administration.
By Quincy
's

ascension to the mayoralty, construction
of the House of
Industry was completed and the new mayor
demanded that the
Overseers empty the Leverett street jail of
its debtor
inmates so they could be transferred to South
Boston.

The

Overseers refused to follow the Mayor's executive
orders on
the ground that they were popularly elected by the
people
and,

therefore, did not have to follow the Mayor's order.

Deadlock between the Overseers and the Mayor's office set
in and both sides refused to back down.

39

In 1824, Quincy initiated a plan to break the

stalemate.

Suspecting the Overseers of corruption, Quincy

ordered city accountants to audit the board's finances.
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When the Overseers refused
to allow Quincy. s
officers to
examine its books, the Mayor
publicly charged the board
with corruption and called
for a city-wide referendum
that
proposed altering the city
charter to grant the mayor
unequivocal supremacy over the
Overseers, when
the

referendum failed, Quincy took
matters in to his own hands.
He defied the Overseers by
selling the Leverett street
jail.
With that, the Overseers found
themselves in the
awkward position of having no
choice but to move inmates to
South Boston's House of Industry.
Although the Overseers
of the Poor remained a state
sanctioned municipal
board,

Mayor Quincy had undercut all its
authority, significantly
increasing the power of the executive. 40
Quincy ravaged the Board of Health in
a similar
fashion as he had the Surveyors of the
Highway.

First,

Quincy assumed all responsibility for
the health of the
city.
Under Quincy 's directions, the city bought
a fleet
of carts and horses, and hired a squad
of laborers
to

remove any potential health hazards within the
city.

Justifying his actions, Quincy explained that,
"[i]f the
powers vested seem too great, let it be remembered
that

they are necessary to attain the great objects of the

city,— health, comfort, and safety."

Then presenting his

reasons for taking over the Board of Health's

responsibilities in insurgency rhetoric, Quincy argued that
"[t]o those whose fortunes are restricted, these powers
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ought to be peculiarly
precious.
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Having

successfully justified to Bostonians
his cooptation of the
board's responsibilities and proven
the efficiency
of his

own system,

in 1823, Quincy abolished the
Board of Health

and placed all its responsibilities
upon the shoulders of
the city marshal, his appointee. 41
By 1824, Quincy had successfully
abolished or

dismantled the power of three out of the
five municipal
boards that had ensnared the Phillips
administration. When
Quincy went after the Board of Firewards
it would take an
devastating urban disaster to wrestle control
away from

this powerful and popular municipal board.

in 1825,

an

enormous fire burned out of control, spreading down
State
and Broad streets.
The voluntary fraternal firemen's
orders, mentioned above, proved totally ineffective in

fighting a blaze of such magnitude.

When the fire finally

burned itself out, fifty stores were lost and, when the
smoke cleared the city of Boston discovered that $1,000,000

worth of damage had been incurred.

Although Quincy had

tried earlier to abolish the old fire fighting system, his

attempts had failed.

After the inferno of 1825, in
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a

hotly

debated city-wide referendum,
Quincy. s proposal for the
abolishment of the Board of
Firewards and the creation

of a

new, modernized fire
department passed/ 2

As mentioned earlier, with
the adoption of a

professionalized fire department
that held both volunteers
and fire fighting specialists,
Quincy further consolidated
his political power through
his use of municipal patronage.
Unimpeded by any structured party
organizations to answer
to, Quincy single-handedly
dictated an active urban policy
between 1823 to 1828-one totally
divorced of partisan
concerns.
These years were marked by a political
vacuum
that Quincy filled with municipal
activism.
Bostonians

may

have questioned the wisdom of their
mayor's actions, but
they never accused him of being
influenced or driven by
partisanship.
By 1823, Quincy had established himself
as a leader

who transcended trivial party ism and
partisanship, and
proposed to lead his constituents on an independent
course
for the good and advancement of all voting
Bostonians.
Clearly, the "Great Mayor," as Quincy would later
be
called, prescribed municipal policy based upon his own

assumptions and prejudices.

At least one student of the

Quincy mayoralty has described it as
that was a gross overstatement. 43

"dictatorship," but

a

Instead, Quincy was

centralizing his authority to promote

a

more modern

political system required by the emergence of large urban
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centers.

Yet

,

by 1823 and partially
due to his past

political activism in the
Middling Interest, Boston's
voters had matured into an
independent and self-confident
electorate that shed its past
deferential
behavior.

Because Boston's traditional
party organizations lay in
chaos, each year Bostonians
evaluated their mayor from
an
independent view point, judging
his worthiness by his

actions-not his class, pedigree or
even his party.
Reflecting back on Boston's complex
political culture
when the Federalist elite's
hegemony in the state was
firmly in control, Josiah Quincy
III, the mayor's second
son, wrote in 1888 that "men
of the stamp of Sullivan and
his friend Otis were more conspicuous
for what they w^rs
than for what they did. They were
predominant men, and gave
the community its quality, shaping,
as if by divine right,
its social and political issues ....
[W e have lost that lay
]

priesthood who were once the accepted models
of high
living, and whose qualifications to direct
the State were

eminent and undisputed

.

Although the younger Quincy

does not offer an opinion as to when such
"divine"

authority came under dispute, by 1823 Boston's "lay
priesthood" found its authority politically vanquished
and

culturally overwhelmed by the political will of an unruly
congregation which neither liked its imposing political
style, nor its elitist culture.

To sustain itself, the

Federalist elite would have to do something that it could
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not-change with the democratic
current.
authority simply be bestowed
to
"they aexe.." Indeed, it was

a

No longer would

leaders because of who

^

who Harrison Gray Otis

that largely destroyed his
gubernatorial campaign of 1823,
taking with him the Federalist
party of Massachusetts.
Tipping Boston's past political
culture on its head, the
electorate mandated that leadership
and authority
be

granted to individuals based upon
"what they did," opposed
to who "they tterj,." Josiah
Quincy understood this as h s
activist reign as Boston's mayor
.

indicates.

Middling class values of hard work,
independence,
productivity, and accomplishment displaced
inherited
wealth, leisure, and pedigree in
setting the criteria for
community authority and leadership.
This is not to
say

that many elites would not still be
elected mayor of
Boston.
But it was because they were politically
capable
and resourceful men, who understood their
authority rested
in an discriminating electorate that
demanded satisfaction,

Indeed,

it was not because of their social position,

despite of it.

but

These new values, heralded the working

electorate, would give the community its guality, not
the

"divine right" of a self-ordained "lay priesthood."

Harrison Gray Otis and leading Federalists had remained
blind to the dramatic shift in popular attitudes toward
them.

Their ignorance and tenacious dependency on the

cultural politics of the past, more than any other factor,
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marked their defeat.

Politicians coming fro, the
state's
economic elite class would
now have to pay respectful
attention to the voice of a
new generation which held
very
different values from their
fathers.

According to Buckingham, the
principal responsibility
for Federalisms demise in the Bay state rested
in the

hands of the "great body of
intelligent young men in
Massachusetts... who are now coming
forward in life, [and]
do not feel all the excitements,
that govern the conduct of
their fathers." Because "the
course of
the federalists

leadership]... is not calculated to
perpetuate its
existence, by extending the hand of
patronage and
friendship [to this powerful new electorate]
.. .without
distinction of person and family...; and
so long as

[Federalism is] reserved only for the rich,
or the sons of
the rich, as a sort of [archaic] hereditary
possession,"

Buckingham explained, "it is not very strange
that the
power of a party, guilty of such impolitic
conduct should
be on the wane

.

" 45

Since his involvement in local politics, Josiah
Quincy

proved sensitive to emerging middling class political
sensibilities.
a

As an ambitious local politician rising to

position of great power within the chaotic and highly

cynical urban political culture of Boston in the 1820s,

Quincy realized his past partisanship to the Federalist
party had to be abandoned.

Quincy had, for many years
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before 1823, set an independent
course for himself.
In the
process, he had helped spark
a democratic fire among
a
growing urban population that
felt neglected and ostracized
from the corridors of power.
Quincy had embraced these
concerns and answered them
effectively.
Whether
Quincy-

appeals to Boston's lower-to-middling
electorate
were driven simply by ambitious
pragmatism or a sincere
respect for ordinary Bostonians is
not important.
the
end, what makes the story of
Josiah Quincy significant
s

m

is

the effective relationship he forged
between himself and
the Boston electorate.
By helping to build a temporary
third party in Boston that tore down
the Federalist party's
viability, Quincy and his allies helped
transform the
political culture of Boston. He helped alter
the rules of
the game. Although Boston politics for
years to come would
remain dominated by Brahmin elites, they could
no longer
employ the political style of the old Federalist
elite

leadership.

Assumed guardianship no longer was

automatically conferred on an economic and cultural elite
without suspicion.

In Boston, this dramatically altered

party structures and strategy.

Indeed,

for a time in the

1820s it destroyed them.
As Joseph T. Buckingham illustrates,

commonwealth and city politics are in

a

"[o]ur

state

of ... confusion. Every tenth man are the leaders of a

party;

— the

blind leading the blind. Republicans and
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Federalists, Jacksonmen,
Adamsmen, Linclonmen,
adminstrationmen, f reebridgemen,
antif reebridgemen,
antitariffmen, and woolen crusaders,
are all are thrown
together into the political pot.
The fire burns and the
caldron bubbles; and many are
the weird sisters that are
practicing their incantations over
the ingredients. Whether
any thing will rise from this
solemn sorcery, except

s^m,

we profess not to foresee."

For Buckingham, Josiah

Quincy's strong leadership of Boston
transcended this
political "state of ... confusion. "
The influential editor
praised Quincy's brawny and clear
sighted command of
the

city as not only refreshing, but
imperative to the
stability of the city. 46
By 1827, others in the city viewed
Quincy's

dictatorial-like style differently and, inevitably,
the
mayor's activism eventually would be challenged.
Quincy
had operated as mayor without the support of
any formal
party organization or structure backing him up.
For most
of his duration as the city's chief executive,
this had

provided the mayor with significant latitude to operate
freely

— unentangled

by partisan interests.

Yet,

after

winning the 1827 election, new forces emerged to dismantle
his administration which may have been stopped if Quincy

had been less independent and established a party-based,

partisan machine.
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When Quincy took on the
last remaining independent
municipal board-the Boston
School Committee in
1827,

hostile forces smelled
vulnerability and jumped,
converging
to destroy "the Great
Mayor." Having placed himself
as its

chairman, Quincy had used
highly tenuous executive
powers
to strong-arm the committee
into abolishing Boston's
only
public high school for girls.
Quincy. s actions were an
effort to stem popular rumblings
that accused the mayor of
spending to freely. The mayor
was met by criticism from
both sides of the political
spectrum.
The once Federalist,

^mhi^L^n^lj^l,
Republics

as well as the Republican,

Jeffer.nn^

and the Boston Patriot, denounced
the mayor for
overextending his executive powers on
the school board.
Quincy 's various pet projects and
municipal reforms had
proven expensive. Broadsides appeared
in Boston attacking
Quincy for being "overbearing and imperious." 47
,

Although old Middling Interest spokesman,
William
Sturgis tried to rally the mayor's traditional
partisan
base, Francis Wayland had left the city
to takeover the

presidency of Brown University, and Sturgis 's efforts
were
in vain.

Despite Buckingham's support, with Wayland 's

departure from Boston, Quincy had lost

According to Quincy-supporter

,

a

vital spokesman.

George Shattuck, the people

of Boston finally "have made the astonishing discovery
that

[Quincy] is not perfect."

During the mayoral election of

1828, Quincy faced a myriad of groups that opposed him.
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After three inconclusive
balloting where his fragmented
opposition ran a number of
candidates to deny him the
majority, Quincy withdrew his
name as a candidate, opening
up the field for another
to become Boston's third
mayor.
One week after he had publicly
declared he would refuse to
stand as a candidate, Quincys old nemesis, Harrison
Gray
Otis, ironically, ran unopposed,
quietly slipping into the
mayor's office to serve three
uneventful years as mayor."
Eliza Quincy only hinted at the
forces that brought down
her father's long reign as mayor.
According to
Eliza,

Quincy "was defeated by
&

a

political managements.-

combination of private interests
Surprisingly, otis's inaugural

speech sheds light on who was behind
Quincy 's defeat.
Otis's inaugural speech first reprimanded
the activism
of the Quincy administration.
Harkening back to the more
"judicious" Phillips administration, Otis
promised the
people of Boston that his would be a passive
administration, unlike his predecessor.

The new mayor

promised »[t]o reconcile by gentle reform, not to
revolt by
startling innovation," as Quincy had done. Claiming
the

city had incurred an outstanding debt of over half

a

million dollars during the Quincy years, Otis declared

a

reversal of the past mayor's "radical reformation" of
Boston and promised his overriding policy would be based on
"strict economy.
debt."

.. [f]

or the gradual extinguishment of this

Reassuring his audience, Otis pledged to balance
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the city budget and follow
John Phillips's example
by
allowing the city to run a
natural course without his
interference. 50

Secondly, Otis explained that
he understood his
successful ascension to the mayor's
office was largely the
result of support he had garnered
from past political
enemies who remained highly
skeptical of the man they had
just voted into office.
This portion of the electorate
had
not voted so much for Otis, as
they had against Quincy.
Realizing his tenuous position, Otis
understood his

appointment from the people was highly
provisional.
stepped out of line, he would be
banished

if he

and the old

Federalist chieftain knew it.

As his speech indicates, the

once dominant political figure of Harrison
Gray Otis, by
1828, was hobbled.
"it is quite apparent to all our Fellow
Citizens that the honour of the chair which
I now occupy is
not the fruit of any party struggle," Otis
explained. "With
the friends of former days, whose constancy
can never
be

forgotten, others have been pleased to unite (and
to honour

me with their suffrages,) who hold in high
disapprobation

the part

I

formerly took in political affairs. Their

support of me on this occasion is no symptom of a change of
their sentiment in that particular," Otis confessed, but
did confirm only their frustration with Quincy'

dictatorial activism.
Otis,

"that

I

"I... admit," concluded a humbled

am not indifferent to the desire of removing
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doubts and giving satisfaction
to the minds of any who
by a
magnanimous pledge of kind feelings
towards me, have a
claim upon me for every candid
explanation and assurance in
my power to afford." Finally,
stating that he hoped "our
beloved city prove an exception"
to the partisan
"antipathies" and the "torch of discord
[that] blazes while
the fire of patriotism expires"
under the suffocating

weight of partisan warfare, Otis
called for peace in
Boston. 51
In an editorial on the recent
events in Boston,

Buckingham chastised the selection of
Otis as mayor.
Providing insight to those Quincy
supporters who remained
shocked by Boston's dismissal of its
second mayor,
Buckingham explained the problem.
"The old republican
party is divided, and all are acquainted
with the inspired
maxim A Kingdom divided against
comp.l-h tn

jMsU

'

n o^f^

The old federal party is declared to be defunct,
and its
odor remaineth only as an offence to a few individuals,

who

have survived its dissolution. If it be indeed so,
we

derive some consolation from the hope that, phoenix-like,

a

new party may arise from its ashes, possessing the wisdom,
the magnanimity, the prudence, the disinterestedness, the

patriotism, which rendered the original an object of

admiration and respect while in its vigor of manhood; but

without any of the weakness, meanness, or infidelity to
friends and benefactors, that disgraced its decline."
347

Then

in a thinly veiled attack
on Harrison Gray Otis'
s "phoenixlike" reemergence in
politics, Buckingham scolded

Boston

for resurrecting what he
believed to be the worst
that
Federalism ever had to offer.
" The dotage
of the Sage and
the imbecility of the Giant
may excite compassion; the

affected humility of an aristocrat
in fetters, like the
morality of a superannuated
libertine, produces only
disgust."- Certainly, Josiah
Quincy would have agreed.
The year Quincy stepped down
from office in 1828,
Buckingham stepped into the political
fray running
successfully as a National Republican
for the Massachusetts
General Court.
From that position which he held
for
three

terms, Buckingham continued to be
an advocate for emerging

urban entrepreneurs like himself.

His hatred of an

economic "aristocracy" that confined the
ambitions and
possibilities of an ascendent middling class,

by 1828, had

been vanquished.

Buckingham, thus, turned to a new enemy-

foreign manufacturers who could undercut and
destroy

emerging American industrial inventiveness,
production and
acquisition. 53
Harkening back to the founding principles of the

Middling Interest, but having expanded them into

a

much

more sophisticated, national political doctrine, Buckingham

pursued the interests of an acquisitive, urban middling
class by demanding protective federal policies.

"We cannot

so libel the intelligence, sagacity, and god sense of the
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middling class, -which
includes seven eighths of
the whole
population, -as to give currency
to a supposition that
they
are ready to abandon the
manufacturers of woolens and
cottons... the hatters, the
tailors, the shoemakers,
the

cabinet-makers, and those who
are employed in almost every
trade which furnishes articles
necessary for comfort,

convenience and luxury, to the
mercy of Manchester and
Birmingham agent." Speaking to
the insecurities of his
class, Buckingham called for
a rational, regulated
economy.
He embraced and defended the
social transformation the
market economy inspired during the
Jacksonian era. 54
In the 1830s,

Buckingham followed Daniel Webster in

spurning the Workingman's party and
adopting the Whig
agenda.
Rejecting any leveling impulses, Buckingham
clearly saw great virtue in a form of
capitalism tempered
by government regulation that insured
an individual's rise
to wealth and security would be based
on hard
work,

ambition, and productive creativity, and
nothing else.

For

Buckingham, these ideas spawned from his past
political

activism and experiences in Boston during the early1820s.
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In sum, Middling Interest spokesmen who cut their

teeth in the stormy, depression politics of Boston between
1818 through 1824 provide insight into the painful

political, economic and social transformation that American

society went through during between the first and second
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party systems.

The stories of elites like
Harrison Gray
Otis and Josiah Quincy cannot
be fully understood without
viewing them in stark contrast
to the stories of Joseph
T.
Buckingham and the middling class
he represented.
Neither
can those who represent an emerging,
politically potent,

lower-to-middle class be fully imagined
without some
conception of their profound relationship
with established
political and economic elites. Each
informed and often
challenged the other's conception of
democracy.
The season
of social and political disruption
and insecurity that
this

study investigates, set not only the
landscape for the
formation of an established second party
system, but also
exposes the changing values that urbanization
and urban

political warfare provoked in the body politic.
Most everything changed in Boston between 1800
and
1828.

it had gone from a provincial town predicated
on an

organic notion of community to

a

Manufacturing interests took over
maritime trade.

burgeoning, teeming city.
a

past economy based on

The urban transformation proved the death

knell of a dominant political party and signaled the rise
and fall of an incendiary third party that deeply

influenced the formation of the National Republicans and
Whigs in Boston.

These years marked the decline of an

elitist based conception of cultural politics and the

emergence of perhaps the strongest mayoralty of the
nineteenth-century.

The most important development can be
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found i„ the activism Qf
a ngw generat on
Qf yoters
political energy was matched
only by the intensity
of
Boston's urban transformation.
These Bostonians shoo*
the
established political culture
and forced a change
.

in

political style.

These activists challenged
the
assumptions of their parents.
Understanding that their
future hopes and dreams-their
very security-would depend
upon a new economy, they
challenged the political status
quo to insure their place
within the market revolution.
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